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I. INTRODUCTION TO NATO EXPANSION 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other 
European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to 
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. 
Any state so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its 
instrument of accession with the Government of the United Staies of 
America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each 
of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession. 
Article 10, North Atlantic Treaty 
The collapse of the "Soviet Empire" in 1989-1991 has left a gap between Russia and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This gap is filled with the states of 
Central Europe, the new nations of Ukraine and Belarus, and the Baltic states. These states 
see themselves poised between two possible futures, one consisting of democratic freedom 
and economic prosperity and the other involving risks of Russian dominance, 
authoritarianism, and economic stagnation, if not chaos. The Baltic states have experienced 
both independence and annexation by the Soviet Union and, therefore, are especially 
cognizant of their delicate position. The three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
are attempting to ally themselves with the West and are seeking NATO membership for 
various reasons--above all, to protect themselves from future Russian expansionism. 
An invitation to join NATO can only come from the unanimous decision of the 
existing members of the alliance. It is therefore important to study how the sixteen 
sovereign states of the alliance debate the various aspects of expansion and reach a decision 
acceptable to all the members. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the study of the 
decision-making process within NATO. Many factors will influence decisions on whether 
to expand NATO, and whether the Baltic states should be included in an expanded alliance. 
This thesis critically examines the proposition that American and Russian views are the most 
critical factors in this decision. The nature of this subject would tend to gravitate towards a 
generic analysis of the NATO expansion debate and the decision-making process. 
However, this thesis attempts to study the case of the three Baltic states and their position 
within the NATO expansion debate. The issue ofNATO expansion and the politics behind 
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the decision-making process are at times dealt with in a general sense. When appropriate, 
the specific subject of the Baltic states is examined and analyzed. 
Organizationally, this thesis is divided into four segments or blocks of research and 
one of analysis. These segments correspond to the five chapters ofthe thesis. Chapter I 
discusses the past and present of NATO expansion. The five previous enlargements of 
NATO and their circumstances are described, as are NATO's current plans and policies 
regarding expansion. Chapter II introduces the specific case of the Baltic states and 
discusses their relationship with NATO. The recent history and current situation, the 
actions taken by the Baltic states to gain inclusion in the alliance, and their problems in 
meeting NATO requirements are examined. Chapter ill describes the critical role in NATO 
decision-making played by the United States, and assesses the probable significance of the 
other NATO allies in decision-making with respect to enlargement. The chapter examines 
both the general views on expansion found within the American body politic and the specific 
views held by American leaders. Chapter IV investigates the special role played by Russia 
in the NATO expansion decision-making process. The specific issues concerning expansion 
and their implications for Russia, along with the internal political dynamics that influence 
the positions of Russian leaders on expansion, are examined. Chapter V analyses the critical 
factors in the decision to expand NATO. This final chapter focuses on the position of the 
Baltic states and the role of the United States and Russia in the NATO decision-making 
process. It concludes by examining some possible outcomes and the implications of these 
outcomes on NATO, Russia, and the Baltic states. 
A. PREVIOUS ENLARGEMENTS OF NATO 
The North Atlantic Treaty was originally signed on 4 April1949 in Washington, 
D.C., by twelve states. Since that time, four states have joined NATO, expanding the 
territory covered by the collective defense pact. A fifth enlargement ofNATO territory 
occurred when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was disestablished. Five new 
Lander were then united with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and came under 
NATO protection. These prior expansions of the alliance occurred under specific 
circumstances that are important in understanding their relevance and impact on the current 
expansion debate. 
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The first two expansions occurred at the same time. They were the accession of 
Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty on 18 February 1952. Both states had 
been considered as potential adherents to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, but were never 
invited to the negotiations that resulted in the treaty. A number of reasons account for the 
absence of Greece and Turkey at these negotiations. Many of the Northern European and 
Scandinavian states felt that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey would alter the "Atlantic" 
focus of the alliance and dilute American military aid. There were also questions of whether 
Turkey was even a European state and acceptable as a member of the alliance. Some of the 
future member states further believed that defense requirements in the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea region would overstretch the alliance's limited resources and "extend 
their commitments beyond the field of their actual interest. "1 The British government was 
concerned with the security of Greece and Turkey but was intent on building a 
Mediterranean and Near East defense pact that would be anchored around those two states. 
In the end, the few states that wanted Greece and Turkey to be members of the alliance 
were unwilling to delay the creation of the alliance to fight for their immediate inclusion. 2 
After the birth of the alliance, Greece and Turkey immediately began a campaign for 
membership in NATO. In September of 1950, their requests for membership were rejected 
by the alliance. Two significant events altered the situation and led to the accession of the 
two states into NATO. The first was the Korean War. Both states participated by sending 
combat troops to serve under the United Nations command. In fact, the Turkish brigade 
was the third largest national contingent in the war, after the forces of the United States and 
South Korea. The Greek and Turkish motive for sending troops was "to override 
objections to their entry into NATO. "3 The second event was the reorganization of NATO 
in 1951 as a response to the Korean War. With the establishment in 1951 of the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), which was responsible for planning the 
1 Hamilton Armstrong, "Eisenhower's Right Flank," Foreign Affairs, July 1951, p. 660. 
2 Alexander Rendel,"The Uncertain Months: British Anxieties," in Nicholas Sherwen, ed., 
NATO's Anxious Birth (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 59. 
3 Thanos Veremis, "Greece and NATO: Continuity and Change," in John Chipman, ed., 
NATO's Southern Allies (New York: Routledge, 1988) p. 242. 
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defense of Europe, it became more obvious to the alliance members that Greece and Turkey 
were critical nations on the southern flank ofEurope. The large standing armies of the two 
states, which had a combined total of about twenty-five divisions, were also considered 
important for the defense of Europe from Soviet expansionism.4 With these two events, 
the Korean War and NATO reorganization, the attitudes of the alliance members changed, 
and Greece and Turkey were invited to join the alliance. 
The third expansion was the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the 
North Atlantic Treaty on 5 May 1955. Like Greece and Turkey, West Germany was not 
invited to be an original signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty. At the time Germany was 
still an occupied state ruled by four powers and two competing blocs. The United States 
had already begun to debate the importance of rearming allied-occupied West Germany and 
integrating these forces under NATO command to defend against the Soviets, but the 
European allies--particularly France--were not ready to accept a re-armed Germany so soon 
after the Second World War. The Korean War and subsequent NATO reorganization gave 
even greater importance to establishing and building up the West German armed forces in 
the face of apparent increasing pressure by the Soviet bloc. 
The French, who were the most concerned with a rearmed Germany, understood 
that German rearmament would occur at some point and tried to shape the process in a 
fashion advantageous to French security. In late 1950, the Pleven Plan for a European 
Army was introduced by the French to NATO. This plan, later known as the European 
Defense Community (EDC), would have created a supra-national European army in which 
German troops would be integrated at the battalion level. The plan would also have 
ensured that French and Allied rearmament would be completed before that of West 
Germany. The EDC was debated for a few years with no progress and increasing American 
displeasure. Ironically, it was the French National Assembly that rejected the EDC and put 
an end to the idea of a European Army in NAT0. 5 
4 Lawrence Kaplan, NATO and the United States (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 
p. 47. 
5 William Park, Defending the West (Boulder: Westview Press; 1986), p. 18. 
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After the demise of the EDC in 1954, the FRG still supported rearmament and 
membership in NATO. A new plan, sponsored by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, 
was devised that would rearm West Germany and integrate these national forces at the 
division level under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). The London and 
Paris Agreements provided for West Germany's membership as a fully sovereign nation in 
both the Western European Union (WEU) and NAT0.6 Within a few months, the FRG 
was formally invited to join NATO. 
The fourth expansion of the alliance was the accession of Spain to the North 
Atlantic Treaty on 30 May 1982. Spain, like Greece and Turkey, had been considered for 
inclusion in the original negotiations of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, Spain was not 
invited as a result of Dutch and Scandinavian antipathy towards the authoritarian Franco 
government. Later, in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States resurrected the idea of 
including Spain in NATO, but the idea failed to gain support as a result of the continued 
dictatorship in Spain. 7 Ironically, Portugal, as much a dictatorship under the Salazar regime 
as Spain under Franco, was invited to the original treaty negotiations. Also, Greece and 
Turkey, both of which had had periods of authoritarian government, saw no adverse effects 
on their applications for membership in NATO. It appears that in the calculus of alliance 
building, the antipathy towards the Spanish dictatorship was not overcome by the strategic 
importance of Spain, unlike the cases of Portugal, Greece, and Turkey. By the early 1950s, 
Spain's importance to NATO was lessened by the Spanish-American bilateral agreements 
that allowed for the stationing of American naval and air forces, including nuclear weapons, 
on Spanish territory. 
After the death of Franco and Spain's return to democracy in the late 1970s, allied 
support for Spanish entry into the alliance grew for two main reasons. The first reason was 
the expected Spanish contribution to the alliance's military strength. Though the Spanish 
6 Richard Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), pp. 65-66. 
7 Thomas Carothers, "Spain, NATO and Democracy," World Today, July-August 1981, p. 
298. 
5 
armed forces consisted of only a poorly equipped and trained army and a small, but 
professional, Navy and Air Force, Spain could add strategic depth to the alliance. 
Considering France's refusal for the peacetime use of its territory, the accession of Spain to 
the alliance would greatly expand the amount of territory available for peacetime training 
and basing. In wartime, Spain could act as a strategic redoubt, especially as its national 
forces were better adapted for territorial defense than for external operations. 8 The second, 
and more important reason, was to support and consolidate Spanish democracy. It was 
assumed that joining NATO would give Spain's army, which had a tendency to alter the 
governmental structure through extra-constitutional measures, something to concentrate on 
other than internal politics. Spain requested to join the alliance in June of 1981 and became 
a member in May of 1982, less than a year later. 
The final expansion of the territory covered by NATO resulted from the unification 
of Germany on 3 October 1990. The GDR's Communist government was overturned by 
popular dissent in late 1989 and early 1990. In March of 1990, free elections were held in 
the GDR, and the conservative "Alliance for Germany" won a strong majority. This 
government soon stated that it supported unification with the FRG under the West German 
Basic Law. The heads of state and government of the members of the alliance, in the 
London Declaration of 6 July 1990, gave their support for a united Germany anchored in 
NATO and tied to the West in the European Community. 
After extensive negotiations between the two German states and the four victorious 
powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, an 
agreement, the so-called Two-plus-Four Treaty, was reached that would allow the united 
German state to remain in NATO. The treaty placed restrictions on the use of former GDR 
territory by Germany and NATO. It included a prohibition on the permanent stationing of 
non-German NATO forces, nuclear weapons, and "offensive" German forces (and 
limitations on NATO exercises) in the former East Germany. The treaty also provided for 
the removal of all Soviet troops from the region by 1994 and the reduction of the German 
8 Glenn Snyder, "Spain in NATO: The Reluctant Partner," in Federico Gil and Joseph 
Tulchin, eds., Spain's Entry Into NATO (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), p. 141. 
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armed forces to about 50% less than the combined FRG-GDR level. 9 With the signing of 
this treaty and the official unification on 3 October 1990, the eastern border ofNATO 
shifted a further 200 miles to the east. 
B. NATO'S CURRENT PLANS FOR EXPANSION 
1. The Evolution of the Official NATO Position Since the Cold War 
The official NATO view on the future expansion of the alliance is certain to be a 
moderate and cautious one. As an amalgamation of ideas :from many, sometimes 
antagonistic, political parties and coalitions within sixteen sovereign states, debated by 
senior members of government at :frequent meetings, the final statements to be found in 
official documents are sure to be free of radical or cavalier conclusions. The official 
position has evolved since the opening of the Berlin Wall and German unification from a 
declared desire for dialogue with the former Warsaw Pact enemies to plans for enlargement 
that may soon see the first new NATO member since Spain joined in 1982. 
The first post-Cold War statement was the London Declaration issued by the Heads 
of State and Government at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting on 6 July 1990. In 
this declaration, the heads of state and government proposed a joint declaration with the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization stating that the two organizations were "no longer 
adversaries" and promised "to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state. "10 The former Warsaw Pact governments 
were also invited to establish a diplomatic liaison with NAT0. 11 A key element of this 
document was the call for the expansion and institutionalization of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 12 The line of thinking favored by some 
analysts and politicians was that the CSCE would be used to link the emerging states of 
9 Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War, p. 471-2. 
10 London Declaration, North Atlantic Council, Bureau ofPublic Affairs, Washington DC, 
6 July 1990, para. 6. 
11Jbid., para. 7. 
12 -Ibid., para. 22. 
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Eastern Europe with the NATO countries in a collective security arrangement, separate 
from NATO. Thus, the Cold War was declared over, and the new lines of communication 
were established with former adversaries. 
The next big step down the road to expansion was taken by the Heads of State and 
Government at the NAC meeting on 8 November 1991. They issued the Rome Declaration, 
which provided for the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). 
The NACC was intended "to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and 
cooperation on political and security issues" with the former Warsaw Pact states. The 
Rome Declaration was specifically worded to state that the establishment of the NACC was 
to "contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the CSCE without prejudice to its 
competence and mechanisms. "13 The NAC later pledged to actively support the continued 
development and strengthening of the CSCE. 14 Though the NACC was considered 
necessary to establish better working relations with the Eastern European countries, it was 
still hoped that the CSCE would play the dominant role in East European security and that 
an expansion ofNATO would not be necessary. 
At the next meeting of the Heads of State and Government at the NAC on 11 
January 1994, two major steps towards NATO expansion were taken. In the Brussels 
Declaration, the allies reaffirmed that "the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the 
Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states"15 and initiated 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. By stating that NATO was open for new 
members, the allies answered the question being asked by many Eastern European states. 
The requirements for membership in the declaration were vague enough to give the alliance 
partners time to fully prepare for the possible accession of new members. The PfP, a 
program that would provide for bilateral political and military agreements with any NACC 
13 Rome Declaration, North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Service, Brussels, 8 November 
1991, para. 11. 
14 Ibid., para. 14. 
15 Brussels Declaration, North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Service, Brussels, 11 January 
1994, para. 12. 
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or CSCE member state, was also designed to further postpone decisions on NATO 
expansion. The PfP was a disappointment to some of the Eastern European states, notably 
the Visegrad Four (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic), that had hoped for 
accelerated membership in NATO. But as active PfP participation was made to "play an 
important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion ofNAT0," 16 all the NATO 
hopefuls were quick to sign on. Facilities for permanent representatives at NATO 
Headquarters were also to be made available for NACC and PfP members, ensuring closer 
working relations and cooperation. The declaration once again stated that NATO was 
"deeply committed to further strengthening" the CSCE17 , but by this time it was obvious 
that the CSCE would not be sufficient as the guarantor of security in Eastern Europe. 
Though NATO has declared itself amenable to expansion, relatively little action 
towards this end has been taken since the establishment of the PfP. In a draft report by the 
North Atlantic Assembly's Working Group on NATO Enlargement, Karsten Voigt pointed 
out that expansion "is not an issue which lends itself to easy solutions: on the contrary it is 
complicated and potentially very divisive. "18 He later stated that there should be an early 
enlargement for reasons of enhanced regional stability and moral grounds. "Yet, that early 
enlargement of NATO is unlikely given the PfP compromise and the competing priorities of 
the main actors in this process, is equally clear. "19 The Final Communique from the 
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 30 May 1995 put NATO expansion on 
hold until after the completion of an internal study on the subject. The same document 
restated the position that active participation in the PfP was critical and was "helping to 
prepare those countries which aspire to membership in the Alliance. "20 At the Defense 
161bid., para. 13. 
171bid., para. 10. 
18 Karsten Voigt, "Enlargement of the Alliance: Draft Special Report of the Working 
Group on NATO Enlargement," North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, 2 November 1994, 
para. 5. 
19 Ibid., para. 18. 
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Planning Committee meeting a month later, the need for all new NATO members to be part 
of the integrated military structure to maintain "strong collective defense arrangements"21 
was discussed. The new members would not be allowed to make special arrangements 
concerning their level of participation, such as Spain or France had. 
In September of 1995, the completed Study on NATO Enlargement was released. 
The study was quite specific about the new members' level of participation, because their 
ability and the manner in which they "intend to contribute to the collective defense will be 
important criteria" for accession. There was also a statement that "we should avoid new 
forms of contribution to NATO collective defense which would complicate unnecessarily 
practical cooperation among Allies," which seemed to rule out any nation joining with less 
than full participation. 22 Allies in the integrated military structure hold that there will be no 
more "Frances or Spains" in the alliance. Russian opposition to NATO expansion has been 
taken into consideration in this study. The statement that "NATO's relations with other 
European states, whether cooperation partners or not, are important factors to consider in 
taking any decision to proceed with the enlargement process, "23 seems to imply that 
Russian opposition might play some part in the process. But in a later paragraph, the study 
states that "NATO decisions cannot be subject to any veto or droit de regard by a non-
member state, "24 which clearly precludes a Russian ability to halt the expansion. In an 
obvious concession to Russian fears, the study claims that the re-deployment of Allied 
forces to the territories of new members, besides being costly, would be unnecessary. "The 
regular and frequent presence of Allied forces, on exercise or when other situations 
20 Noordwijk-Ann-Zee Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Service, 
Brussels, 30 May 1995, para. 3. 
21 Defence Planning Committee Final Communique, NATO Press Service, Brussels, 8 June 
1995, para. 9 . 
22 Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO Press Service, Brussels, September 1995, para. 
48. 
23 Ibid., para. 13. 
24 Ibid., para. 27. 
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demand, is another way to demonstrate NATO's commitment to collective defense. "25 The 
study seems to purposely leave the issue of permanently stationing troops in the former 
Warsaw Pact states a little clouded, so as to not directly threaten the Russians with 
increased military pressures on their western borders. 
Though this study is certainly more specific than any previous NATO document on 
the expansion procedure, there is still a certain vagueness about it. In the final chapter, it 
clearly states that the previous accessions have no bearing on the current situation as the 
"general political and security context" has changed.26 Again, the study talks about the 
need to carefully consider the "precise timing, sequence and content of the accession 
process", but does not give any details or timetables.27 As with previous NATO 
documents, the study stresses that all applicants will be judged on their ability to increase 
the security of the alliance and refuses to specify a geographical limit of possible expansion. 
The enlargement study was described as a "valuable foundation for the enlargement 
process"28 in the Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC on 5 December 
1995. In this document, the Allies stated that "the Alliance will continue the steady, 
measured and transparent progress leading to eventual enlargement"29 and that the 
"eventual enlargement" would be delayed until1997 at the earliest. The entire year of 1996 
would be given over to three elements of the expansion process. Firstly, an "intensified, 
individual dialogue" between prospective members and NATO, concerning the enlargement 
study, would be conducted through bilateral consultations. Secondly, the Partnership for 
Peace program would continue to conduct activities that will prepare prospective members 
to assume the various responsibilities that come with NATO membership. Finally, the 
25 Ibid., para. 54. 
26 Ibid., para. 79. 
27 Ibid., para. 81. 
28 Brussels Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Service, 5 December 
1995, para. 7. 
29 Ibid., para. 2. 
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Alliance would conduct a self-study of internal adaptations, specifically resource and 
staffing implications, that would be necessitated by enlargement. The results of these three 
elements are to be assessed at the December I996 meeting of the NAC, and future courses 
of action will then be decided upon. The effect of this statement is to give the appearance 
that NATO enlargement is stalled untili997 or even later. 
2. Official NATO Requirements for Prospective Members 
Prior to any state being invited to join the alliance, certain conditions and criteria 
will need to be fulfilled by that prospective member. These criteria concern both military 
aspects that pertain to the question ofinteroperability with NATO forces and internal 
political developments. When the NAC issued the Brussels Declaration on II January I994 
and reaffirmed that the alliance remained open for new members, they did not list any 
specific conditions for prospective members to conform to prior to accession to the treaty. 
The NAC only stated, as does Article IO of the North Atlantic Treaty, that new members 
would have to be "European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and 
to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. "30 Interestingly, the Brussels 
Declaration did mention a number of times that the "democratic states to our East" were the 
focus of this new emphasis on enlargement, but it failed to state which countries were 
considered democratic or give any definition of a "democratic state." One of the intentions 
of the NATO enlargement study was to give definition to these vague requirements. 
The Study on NATO Enlargement, completed in September of I995, as was 
intended, delineated many of the specific requirements that would have to be fulfilled prior 
to consideration for inclusion in the alliance. These requirements fell into two distinct 
categories; internal political criteria, and military criteria. Of the political development 
required by the study, there were five major aspects that are perceived as critical conditions 
on membership. The first was the need to conform to the basic principles of the North 
Atlantic Treaty; "democracy, individual liberty and the rule oflaw. "31 The second was the 
expectation that new members would not vote down or "close the door" on accession by 
30 Brussels Declaration, II January I994, para. I2. 
3I Study on NATO Enlargement, para. 70. 
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later candidates. The next and possibly most important political requirement was the 
resolution of all "ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or 
internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means. "32 The fourth was the establishment of 
democratic and civilian control of the armed forces and appropriate civil-military relations. 
The final was the commitment to promoting stability through "economic liberty, social 
justice, and environmental responsibility. "33 In addition to these political criteria, there 
were a number of military criteria for the prospective members. 
The military requirements focused on the themes of standardization and 
interoperability with existing NATO forces. These military criteria included the acceptance 
ofNATO policies and doctrine, funding and staffing representatives at NATO HQ, SHAPE, 
SACLANT, and the various NATO staffs and agencies, applying NATO security rules and 
procedures, and exchanging intelligence. Another critical interoperability criteria was 
achieving "a sufficient level of training and equipment to operate effectively with NATO 
forces. "34 The study further specified that "NATO standardization priorities include 
commonality of doctrines and procedures, interoperability of command, control and 
communications and major weapon systems, and interchangeability of ammunition and 
primary combat supplies. "35 These requirements are not surprising considering the 
multinational nature of the NATO integrated military command structure and the alliance 
itself Without strict standards for interoperability, the armed forces of the alliance 
members, when operating under NATO command, would fail to be a credible fighting force. 
There was one major criteria that did not fall into the category of standardization and 
interoperability. The study stated that a key factor in the decision to include a prospective 
member would be their ability to "contribute militarily to collective defence and to the 
321bid., para. 72. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., para. 74. 
35 Ibid., para. 76. 
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Alliance's new missions. "36 This statement is somewhat vague and a minimum or expected 
contribution was never defined in the study. This criteria could be used to accelerate or 
delay the accession of certain states while disregarding the status of the other requirements. 
Despite the specific nature of the criteria listed in the Study on NATO Enlargement, 
the study is not the final word on what a prospective state will be required to accomplish 
prior to being considered for acceptance in NATO. A "disclaimer" in the study states that 
"there is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new members to join the Alliance. "37 
This means that it is possible for a state to accede to the treaty without meeting all the 
requirements listed in the study, or that a state that has met all the requirements in the study 
may still not be allowed to join the alliance. This situation, with no exact set of minimum 
criteria for membership, would seem to be in opposition to the alliance's goal of 
transparency in the enlargement process. Though it is prudent for the alliance to give itself 
some leeway in deciding which nations would be acceptable for inclusion in the alliance, this 
situation certainly creates doubts in the minds of prospective members as to the sincerity of 
the alliance's claim to the transparency of the enlargement process. 
36 Ibid., para. 75. 
37 Ibid., para. 70. 
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ll. THE BALTIC STATES AND NATO EXPANSION 
When the elephants fight, it is the grass that is trampled 
African Proverb 
The states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have a very unique role to play in the 
drama ofNATO expansion. According to the Russians, their strategic location on Russia's 
western border, separating Kaliningrad from the rest ofRussia, is critical to Russian 
national security. The Russians believe that these states should be in their sphere of 
influence, or even a part of an expanded Russia, and maintain that an expanded NATO must 
not include the Baltic states. The West, which hopes to solidify the recent eastward 
expansion of democracy and free markets, would prefer to see the Baltic states protected 
from possible Russian revisionism. While NATO has not stated or implied that it will invite 
the Baltic states to join, it has stated that it will not allow the Russians to "veto" any 
possible members. The three Baltic states, more than any other country freed by the 
collapse of the "Soviet empire," are caught in the middle of a struggle of wills between 
NATO and Russia. 
The Baltic states have strong ties to Western Europe. The Estonians, who speak a 
language similar to Finnish, and the Latvians, who speak an Indo-European language, are 
both predominantly Lutheran and have a long history as a part of Scandinavia and Northern 
Europe. These states were ruled by the Danes, Germans, and Swedes prior to their 
inclusion in the Russian empire in the early eighteenth century. The Lithuanians, who speak 
a very pure Indo-European language, are almost entirely Roman Catholic and have strong 
historical ties to Poland. The Lithuanians were incorporated into the Russian empire in the 
second half of the eighteenth century. Even as a part of the Russian empire, the Baltic 
region was considered a "window to the West", and its European, as opposed to Russian, 
culture flourished. Despite attempts at "Russification" by Imperial Russia and the Soviet 
regime, this region, the eastern terminus of Latin Christianity and European culture, was 
able to maintain its heritage. During the Baltic states' brief period of independence during 
the "inter-war years," these states were fully integrated into Europe both politically and 
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economically. The forced annexation of these states into the USSR, which Germany fully 
condoned and France and the United Kingdom failed to act on, created a feeling of guilt in 
the West similar to that felt over Czechoslovakia and the failures of Munich. With this in 
mind, the Western leaders feel a need to ensure that this dark chapter in European history is 
not repeated. Now that these states are independent again, they are working tore-
integrate into Europe and reverse the effects of half a century of Soviet- political and 
economic control. To this end, the Baltic states have requested to be admitted as members 
ofNATO as a guarantee against future Russian aggression. 
The Russians see the situation very differently. For many Russians, the fact that this 
region was a part of the Russian empire for almost 200 years and a part of the Soviet Union 
for over fifty years gives them the right to have a special influence over the region. Some 
Russians would go so far as to say that the Baltic states should be re-incorporated into 
Russia. The Baltic states, which were still seen as a "window to the West" during the 
Soviet period, occupy a very strategic region for Russia. These states separate the 
Kaliningrad district from the rest ofRussia and are very close to the Russian "heartland." 
Considering the close relations between Russia and Belarus and Russian influence in 
Ukraine, the Baltic states (in Russian eyes at least) constitute a geographic threat to the 
political and demographic core of the Russian state. If these states were to join NATO, the 
American-led alliance that "won" the Cold War, this would be perceived as a grave threat to 
the security ofRussia. Conversely, possession of this region would give Russia a well-
defined and defensible border with Poland and the rest of Europe. The presence oflarge 
numbers of ethnic Russians in these states, primarily remnants of the Soviet period, makes 
the issue even more emotional for the Russian government. Though these ethnic Russians 
have no desire to leave the Baltic states and "return" to Russia, nationalist politicians in 
Moscow use this issue to justify expanded influence in the internal affairs of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania. Finally, the Baltic states are still a "window to the West" for Russia. The 
loss of important port facilities on the Baltic Sea and the robust, by Soviet standards, 
economic infrastructure of these states was a blow to the economy of Russia, one that some 
Russians would like to reverse. For these reasons, the Russians have demanded special 
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influence over the Baltic states and have threatened to take military action if they are 
admitted into NATO. 
The sensitive nature of this region, with its geopolitical and emotional importance to 
both Western Europe and Russia, makes it a critical aspect of the NATO expansion debate. 
This is a region that has significant and legitimate reasons for seeking inclusion in the 
alliance. Because it is also vital to the security of Russia, some observers see the Baltic 
states as an "albatross" around the neck ofNATO-Russian relations. When the fates of the 
Baltic states are discussed, all aspects of the issue ofNATO expansion are revealed and 
debated. It is therefore important to understand the exact circumstances of the Baltic states 
and how they relate to the various aspects of the NATO expansion debate in the West and 
in Russia. 
A. THE IDSTORY OF THE BALTIC STATES 
The area that is now Estonia and Latvia was first integrated into Europe by religious 
crusade and trade. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the predominantly German 
Brothers of the Militia of Christ, also known as the Sword-Brothers, began to look towards 
the pagan north after suffering defeats in their Mediterranean crusades. The German 
crusaders, who were later absorbed by the Teutonic Knights, another military-religious 
order that had conquered Prussia, controlled Latvia and southern Estonia by middle of the 
fourteenth century. During the same period, the Danes seized northern Estonia and 
founded the town of Tallinn as their administrative center. As the Danes and Teutonic 
Knights expanded their domain in this region, they came into conflict with the nascent 
Russian Empire to their east. In 1343, the Teutonic Knights purchased the Danish holdings 
and consolidated their control of Estonia and Latvia. All throughout this period, the 
Hanseatic League was active in commerce in this region. The cities of Riga and Narva were 
important centers of trade for the league and continued to grow and thrive, even during the 
crusader wars. The Protestant Reformation signaled the end of the Teutonic Knights, but 
the Baltic Germans remained as the secular nobility of the region. During the sixteenth 
century, Sweden and Russia fought for domination of the Baltic coast, with Sweden 
eventually pushing the Russians out of Estonia and Latvia. The final collapse of the 
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Teutonic Knights and the Swedish domination brought Lutheranism and some elements of 
European culture to the recently converted Baltic peasants. 
The early history ofLithuania is somewhat different from that of the other two 
Baltic states. The better organized Lithuanians successfully resisted the German crusaders 
and turned Lithuania into an aggressive regional power, extending its control to the south 
and east. However, the constant pressure of the Teutonic Knights forced the Lithuanian 
leaders to seek a personal union with Poland, which occurred in 1386 and resulted in the 
their conversion to Roman Catholicism and increased Polonization of the Lithuanian 
nobility. By 1569, Russian pressure on Lithuania made a formal commonwealth with 
Poland necessary. This Polish Commonwealth, in which Lithuania was the junior partner, 
successfully defended its territory for over two hundred years, but suffered a steep 
economic decline, which left Lithuania significantly poorer than Estonia and Latvia. 38 
Russia again attempted to expand to the Baltic coast when, in 1700, Peter the Great 
launched his Great Northern War against Sweden. After initial defeats, the expanded 
Russian Army was victorious, and Sweden ceded Estonia and Latvia to Russia in the 1721 
Treaty ofNystad. Peter the Great, who wanted to modernize Russia on a European model, 
was motivated to fight this war in order to give Russia direct contact with Western Europe. 
Russia, along with Prussia and Austria, later turned on the internally weakened Polish 
Commonwealth. In the three partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795, Lithuania joined 
Estonia and Latvia as part of the Russian empire. During this period of Russian control, the 
Baltic German elites and their culture dominated Estonian and Latvian life, while Polonized 
Lithuanian elites and Polish culture dominated Lithuanian life. 39 The Baltic Germans, who 
had been guaranteed permanent control over local administration by the Tsar, quickly 
adapted to life in the Russian empire and found great opportunities to rise to powerful 
positions in the Russian army and civil service. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian elites repeatedly 
took part in the various Polish uprisings.4o 
38 Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 48. 
39 David Crowe, The Baltic States and the Great Powers (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1993), p. 1. 
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The mid to late nineteenth century saw the ''National Awakening" of the native 
populations of the three Baltic states. This ethnic nationalism, based on linguistic and 
historical criteria, had emerged as a political ideology for peoples without a state in the 
Central and Eastern European empires in the mid-1800s. 41 The national cultures of these 
primarily peasant peoples were greatly influenced by the state-approved church, the culture 
of the elites, and German Romanticism. Despite the recent birth of this-national awareness, 
it proved strong enough to resist a campaign of intense Russification carried out during the 
last few decades of the Russian empire. 
In the aftermath of the First World War, which saw fighting between the Germans 
and Russians in the Baltic region and the eventual collapse of both their empires, the Baltic 
states gained independence. After the first Russian Revolution, the nationalist leaders of the 
Baltic states aimed to acquire "autonomy within a democratic Russian Federation, if only 
because they regarded such a link as their only protection against conquest by the Germans; 
they declared full independence only after Russia itself had collapsed into the hands of the 
Bolshevik:s."42 The German army, which occupied the Baltic states in the spring of 1918, 
withdrew after the armistice in November 1918. The Bolsheviks then tried to invade and 
were repulsed by local militias with British assistance in Estonia and German assistance in 
Latvia. By the end of 1919, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had cleared their territories of all 
foreign forces, with the exception of the Polish occupation of the Vilnius region of 
Lithuania. 
The newly independent Baltic states quickly began to work on integrating 
themselves with Europe and securing their borders through diplomacy. In 1920, all three 
states signed treaties with the Soviet Union that renounced all territorial claims. Estonia 
and Latvia were granted de jure recognition by the Allied Supreme Council in January 
1921, while Lithuania was denied recognition until 1922 due to the disputes over Memel 
40 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, pp. 49-50. 
41 Kristian Gerner and Stefan Hedlund, The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire 
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 49. 
42 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, p. 55. 
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and Vilnius. All three states joined the League ofNations in the fall of 1921. Despite this 
official recognition, the two main Western powers, France and the United Kingdom, refused 
to accept the "absolute permanency of the Baltic states, and both governments refused to 
adopt any stance that would force either of them to defend Baltic sovereignty in the 
future. "43 France even "assumed that they would ultimately be reunited with a 'resurrected 
liberal Russia'. "44 Economic integration with Europe proved to be mueh easier and more 
successful than political integration. The Baltic states had been the most industrialized part 
of the Russian empire and the main conduit of trade between Russia and the West. As a 
result, a large segment of Baltic society understood Western capitalism and could "facilitate 
the transition towards a fully functioning market economy. Their well-established agrarian 
economies had much to offer their major industrial trading partners, and in return the Baltic 
states became major importers ofWestern manufactured goods."45 This set of 
circumstances allowed the Baltic states to rapidly integrate with the European economy and 
to cut virtually all of their economic ties with the newly established Soviet Union. 
These newly independent states started out as parliamentary democracies but soon 
went through periods of authoritarian government. The power of the Baltic German nobles 
was broken, and land reforms were carried out. All three states adopted a multi-party 
system based on universal suflfage with parliamentary rule and an elected president as head 
of state. They all granted full civil rights to minorities and were considered "models of 
tolerance and minority rights in that region ofEurope."46 The world-wide recession of 
1929 had a severe effect on the agrarian economies ofthe Baltic states. Social and political 
unrest, spawned by the economic recession, fostered the development of Fascist parties on 
the model of Germany. Authoritarian regimes were established in Estonia and Latvia in 
43 Crowe, The Baltic States and the Great Powers, p. 4. 
44 Ibid., p. 6. 
45 Graham Smith, The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of Estonia. Latvia. 
and Lithuania (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 6. 
46 John Fitzmaurice, The Baltic: A Regional Future (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 
p. 99. 
20 
1934 to pre-empt Fascist coups. An authoritarian government had been established in 
chronically unstable Lithuania in 1926. By the end of the 1930s, the economic situation had 
improved, and the authoritarian leaders began to re-establish a democratic form of 
government. 47 This re-democratization was never completed, owing in large part to the 
Soviet annexation. 
Baltic attempts to form security arrangements after independence failed to produce 
any results. Estonia and Latvia tried to establish security arrangements with Finland and 
Poland in 1921, 1922, and 1925, but Russian threats of aggression succeeded in disrupting 
negotiations and kept the Baltic states isolated.48 Lithuania did not take part as it refused 
to meet with Poland as a result of the dispute over the Vilnius region. Unable to raise 
regional interest in a security pact, the three Baltic states finally worked together to create 
the Baltic Entente in 1934. This weak security pact soon became irrelevant as the members 
continued to bicker over petty items and trade disputes. Without a strong alliance between 
the three Baltic states and with no security guarantees by the Western democracies, the 
Baltic states were virtually defenseless against their two aggressive neighbors, Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union. 
The secret protocols to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact left the Baltic states 
within the Soviet sphere of influence. After the dismemberment of Poland in late 1939, the 
Soviet Union demanded military basing rights in the Baltic states. All three states 
acquiesced, with Lithuania receiving the Vilnius region as a reward. In July 1940, shortly 
after the fall of France, the Soviets forcibly annexed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. During 
the initial phase of annexation, Soviet forces deported 14,000 and executed 2, 000 political 
leaders, military officers, and national elites. The Soviets later deported another 60,000 
Baits in a second wave of arrests just prior to the German invasion. 49 Needless to say, 
there was no Baltic resistance to Germany's Operation Barbarosa in June 1941. The Baltic 
47 Gerner and Hedlund, The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire, pp. 57-58. 
48 Crowe, The Baltic States and the Great Powers, pp. 7-9. 
49 Fitzmaurice, The Baltic: A Regional Future, p. 112. 
21 
peoples did resist the return of the Red Army in 1944, with some groups of partisans, 
known as the "Forest Brothers", fighting as late as 1953. 
This armed resistance was eventually broken by a brutal assault on the Baltic 
peoples perpetrated by the Russian-dominated Soviet Union. Once the Red Army regained 
control of the region, a campaign of collectivization of agriculture, rapid industrialization, 
and Russification began. Massive numbers of former political party members, middle class 
citizens, and farmers resisting collectivization were arrested and deported. Between 1944 
and 1949 about 140,000 Estonians, 250,000 Latvians, and 550,000 Lithuanians were 
deported to Eastern Siberia and Central Asia. 50 During this same period, rapid 
industrialization created a need for industrial workers. A huge wave of immigrants, mostly 
Russian, flooded the Baltics, directed by Stalin's government in Moscow and drawn by the 
higher standard ofliving to be found in the region. As Anatol Lieven wrote, "these in many 
cases moved straight into flats abandoned by the refugees who had fled to the West, or 
belonging to Baits deported to Siberia." By the mid-1950s, 230,000 immigrants had arrived 
in Estonia, 535,000 in Latvia, and 160,000 in Lithuania, where industrialization was slowest 
and armed resistance most effective. 51 
Though the deportations and Russian immigration reduced the proportion of ethnic 
natives in the population of the Baltic states, and the Russians dominated the government 
and economy, the Baltic states were never successfully Russified. Even within the Soviet 
Union, it was obvious that the Baltic states, popularly referred to as "our West", were 
different from the rest of the state. 52 "The fact that the educational and professional 
qualifications of Russian and Slavic immigrants was not superior, but often inferior to the 
natives', facilitated development of a new national elite in the Baltics."53 It was this new 
elite that led the Baltic peoples to independence :from the Soviet Union. 
50 Ibid., p. 114. 
51 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, p. 183. 
52 Gerner and Hedlund, The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire, p. 50. 
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Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who gained power in 1985, began a 
series of reforms, including glasnot and perestroika, with the intent of strengthening the 
Soviet economy. An outcome of these reforms was the independence of the Baltic states 
and the end of the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1987, demonstrations in support of 
environmental causes and to celebrate historical days, the "calendar demonstrations," began 
to occur. These demonstrations continued, and in the summer of 1988, -independent 
political movements were formed in each of the Baltic states. "These moves began 
gingerly, and by spring 1988, an Estonian Popular Front movement, followed quickly by the 
Lithuanian Popular Front (Sajudis), and the Latvian Popular Front began to emerge."54 Up 
to this point, Gorbachev had supported the actions in the Baltic Soviet republics as part of 
his reform campaign. 
The Popular Fronts radicalized by the end of 1988 and started to call for Baltic 
independence. The native Baltic officials that had risen to power in the Baltic Soviet 
republics were sympathetic to these demands, and by the summer of 1989, all three 
governments had declared themselves sovereign within the Soviet Union and economically 
independent. In March 1990, Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union. 
Moscow at first responded with economic sanctions, which seemed to hurt the Soviet 
Union as much as Lithuania, and then, in January 1991, resorted to limited amounts of 
military force in an attempt to dissuade the Baltic states from seeking independence. 55 This 
failed, as the results of referendums held in all three states in February and March 1991 
were overwhelmingly for independence, even among ethnic Russian voters. Independence 
finally came in the aftermath of the August 1991 attempted coup in Moscow by Communist 
hard-liners against Gorbachev. 
The re-integration with the West during this second period of independence was 
more difficult than after the First World War. Political recognition and acceptance in the 
53 Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 218. 
54 Crowe, The Baltic States and the Great Powers, p. 179. 
55 Gerner and Hedlund, The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire, p. 147. 
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United Nations and OSCE came relatively quickly, but economic integration proved to be 
much harder the second time. Half a century of Soviet domination had left the Baltic states 
with heavily industrialized and highly specialized economies that were tightly bound to 
Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. Specifically, the 
resource-poor Baltic states were dependent on Russia for raw materials and energy. In the 
1990s, unlike the 1920s, the Baltic states did not have established markets in Europe for 
their products, a situation which was made all the more difficult by "the highly regionalised 
structure of a Europe dominated by the European Union. "56 Finally, despite securing their 
independence, it was not until August 1994 that the last Soviet "occupation" troops actually 
left the Baltic states. 
B. WHY THE NATO OPTION 
The leaders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are very aware of the difficult situation 
in which they find themselves. They share a border, bereft of any natural defenses, with 
Russia; and their territory lacks sufficient depth to slow an attack. As Hannes Walter, an 
Estonian security analyst, stated, "to say bluntly that Estonia needs a defence against the 
Russian threat is not an unfriendly act, but an acknowledgment of reality. "57 The armed 
forces of the three states, which can only muster a few thousand troops with no heavy 
weapons, will never be a match for the forces available to even a prostrate Russian Army. 
Their only reasonable defensive strategy would be a "CNN Defense," with a brief formal 
resistance and a guerrilla campaign, while hoping that Western pressure would force the 
Russians to leave on their own. 58 The threat of Russian revisionism is very real and a 
constant concern for two main reasons. 
The first reason is the extremely vocal Russian concern for the condition of the 
ethnic Russians living in the Baltic states. As of 1994, the ethnic Russian portion of the 
56 Smith, The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of Estonia. Latvia. and 
Lithuania, p. 7. 
57 Hannes Walter, 28 December 1994, cited in Igor Grazin, "Why the Baltics Want to Join 
NATO," Focus, February 1996, p. 2. 
58 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, p. 320. 
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population was 29.4% in Estonia, 33.5% in Latvia, and 8.5% in Lithuania. 59 These large 
Russian minorities, which tend to be loyal to the Baltic states, are still a great concern and a 
potential problem for relations with Russia. Many leaders from Russia~s national parties 
and members of the government have stated that it is the responsibility of the Russian 
Federation to protect the rights and privileges of the Baltic Russians, especially in Estonia 
and Latvia, and therefore, Russia should have influence over the legally-elected 
governments of the Baltic states. As Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated in 
April 1995, "there may be cases when the use of direct military force will be needed to 
defend our compatriots abroad."6° For all their declared loyalty to the Baltic Russians, 
there is much doubt as to the sincerity of Russia's concern. Many of the ethnic Russians in 
the Baltic states feel that all this posturing is done for reasons of domestic politics within 
Russia. "Moscow does not give a damn about Russians in Latvia! Moscow is manipulating 
the Russian question in Latvia for its own purposes," contends Aleksei Grigoriev, a 
spokesman for the moderates in Latvia's Russian community and a member ofparliament.61 
For a large portion of the ethnic Russian minority, there is no loyalty to Moscow nor a 
desire to "return" to Russia. 
An extensive survey done in the fall of 1993 found that relations between ethnic 
groups within the Baltic states were not nearly as bad as had been stated by the Russian 
government. In the survey, a majority of Russian speakers (74% in Estonia, 62% in Latvia, 
and 88% in Lithuania) said that inter-ethnic relations were good, which is better than results 
from other countries such as Germany or the United Kingdom. The Russian government 
may feel that it speaks for the Baltic Russians, but that does not mean the Baltic Russians 
feel a similar closeness. Over three-quarters of all Russian speakers felt that the Baltic 
59 Martin Klatt, "Russians in the Near-Abroad," RFEIRL Research Report, 19 August 
1994, p. 35. 
60 Andrei Kozyrev, 18 April1995, cited in Peter van Hamm, The Baltic States: Security 
and Defence After Independence, Chaillot Paper No. 19 (Paris: Institute for Security 
Studies, Western European Union, 1995), p. 7. 
61 Aleksei Grigoriev, cited in Richard Krickus, "Latvia's "Russian Question","RFEIRL 
Research Report, 30 April1993, p. 32. 
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states "offer a better chance to improve living standards than does Russia", and 62% said 
that conditions for people like them are worse in Russia.62 Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Sergey Krylov' s comment is very telling, "The fact that there are not too many 
people who would like to leave Latvia says something in favor of the Latvian 
government."63 It does indeed. Despite the fact that most of the Baltic Russians see 
themselves as a part of the Baltic states and not as a part ofRussia, the threat of Russian 
aggression in the name of supporting ethnic Russians in the near-abroad creates insecurity in 
the Baltic states. 
The second reason for Baltic insecurity is a perceived Russian desire to restore the 
Russian empire or the Russian-dominated Soviet Union that would include the Baltic states. 
A Lithuanian representative commented that when the Russians say "near abroad", it sounds 
very much like "temporary abroad". 64 Russian "occupation" troops only left Estonia in 
August 1994, while a few remain in Latvia, and Lithuania is a transit route for the 
Kaliningrad Military District. The Baltic states, with historical memories of Russian 
aggression and recent experiences ofRussian domination, fear the consequences of a 
revisionist Russia. Articles in Russia's nationalist press that call for subjugating or even 
annexing the Baltic states, though not numerous, reinforce the idea that they are exposed to 
real security threats from an expansionist Russia. Comments by the leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, such as, "soon there will be no Lithuanians, 
Estonians, and Latvians in the Baltics. I'll act as Hitler did, "65 no matter how unrealistic, 
create huge doubts about future security. Actions like the Russian Duma's decision to 
repeal the December 1991 Belovezhskaya Agreement, which codified the breakup of the 
62 Richard Rose and William Maley, "Conflict or Compromise in the Baltic States?'' 
RFEIRL Research Reports, 15 July 1994, pp. 28-33. 
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Soviet Union, and promote the "deepening of the integration of the people who were united 
in the USSR,"66 though legally irrelevant, do effect the mindset of the Baltic governments. 
In addition, the recent Russo-Belarusian "Community Treaty," which calls for "coordinated 
foreign policies and general positions on basic international questions" and joint efforts for 
the protection of external borders, military development, and security, 67 increases the 
perceived threat of Russian expansionism and inflates fears of encirclement by the Russians 
in the Baltic states. The Baltic states fear that Russia will take an openly revisionist course 
and once again attempt to annex them. For this reason, they feel it necessary to find a 
suitable security architecture that will protect their independence. 
A large number of possible security arrangements for the Baltic states exist. The 
five most important options are: a new "Baltic Entente" , a ''Nordic Defense League," the 
collective security of the OSCE and UN, the Western European Union (WEU), and NATO. 
A new "Baltic Entente" has failed to form for the same lack of interest that doomed the first 
to failure. The Baltic Council of Ministers, which was established in June 1994 by Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, was intended to "revitalize cooperation on matters of foreign, 
security and defence policy." This group has seen some success, such as the creation of a 
joint Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion and a trilateral agreement on defense cooperation signed 
in February 1995, but it has yet to fully integrate the defense organizations ofthe three 
countries.68 Though many declarations of unity have been made, "divergent foreign policy 
priorities and subjective security concerns check the development of a trilateral security and 
defence alliance. "69 The Baltic states are also finding it difficult to reach trilateral economic 
66 Text of Duma Resolution, 16 March 1996, cited in Gleb Cherkasov, "Duma Denounces 
Beloveahskaya Agreements," Sevodnya, 16 March 1996, cited in The Current Digest of the 
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agreements as the three states have similar economies and are thus generally competitors. 
Even if the Baltic states were able to create a fully integrated defensive alliance, it is 
doubtful that this would be any more capable of defending against a Russian invasion than 
the current defensive posture. 
The idea of a ''Nordic Defense League" that would include the Scandinavian states 
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland) and the Baltic states has been raised. 
Considering the material and technical support that the Scandinavian states, especially 
Denmark and Sweden, are supplying to the Baltic states, this idea seems to be a good one. 
However, it also has fatal flaws. The Scandinavian states, which during the Cold War 
developed individual security and defense policies, are interested in enhancing the security 
of the Baltic Sea region, but not in creating defense commitments that their limited forces 
would have difficulty fulfilling. They are focusing their aid on the Baltic states for reasons 
that are "a typical Scandinavian mix: altruism and pragmatism. If Baltic borders or nuclear 
reactors leak, the results will soon be felt"70 in Scandinavia. These states, with the 
exception ofNorway, do feel certain historic and cultural ties to Estonia and Latvia but not 
to Polinized Catholic Lithuania. Finally, with Sweden and Finland having in 1995 joined 
Denmark in the EU, which is developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Baltic 
states will find it difficult to participate in a Nordic security alliance. 71 The concept of a 
"Nordic Defense League" is not realistic, considering the attitudes of the Scandinavian 
states. 
The two collective security organizations, the OSCE and UN, which the Baltic 
states are members of, would be unable to guarantee their security. Both organizations 
have Russia, the only real threat to the Baltic states, as a member. The OSCE, which has 
no standing capability to provide aid, requires virtually unanimous consent to act. Russia 
with its ability to influence some of the other post-Soviet states, would be able to block any 
69 Vidmantas Purlys and Gintautus Vilkelis, "Cooperation Between the Baltic States: A 
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decision it did not care for. In the case of the UN, Russia's Security Council veto would be 
sufficient to stop any action to assist the Baltic states. These institutions are reminiscent of 
another discredited collective security organization, the League ofNations, which failed to 
preserve Baltic independence in the 1930's. Thus, in the opinion of the Baltic leaders, the 
OSCE and UN would be unable to protect the Baltic states. 
Another security option would be to join the WEU, which is a defensive alliance that 
provides security guarantees for its members. The problem is that the Baltic states are not 
members of the EU and are not eligible for full membership in the WEU. The Baltic states, 
which have Europe Agreements with the EU, were granted Associate Partner status in the 
WEU in June 1994, but this associate partnership does not provide for any security 
guarantees.72 Though this first step shows that there is a possibility of future EUIWEU 
membership, that may be a long way in the future and does not affect the security concerns 
of the present. There is a possibility that Estonia, which has progressed the farthest towards 
meeting the EU requirements for entry, might be able to join with the first group of Central 
European states. "Thus a form of linkage between Russian behavior towards the Baltic 
states and the EU's overall relationship with Russia would be established,''73 creating a 
greater sense of security in the Baltic states. Though the WEU would certainly be an 
attractive defense structure for the Baltic states, there are difficult economic requirements 
for EU membership that must be met before they can avail themselves of the security 
provided by the WEU. 
The remaining defense option is membership in NATO. This alliance gives its 
members security guarantees and certainly has the military resources to fulfill its 
responsibilities. It has no strict economic requirements for entry and, as a result of Soviet-
era propaganda, "the Atlantic Alliance was perceived," by the Baltic states, "as the most 
powerful anti-Soviet structure. This made NATO all the more attractive, since the general 
72 Peter van Hamm, The Baltic States: Security and Defence After Independence, Chaillot 
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feeling in Estonia [,Latvia, and Lithuania] was that the country should side with whatever 
body seemed to have a strong anti-Russian/Soviet connotation."74 NATO is perceived to 
be a strong and reliable alliance of democratic states that has proven itself over nearly fifty 
years of existence. The Baltic states, whose goal is to ensure their independence as 
democratic states with free-market economies, feel that membership in the alliance will give 
them the security to achieve their goals. The comment by a member of.the Lithuanian 
Ministry ofForeign Affairs about Lithuania could apply to any of the three states. "On the 
one hand, Lithuania fears a resurgent Russia while on the other being aware of the absence 
of an effective security architecture for the region. It is therefore not surprising that in this 
atmosphere of drift, Lithuania clings to the most visible symbol of support, and that it 
considers NATO membership as a crucial assurance against the unknown.''75 As far as the 
Baltic states are concerned, NATO membership is the only realistic method of ensuring the 
security of their territory from Russian aggression. As Gerhard Wettig wrote, "the only 
hope that Baltic security can be maintained lies in Moscow's being dissuaded by self-
restraint and/or Western, particularly US, security guarantees from extending its power to 
the three countries. "76 For these reasons, the governments of the Baltic states have made 
all possible attempts to ally themselves with the West and have made it clear that they 
would like to join NATO. 
C. BALTIC ACTIONS CONCERNING NATO EXPANSION 
With the inception of the NACC by the alliance, the Baltic states began to make use 
ofNATO assistance on defense planning, building of military structures, and civil-military 
relations. After the 12 December 1993 Russian parliamentary elections and the victory of 
the nationalist parties, specifically Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party, the Baltic 
leaders felt a need to redouble their efforts to create ties to the West. In response to the 
74 Haab, "Estonia and Europe: Security and Defence," p. 51. 
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election, on I6 December I993, the Presidents of all three states issued a joint statement in 
which NATO was identified as "being the main prospective guarantor of our security." 
They further stated a "desire to deepen cooperation with NATO," as a step "towards our 
countries' participation in Europe's evolving security structures. "77 
Once the PfP was officially announced by the NAC, the Baltic leaders 
enthusiastically supported it, unlike some of the other Eastern European. leaders. It was 
seen as a way towards membership within the alliance, and all three states were enrolled in 
the program within a few weeks. The Baltic states seemed more positive towards the PfP 
than many other states. This is partially because the Baltic states, unlike the Visegrad 
states, did not have developed armed forces that they felt would be needed for full 
membership in NATO, and more importantly, the PfP proposal "indicates that NATO has 
not made a clear distinction in Central Europe between countries which can and countries 
which cannot join the Alliance. "78 In other words, the Baltics might still have a chance of 
entering NATO if they were active in the PfP. 
To this end, the idea for a Baltic peacekeeping battalion, which had been under 
discussion for some time, was proposed in February I994 at a meeting of the Baltic Defense 
Ministers. The unit was initially trained with the assistance of Denmark, and two platoons 
of Lithuanian peace keepers were attached to a Danish battalion with the UNPROFOR in 
Croatia.79 On II September I994, the battalion was officially formed, with its headquarters 
in Latvia and each Baltic state supplying a company of soldiers. Great Britain, Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden funded the training and maintenance of the battalion, and it was 
expected to be ready for service with the UN by November 1995.80 
77 Statement by the Baltic Presidents Regarding NATO, Baltic News Service, 16 December 
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Throughout 1994, the governments of the Baltic states continued to stress their 
desire for accession into NATO. A statement issued at the Foreign Ministers conference in 
March "emphasized [that] their countries desire to eventually become full-fledged 
members, "81 while the Prime Ministers, in June, reaffirmed a desire for closer relations, 
"paving the way for the active and interested partners to play an important role in the 
evolutionary process of the expansion ofNAT0."82 The disagreements over citizenship 
laws and troop withdrawals, and the hardening ofMoscow's opposition to NATO 
expansion, made the Baltic leaders more anxious to receive some sort of a security pledge 
from the alliance. As NATO lost credit for failing to act in Bosnia, "it was felt to be even 
more essential to be a member of the club given the increasingly obvious fact that those who 
did not belong to it could not count on any protection. "83 
Though the Baltic governments desperately wanted to enter NATO, they did at least 
realize that they were probably not going to be part of the first group of states to enter the 
alliance. The Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas commented while in the Czech 
Republic, "we know that the Czech Republic is several steps ahead of us. We can make use 
of your experience and take the well-tried path. I know we are heading in the same 
direction, but we will try not to lag too far behind. "84 This appreciation for their probable 
position in the second tier of nations to be admitted could not be of much comfort, 
especially considering the threats coming out of Russia. As Estonian Prime Minister Tilt 
Vaki diplomatically noted in March 1995, Estonia "has reasons to worry about its security--
some Russian politicians aspiring to high office have an aggressive attitude towards the 
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Baltic countries. "85 The policy of the Baltic governments is to ensure that they are given 
the same consideration for membership as the other Central European states. 
The Baltic leaders feel that it is imperative to ensure that NATO leaders do not put 
them in a category for membership separate from the Visegrad states. Brazauskas's speech 
before the WEU Parliamentary Assembly in June 1995 clearly stated this position. "Just 
like the other Central European states Lithuania cannot ensure its security by itself," and if 
the Baltic states were "separated from the other Central and Eastern European states in the 
context of their relations with the EU, WEU, and NATO, that would be a misfortune for 
both, the Baltic States and the West. "86 This policy saw some success when the Study on 
NATO Enlargement, which states that all prospective members will be treated equally, was 
released in September 1995. The governments of the Baltic states were encouraged by this 
document. A Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, which was typical of the 
response by all three governments, "welcomes the plan for the development ofNATO" 
which places "all countries interested in NATO membership on an equal footing and 
strengthens security for Europe as a whole. "87 
Recent Russian threats of military action in the Baltic states if they were to join 
NATO have increased the fear of a possible abandonment by the West. Many leaders in the 
region feel that these threats are aimed mainly at NATO and the West, in an attempt to 
reduce their willingness to give security guarantees to the Baltic states. As the Lithuanian 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Albinas Jansuka, stated, "this is being done with the 
purpose of impressing the West that the Baltic states are within the sphere of Russia's 
special interests ... and that further steps toward sovereignty on the part of the Baltic states 
might lead to a nuclear catastrophe. "88 
85 Aleksei Toom, "Results of Elections in Estonia," Kommersant-Dally, 7 March 1995, 
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Despite the Russian demands that the Baltic states remain a neutral buffer for 
Russia, the Baltic states remain dedicated to the goal of eventual inclusion in the Atlantic 
Alliance. As Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis told ambassadors from NATO countries, 
"Latvia cannot be a neutral state in the modem world, taking into account the lessons of the 
past and the current geopolitical situation."89 The Baltic leaders remain uneasy about the 
sincerity of Western promises of support in the face of serious Russian opposition and, at 
every opportunity, try to remind the West that only as members ofNATO can they ensure 
their security. During NATO Secretary General Javier Solana's self-described 
"reconnaissance trip" to the Baltic states in April 1996, Estonian President Lennart Meri 
told him that "NATO is a security priority with no altemative,"90 while the Foreign 
Minister, Siim Kallas, said that "NATO is now the only effective system and all projects 
should be considered in the context of cooperation with the alliance. ''91 The Latvian 
Foreign Minister, Valdis Birkavs, discussing his meeting with Solana, went on to say that "it 
is completely clear that the only true security guarantee is full membership in NAT0.''92 
This theme has been repeated by members of the Baltic governments whenever and 
wherever they have the opportunity. The most recent round of requests for security 
guarantees from NATO was set offby the results of the Vienna conference to review the 
CFE Treaty, which were announced in June 1996. This conference produced an agreement 
that would extend Russia's deadline for compliance to the treaty until1999 and exempt 
Russia's Pskov Oblast, which is bordered by Estonia and Latvia, from the treaty's "flank 
88 Albinas Jansuka, cited in "Foreign Ministry Official on Russia's NATO Threat," Baltic 
News Service, 3 October 1995, cited in FBIS-SOV-95-193, 3 October 1995. 
89 Guntis Ulmanis, cited in "Latvia Cannot Remain Neutral," Moscow INTERFAX, 12 
March 1996, cited in FBIS-SOV-96-052, 12 March 1996 
90 Lennart Meri, cited in "Meri, Solana Comment on NATO Enlargement," Eesti 
Postimees, 17 April1996, p. 1, cited in FBSI-SOV-96-075, 17 April1996. 
91 Siim Kallas, cited in "NATO Viewed as Sole Reliable Security System," Moscow 
INTERFAX, 17 April1996, citedinFBIS-SOV-96-077, 17 April1996. 
92 Valdis Birkavs, cited in "Birkavs Interviewed on Security," Radio Riga, 22 April 1996, 
cited in FBIS-SOV-96-080, 22 April1996. 
34 
limits." With the prospect of increased Russian military strength on their borders, Estonia 
and Latvia immediatly began to ask for Western security guarantees. 93 In addition to the 
rhetoric, the Baltic states are taking concrete steps to create and strengthen their ties with 
NATO and the West. 
An example of this is the use of the Baltic peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT) with 
the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By participating in these 
types ofbroad-based actions, the Baltic states prove that they are "both 'producers' as well 
as 'consumers' ofsecurity."94 Currently, the BALTBAT is acting in conjunction with 
battalions from the Nordic countries, but, by the end of 1996, the unit will be able to 
participate independently in its assigned missions. The Baltic states are making plans to 
form a second battalion that will enable the peacekeepers to undertake larger missions or 
rotate units and conduct long-term operations.95 In April1996, the first casualty in the 
BALTBAT, a Lithuanian officer, confirmed the dedication of the Baltic states to support 
NATO and European security in general. After the death, the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry 
stated that "Lithuania will keep its international commitments on maintaining peace under 
the aegis ofNATO." The communique added that the death was a "symbolic confirmation 
of the integrity and indivisibility ofEuropean security,''96 a statement that was meant to 
apply to the Baltic states, as well as to Bosnia. Other examples of Baltic commitment 
include active participation in multilateral PfP exercises and training programs and in efforts 
to create a NATO-compatible airspace control system. 
A final action that will increase the attractiveness of the Baltic states as possible 
members of NATO is increased joint defense efforts. As Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick, 
senior analysts at the RAND Corporation, wrote, "in political terms it is important for the 
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Baltic states to show that they are seriously committed to defence and that they are not 
'free riders' ,''97 Due to divergent foreign and defense policies, a defense union for the three 
states has been an elusive goal. Many leaders in the three countries realize that a Baltic 
defense alliance is needed to positively influence NATO, as well as to increase regional 
deterrence against a revisionist Russia. The Baltic Assembly, a consultative body of the 
Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian parliaments, declared at both its I995 and I996 annual 
meetings that a military union was necessary. The chairman of the Assembly's presidium 
went on to say that a defense union "is not an alternative to the Baltic countries' admission 
to NATO. On the contrary, it is likely to prepare our countries for membership in this 
organization,''98 
Though the need for a military alliance may be recognized, movements to create 
such an organization have progressed slowly. In February I995, a formal Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Fields of Defense and Military Relations, which established specific areas 
where cooperation would be undertaken, was signed by the Defense Ministers of all three 
states. With this agreement, joint meetings at all levels of the three defense organizations 
have occurred and joint projects have been developed. The most significant advances have 
been in the areas of naval interoperability, communications and intelligence, and the 
development of a joint air-surveillance system.99 At a recent meeting of the Chiefs of Staff 
of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian armies, plans were made to create joint military 
units that would participate in PfP exercises and work on restructuring the logistics system 
and legal codes of the Baltic armies to meet NATO standards. 100 These efforts were given 
further impetus by American Secretary of Defense William Perry's September I996 
statement that the Baltic states were "not yet ready" for NATO membership. Reacting to 
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this assessment, the three Baltic presidents issued a joint statement declaring that they 
would do whatever might be necessary to bring their armed forces up to NATO 
standards. 101 
The governments of the Baltic states are slowly but steadily progressing towards a 
defensive alliance between the three states. During the first period of Baltic independence, 
such an alliance proved impossible to create, but the memory of the consequences has given 
increased impetus to the leaders of today. The creation of a solid military alliance would 
certainly make the "indefensible" Baltic states more attractive to the West and increase their 
chances of NATO membership. However, the lack of a defensive alliance is not the only 
weakness the Baltic states have in meeting NATO expectations. 
D. BALTIC PROBLEMS IN MEETING NATO REQUIREMENTS 
The Baltic states do not meet all the criteria NATO promulgated in its Study on 
NATO Enlargement. The most significant problem is the requirement for the "resolution of 
ethnic disputes [and] external territorial disputes including irredentist claims."102 Other 
areas where the Baltic states do not yet measure up to NATO standards are military 
interoperability and, to a limited extent, economic and political reforms. 
Minority issues are critical for the Baltic states. The Atlantic Alliance is reluctant to 
take in new members with minority disputes, and it is especially hesitant when those 
disputes involve Russia and Russians. Since independence, the three states have used 
different options in dealing with their Russian minorities. Estonia and Latvia, where Soviet-
era immigration came dangerously close to overwhelming the local population, have 
approved legislation that restricts the citizenship and political rights of non-Baltic residents. 
Lithuania, with its clear local majority, has given full citizenship and political rights to all its 
residents regardless of ethnic origin. It must be noted that none of the Baltic states has 
taken any actions that restrict the human rights of any of its residents. The actions taken by 
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the three states have had a direct effect on their individual relations with Russia, especially 
concerning the removal of Russian troops from former Soviet bases. 
The actions taken by the three Baltic States on the question of citizenship for the 
Russian minority reflect the different situations of the three countries. The goal of all three 
states after independence was to create a government consisting of a significant majority of 
the titular nationality. None of the countries was willing to accept a divided or weak 
government that Russia could exploit. The worst fear of the Baltic peoples was giving the 
Russians an opportunity to return. The Lithuanians started with a comfortable majority 
(80% ), and their minority population was split into two roughly equal Polish and Russian 
minorities that were not willing to join in opposition to the Lithuanians. With this stable 
power base, the Lithuanian government was in a position to be generous with citizenship 
and political rights. The Estonians and Latvians did not start with a comfortable majority 
(62% and 52%) and faced a large ethnic Russian minority (30% and 34%), so they felt it 
necessary to exclude the Russian minority from participation in the government. 103 Both 
states did this by binding citizenship eligibility to citizenship prior to the Second World War. 
Estonia, with its larger majority, was willing to use June 1941, a year after annexation, 
while Latvia, with a tiny majority, used June 1940 for the citizenship cut-off dates. Estonia 
excluded the Russian minority from the first national elections in September 1992 by 
creating a long naturalization process that could not be completed prior to the elections. 
Latvia simply refused to start the naturalization process until after the first national elections 
in June 1993. 104 In this way, both states were able to create governments controlled almost 
entirely by the titular nationalities. 
Once in firm control, the Estonian and Latvian governments were willing to submit 
to European and Russian pressure to loosen their stringent citizenship requirements. Both 
states requested and received guidance from the Council of Europe and the OSCE, which 
103 Klatt, "Russians in the Near-Abroad," p. 35. 
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was later incorporated in updated naturalization legislation. 105 The governments, 
remembering how close their nations came to being eradicated, were not willing to ease the 
strict language requirements or allow dual citizenship for ethnic Russians, despite Russian 
demands. Relations between Russia and the two states have been poor as Russia claims 
that "discrimination against Russians" and "mass-scale violations of human rights" exist in 
Estonia and Latvia, 106 while the two states complain about excessive Russian interference 
in their internal affairs. The leaders of Estonia and Latvia argue that their citizenship laws 
are no more strict than those of most European states; a claim that most outside observers 
find to be valid. Even so, the strong Russian accusations and threats will continue to cast 
doubts on the eligibility of the Baltic states for NATO membership until a mutually 
agreeable solution can be found. 
A second major issue that requires a solution before NATO membership would be 
possible is the Estonian border dispute with Russia. After independence, Estonia claimed 
that the Estonian-Russian border should be as it was demarcated in the 1920 Treaty of 
Tartu between Estonia and the Soviet Union. After the forced annexation in 1940, the 
Soviet Union under Stalin "adjusted" the border to the west, to the position it is today. 
This is the border that Russia wishes to maintain. The disputed area of 2300 square 
kilometers between the two borders is primarily populated by Russians (83% ). Estonia 
maintained its claim to the territory during border negotiations until November 1995.107 
Once the Estonian government realized that it would never see the land returned and that 
the continuing dispute would undermine its chances for NATO membership, the claim was 
dropped. The border negotiations have not yet resulted in a treaty, as there are still a large 
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number of small issues to be agreed upon. A similar situation occurred between Latvia and 
Russia, but the Latvian government formally accepted the current border as official soon 
after independence. Interestingly, while the Estonians were pressing their claim, the 
Russians were threatening to make a claim against Lithuania for the Vilnius region that was 
ceded by the Soviet Union in 1939 after the destruction ofPoland. 
The issue of military interoperability with NATO is one that bedevils all of the 
prospective members of the alliance. In fact it could even be said that some of the current 
members of the alliance are not fully interoperable. The high cost and long time period 
needed to restructure a state's military forces to meet standing NATO requirements make 
this a difficult task. In a way, the Baltic states were lucky that they were left with virtually 
no established military forces after independence from the Soviet Union. They had the 
opportunity to build a NATO-compatible military from the very beginning. This process 
has been started, and the governments of the Baltic states are making decisions with NATO 
requirements in mind. Interaction with NATO forces in PfP exercises and IFOR is helping 
this process, and one can expect that these activities will continue in the future. Despite this 
fact, it will be a long time before Baltic military forces are fully NATO-interoperable. 
In the case of political and economic reforms, the Baltic states have progressed very 
rapidly towards Western European standards. According to Freedom House, as reported in 
the 1995 edition ofNations in Transit, the Baltic states were each considered to be "Free" 
states. Out of all the states of the former Soviet Union and Central Europe, this ranking, 
based on individual political rights and civil liberties, was given only to the Visegrad Four 
states, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states. Significantly, the Baltic states earned this ranking 
despite problems with citizenship legislation for the Baltic Russians. The report described 
all three states as democracies based on multi-party elections with established constitutions 
and "free and fair" elections. Freedom House's main complaint with the Baltic states was 
on the issue of citizenship legislation in Estonia and Latvia, and the level of political 
influence in the Lithuanian judiciary. Economic reforms have been making progress in all 
three states, with Estonia slightly ahead of Latvia and Lithuania trailing further behind. 
Still, they have a long way to go before they can be considered true free-market economies. 
As of 1995, Estonia had just over 50% of its GOP produced by the private sector, while 
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Latvia was at 45% and Lithuania was at 30%. All three states have over half of their 
agricultural land in private hands with Lithuania at 99% and Estonia at 93%. Privatization 
legislation exists in the three states and is making steady progress towards reforming the 
economies of the three states. 108 Considering this information, it would be reasonable to 
say that the Baltic states are very close to meeting the NATO requirements for political and 
economic reforms. 
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ill. THE UNITED STATES AND NATO EXPANSION 
To render it agreeable to good policy, three things are requisite. 
First, that the necessity of the times requires it; secondly, that it be not the 
probable source of greater evils than those it pretends to remedy; and 
lastly, that it have a probability of success. 
Alexander Hamilton, 15 D-ecember 177 4 
A. AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN NATO 
NATO is an alliance of sixteen sovereign states, guided by policies that must be 
agreed upon by the unanimous decision of all members. On paper, all signatories to the 
North Atlantic Treaty are equals. In reality, the United States is the undisputed leader of 
the alliance and, because of its unique position, has been responsible for NATO's long-term 
success. The American leadership position is a result of many factors. The United States, 
due to its size and physical separation from Europe, can act as an "impartial judge" 
regarding intra-European disputes. Also, the United States stations a large conventional 
military force in Europe and provides a "nuclear umbrella," both ofwhich give it greater 
influence in NATO. America's unique position did not disappear with the end of the Cold 
War, and since then numerous incidents have revealed the continuing importance of 
American leadership in NATO. 
The members of the alliance fall into three categories: the superpower, the United 
States; the great powers, which are limited to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom; 
and the lesser powers, which include Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the others. An 
alliance without the United States would probably have been unstable due to the rivalries 
between the great powers and the lesser powers' fear of domination by the great powers, as 
reflected by centuries of European history. The solidarity shown by the NATO members 
for over forty years, in spite of active Soviet attempts at de-stabilization, is a "product of 
the strong leadership shown by the United States." Richard Kugler writes, "had the alliance 
lacked strong American leadership, it would have fallen victim to the inability of many 
smaller nations to form a common front, and it would have been left vulnerable to the 
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Soviet divide and conquer tactics. "109 During the Cold War, the Europeans were willing to 
follow American leadership, even if it wounded their pride, as it was the safest and most 
stable course of action. Josef Joffe's comment very accurately describes the situation: 
Let us generalize the argument: deep in their hearts, all Europeans 
dread the "re-nationalization" of their defenses. The Atlantic Alliance has 
spared the Europeans the need for autonomous defense policies, one of the 
most powerful causes of conflict and war. They know that non-autonomy, 
the integration of their defense policy under a powerful outsider, provided 
the benign stage on which they could forget their ancient rivalries and link 
hands in economic and political community. And deep in their hearts, the 
Europeans suspect that they may not live as harmoniously without their big 
brother across the sea.uo 
The situation continues to this day. Despite the progress towards a "united Europe," there 
remain many fundamental differences between the European states, which have never been 
suppressed, except under the leadership of the United States. As W.R. Smyser writes, "it is 
very difficult for the European Union to make political decisions because such decisions 
require either unanimity or an overwhelming majority in which the major powers fully 
participate. "111 The need for American leadership may not last forever, but it is still there 
and will be for the foreseeable future. 
The large deployment of American troops to Europe gives the United States greater 
influence over NATO decision making. These soldiers are welcomed by the Europeans and 
"continue to guarantee Europe's security from external and internal sources of 
instability. "112 They add credibility to the American commitment and give the United States 
a significant military presence throughout most ofWestern Europe. Additionally, as Paul 
Gebhard believes, another manifestation of American leadership is the appointment of "US 
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officers in the two top military positions in NATO, SACEUR and SACLANT. Although 
political leadership does not require or imply military leadership, military leadership does 
imply political leadership." 113 The presence of significant numbers of American soldiers in 
Europe will continue to be a source of influence for the United States in NATO. 
In addition to conventional forces, the United States gains influence in NATO from 
its nuclear forces. The large American strategic nuclear arsenal provides a "nuclear 
umbrella" for the members ofNATO. During the Cold War, "U.S. nuclear commitments 
were the backbone of deterrence, "114 and today, despite the reduced East-West tensions, 
are still needed as a deterrent against the robust Russian nuclear arsenal. "The clearest area 
of functional responsibility," writes W.R. Smyser, "for the Americans is that of keeper of 
the global nuclear balance and keeper of the global nuclear stability. "115 The extended 
deterrence that the United States provides to the other members of the alliance gives it 
increased influence in the NATO decision making process. It is difficult to imagine any 
issue of contention so divisive that the other members of the alliance would be willing to 
risk losing American conventional and nuclear security guarantees by voting against the 
United States. This would also apply to the decision to expand the alliance. It is doubtful 
that any member would risk rupturing alliance solidarity to stop expansion, if the United 
States pressed to expand the alliance. 
Since the end of the Cold War, a number of events have shown that American 
leadership is still a critical element of the alliance decision making process. As the Cold 
War came to an end, the question of German unification became a major concern. "At that 
time, it was widely thought that the Soviet Union would never accept a unified 
Germany, "116 and Germany's European allies also hesitated at the thought of a unified and 
powerful Germany. As British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote in her memoirs, 
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... although NATO had traditionally made statements supporting 
Germany's aspiration to be reunited, in practice we were rather 
apprehensive. Nor was I speaking for myself alone--I had discussed it with 
at least one other western leader, meaning President Mitterrand. Mr. 
Gorbachev confirmed that the Soviet Union did not want German 
reunification either. This reinforced me in my resolve to slow up the already 
heady pace of development. 117 
Despite the opposition, President Bush pushed for unification arid was successful, all 
the while controlling the entire process to ensure that European security would not be 
upset. Josef Joffe described the situation quite musically, 
By moving out in front, Washington did what should come naturally 
to the sole remaining superpower. By forcing the pace, Bush grabbed hold 
of the baton; by siding with Kohl, he tightened the bond with the soon-to-be 
number one power in Europe; and by securing both Bonn and the baton, the 
United States clinched control over the Western orchestra. Even a deux, 
France and Britain were too weak to impose a dissonant melody, and since 
Bonn could rely only on Washington, the United States acquired ample 
leverage over Germany to prevent it from playing solo in those heady but 
treacherous days.118 
The successful and peaceful re-unification of the two Germanys was concluded with 
American leadership as a necessary element. Coincidentally, many of the arguments about 
Soviet opposition to German unification are similar to arguments against NATO expansion. 
It would appear that NATO, united by strong American leadership, can prevail over harsh 
Russian objections--at least in some circumstances. 
A second example of a strong American leadership initiative influencing the course 
of action of the NATO allies is the Gulf War. Within a few days of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, President Bush had assembled a coalition with virtually all the Western European 
states contributing combat forces or other types of assistance. The victory was in many 
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ways "a byproduct of the efforts NATO had made over the past years to prepare for 
conventional war in Central Europe. "119 About the position of American leadership, 
Edward Foster wrote, "America's diplomatic and military pre-eminence was confirmed by 
the brief conflict, as indeed was Europe's relative weakness." 120 The victory of the 
American-led coalition in the sands of Iraq stood in stark contrast to the situation of the 
European-led coalition in the mountains ofBosnia until late 1995. 
The U~ted States did not take part in the initial response to the crisis in Bosnia. 
The Americans did not wish to get involved, and the Europeans wanted them to stay out, as 
this was seen as a good test of European unity. "It is a matter of bitter record that this crisis 
exposed the Europeans' real limitations. "121 Jane Sharp comments that, "despite the 
rhetoric about developing common foreign, security, and defense policies, the major 
European powers were incapable of reaching agreement on who was to blame, about 
whether or when to recognize successor states, or about what practical steps to take to end 
the slaughter. "122 She goes on to say that "the lack of U.S. leadership exacerbated inter-
European bickering, which prevented any useful WEU or NATO actions .... "123 President 
Clinton's proposed "lift and strike" policy probably did not help the Europeans' situation, 
but American actions can only be partly responsible for the mission's failure. 
Once the Americans decided to become more actively involved in Bosnia, the 
situation began to change and unified action was possible. The Dayton accords, pushed 
through by strong American leadership, "are Bosnia's best hope for peace," wrote Michael 
Williams, especially given "the commitment by the United States to play the major role in 
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the implementation force. "124 Though the crisis in Bosnia is far from over, it was not until 
the United States became involved and began to take the initiative that any concerted action 
took place. This, writes Roger Cohen, "is the harsh lesson of four years of war in the 
Balkans. America is a European power--not just a member ofNATO, but its cornerstone; 
any attempt to disregard that fact amounts to an invitation to disaster. "125 The United 
States continues to play its key role as the unofficial leader ofNATO. From the beginning 
of the Cold War to today, American initiative has been the driving force behind the tough 
decisions in NATO. This also applies to the issue ofNATO expansion. 
The first few "baby-steps" towards expansion have come about primarily as a result 
of American action. The initial outreach to the Central European states was the creation of 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council , "invented in a joint U.S. -German initiative." 126 
Later, the Clinton administration pressed for NATO adoption of the Partnership for Peace 
program. The P:tP, wrote Catherine Kelleher, "largely an American invention, was first 
floated by Secretary ofDefense Les Aspin at the informal October 1993 meeting ofNATO 
defense ministers .... " 127 "Clearly, one of Clinton's triumphs," it was officially "launched at 
the January 1994 NATO summit and immediately defended against all comers .... "128 The 
success of these two initiatives was certainly tied to their support by confident American 
leadership. 
In the aftermath ofNATO's January 1994 statement that it remained open to new 
members and the creation of the P:tP, active American leadership seemed to disappear. The 
issue of expansion was officially ignored until December 1994, when the Clinton 
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administration asked the alliance to conduct a formal study of the expansion process. The 
Study on NATO Enlargement was completed in September 1995, but no significant action 
has occurred since that time, nor is any expected until 1997 at the earliest. Without strong 
actions by the United States, the alliance cannot move forward towards actually taking in 
new members. 
The other members of the alliance, though technically equals in the language of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, do not have the ability to push for the admission of new members 
without active American leadership. Even the great powers of the alliance, France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom, cannot decisively lead the other fifteen members, all of 
whom agreed in principle to keep the alliance open to new members, to take action. Of the 
great powers only Germany strongly supports NATO expansion. The British support a 
limited expansion of the alliance, but would not include the Baltic states because of their 
border with Russia and because of the impact that the inclusion of the Baltic states would 
have on NATO-Russian relations. 129 According to some reports, the French envisage a 
larger NATO than do the British, and would include the Baltic states, 130 but the French are 
still not actively pressing for an immediate expansion of the alliance. Unlike the other two 
great powers, Germany is pushing for NATO enlargement to occur as soon as possible. 
Germany, a co-sponsor of the NACC, has been an active proponent ofNATO 
expansion from the very beginning. The German government is in favor of NATO 
expansion for two main reasons that are unique to the situation of Germany. The first 
reason is to create a solid and reliable belt of allied states to its east to serve as a shield 
against an unstable and possibly revisionist Russia. As the German Minister of Defense, 
Volker Riihe, stated in a recent speech, 
The opening of the Alliance to the East is a vital German interest. 
One does not have to be a strategic genius to understand this. You only 
have to look at the map. A situation in which Germany's eastern border is 
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the border between stability and instability in Europe is not sustainable in the 
long run. Germany's eastern border cannot be the eastern border of the 
European Union and NATO. Either we export stability or we import 
instability .131 
Germany desires to see the states of Central Europe invited to join the alliance in order to 
push the political vacuum or "no-man's land" towards the east and away from its borders. 
The second reason Germany is in favor of expanding the alliance is to repay a debt 
of gratitude for allied assistance in securing German democracy and economic prosperity 
after the Second World War. West Germany's joining ofNATO in 1955 is seen as having 
been a key factor in protecting it from the economic chaos that is now found throughout the 
former "Soviet empire" and fostering its strongly democratic political system. Today, 
Germany feels that it should assist the states of Central Europe to achieve a similar level of 
democracy and a free-market economy. Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister, wrote, 
"we Germans must remember that 40 years ago, the countries of the North Atlantic alliance 
granted us a credit of trust and, despite several obstacles and objections, extended a hand of 
partnership to us. As a result, we feel obliged to offer to the young democracies in the East 
the same degree of involvement that was offered to us."132 For these two reasons, to 
secure their eastern border and aid the re-emerging democracies of Central Europe as they 
themselves were aided in the post-war period, the Germans are active proponents ofNATO 
expansion. 
Germany would like to see a rapid enlargement of the alliance in place of the string 
of delays that the United States has forced them to endure. As early as 1993, senior 
members of the German government, including Kinkel, Riihe, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 
started making strong statements in support of quickly opening the alliance to new 
members. In 1993, Riihe wrote, "We cannot afford to delay decisions until perfect visions 
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of Europe have been designed. The Atlantic Alliance must not become a 'closed shop'. I 
cannot see one good reason for denying ... membership in NAT0."133 The vocal support of 
German leaders for expansion has been quieted to a certain extent by American pressure on 
Germany and NATO to slow down the expansion process. Despite these attempts by the 
Clinton administration to keep German policy in line with American policy, Germany has 
continued to press for a more rapid expansion process. As a result of American inertia, 
however, Germany has found itself unable to accelerate the enlargement process in any 
meaningful manner. 
On the subject of the Baltic states, Germany appears to be less decided on a policy. 
Initially, Germany was for the inclusion of the Baltic states in NATO. In Aprill995, Kinkel 
stated at a press conference in Tallinn, Estonia that, ''NATO has decided to admit Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. It's only a question oftime."134 Since that time, officials of the 
German government have been much less adamant that the Baltic states have a place in 
NATO. Some analysts explain this reduced commitment to the Baltic states as a result of 
increased threats by Russia. ns 
One state that has not reduced its commitment to the Baltic states is Denmark. Of 
all the NATO allies, this is the only state that might be willing to delay NATO enlargement 
in general if Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are not given security guarantees. The 
requirement for a unanimous vote that is used in NATO decision-making can give small 
states, like Denmark, the opportunity to wield increased power on issues that are critical to 
their national interests. The Danes have strong ties with the Baltic states and feel that they 
should be invited to join the alliance. "Further, the Danes have a reputation for going their 
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own way: Denmark's public in June 1992 rejected the EU's 1991 Maastricht Treaty"136 and 
created an EU-wide governmental crisis. There is a real possibility that the Danish 
parliament could vote against the accession of new members, thereby blocking enlargement. 
Despite this possibility, many officials in the Danish government understand that there are 
valid arguments against the early inclusion of the Baltic states and that they may not be 
invited to join with the first group of countries. If that is the case, the Danish government 
will ask its NATO allies to create a strategy for their future accession to the alliance. 137 
As far as the Europeans are concerned, active American leadership in the NATO 
expansion debate appears to have dissipated, and the drive to expand the alliance has 
stalled. Senator Richard Lugar, after holding hearings on "NATO's Future" in 1995, 
described the European view of the situation. "They see the Clinton administration as 
divided and uncertain, and they harbor serious doubts about the will and ability of the 
United States to lead this debate. They openly note that NATO enlargement will never· 
occur without strong U.S. leadership. "138 The strong and active leadership of the United 
States is necessary to continue the process ofNATO expansion. No other state or 
coalition of states in the alliance is currently in a position to lead the NATO expansion 
debate. The decisions of the American leaders will strongly influence the decisions of the 
Atlantic Alliance. It is therefore important to examine the different views on NATO 
expansion in the United States. 
B. AMERICAN VIEWS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT 
Within the United States there has been a lively debate over the subject ofNATO 
expansion. The obvious division would be between those who support expansion and those 
who do not. On each side of the debate are people with differing ideas and attitudes. An 
examination of the relevant opinions and their basic tenets is important to understand how 
they may influence the American leaders and public. Of those who condemn NATO 
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expansion, there are two main groups, the "Isolationists," and those who support the idea of 
"Russia first." 
The "Isolationists" would see the United States give up all security commitments in 
Europe and concentrate on dealing with domestic problems. A proponent of this policy is 
Ted Galen Carpenter, who suggests four reasons to disband NATO and quit Europe. First, 
he would end European "free riding" on American security guarantees "that have cost the 
American taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars." Secondly, he would end "Western 
Europe's unhealthy dependent mindset on security issues," a mindset that has rendered it 
incapable of acting in European disputes, such as Bosnia. 139 Third, in his view, NATO 
expansion would be a "blueprint for war with Moscow" 140 over stakes far less important 
than those of the Cold War. Finally, it would entangle the United States in an Eastern 
Europe full of "unresolved territorial disputes; intense ethnic and religious rivalries; and 
fragile, unstable political systems," that are three or four centuries behind those ofWestern 
Europe. 141 In place ofNATO, Carpenter proposes a European-only defense structure and 
limited American ties to the Western European Union (WEU). 
Another "Isolationist," Owen Harries, believes that the "West" is an artificial 
construct, defined only by the hostile and aggressive "East". With the fear of Soviet 
domination gone, he doubts that the unity of the "West" can survive. On this premise, 
Harries argues that NATO expansion rests on a questionable base with numerous specific 
problems, including a failure to take legitimate Russian interests into account, the poor 
credibility of a post-Bosnia NATO, and the extensive costs of "peacemaking" in an unstable 
Eastern Europe. 142 Though not demanding the immediate disbanding ofNATO, Harries 
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does "believe that the time has come to alter the country's priorities in favor of domestic 
concerns. "143 
This isolationist tendency is based on a number of trends in public attitudes. The 
foremost is the desire to concentrate on domestic problems that appeared to be ignored 
during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. As evidence of this trend, it should be 
recalled that, despite President Bush's immense popularity after Operation Desert Storm, a 
relatively unknown Democrat from Arkansas, concentrating on domestic issues, was able to 
win the 1992 presidential election. The lack of confidence in the United Nations and its 
ability to find solutions for the crises that it responds to has made Americans skeptical of 
the utility of foreign interventions. The debacle in Somalia and the failures in Bosnia have 
done nothing but reinforce the idea that American lives should not be risked in countries 
where there is no vital national interest. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote, "Dying for world 
order when there is no concrete threat to one's own nation is a hard argument to make. "144 
This renewed isolationist spirit can be found on both sides of the political spectrum and 
could affect American policy towards NATO. However, the view that the United States 
ought to leave Europe on its own is not held by all those who oppose NATO expansion. 
The liberal internationalists that support a "Russia first" policy would like to see the 
United States create stronger ties with Russia for three reasons: to assist that state in its 
progress towards democracy, to continue with arms control negotiations, and to secure 
assistance in responding to international crises. Concerning Russian democratization, 
Michael Mandelbaum argues that a "nee-containment" policy of NATO enlargement would 
run the risk of weakening democratic forces in Russia, and if imposed, would be seen as 
illegitimate by the Russians. This illegitimacy would give a revisionist Russia reason to try 
to undermine the fragile European order. 145 Despite his opposition to enlargement, he does 
143 Ibid., p. 52. 
144 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Back to the Womb?: Isolationism's Renewed Threat," Foreign 
Affairs, July/August 1995, p.7. 
145 Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995, p. 
11-12. 
54 
see the continued need for the alliance to assure German security and ensure that Germany 
does not heavily arm itself, which would cause a sense of insecurity among its neighbors. A 
strong alliance would also maintain the US military presence and reassure the Europeans of 
American commitment, in case Russia were to regain its imperial ambitions. 146 
Michael Lind, another "Russia firster," would promote better relations with Russia 
and give the Russians a free hand in the "near abroad." He states "it is not in America's 
interest to back a weak, friendless Russia into a wall, by expanding NATO into a 
cumbersome and unnecessarily hostile coalition." In his opinion, "a traditional Russian 
great power with modest regional goals" is not a threat, and US-Russian relations should 
become one of "neither adversaries nor allies. "147 A final "Russia firster" is Catherine 
Kelleher, the Defense Advisor to the United States Permanent Representative to NATO, 
who believes that the most important aspect of American and European policy should be to 
promote a democratic Russia that will accept security responsibilities in Europe on a basis 
of cooperation with NATO. Unlike the others, she believes that NATO expansion would be 
able to garner some short-term gains to European security, though not very much when 
compared to the goal of "active Russian engagement in a transformed European security 
regime. "148 Besides the goal to see reform and democracy flourish, the "Russia firsters" 
would like to see Russia abide by current arms control agreements and continue with 
ongoing negotiations. 
Russia is the state most capable of directly threatening the United States, and there 
is a great fear that NATO expansion would give nationalists in Russia justification to stop 
the arms control process. The current dispute over the flank limitations of the Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty would probably not be resolved, and it is possible 
that Russia might repudiate the entire treaty, claiming that the balance of power has 
changed so much that the treaty is no longer valid. In the field of nuclear weapons, START 
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IT, or provisions of it, could fall victim to nationalist leaders who feel Russia is threatened 
by NATO expansion. Hard-liners in Russia could claim that further nuclear disarmament is 
impossible in the face of NATO "aggression". The Western monitoring of current 
denuclearisation could be portrayed as espionage by a hostile power, and it might be sharply 
reduced or ended completely. 149 It is even possible that Russia could attempt to rebuild its 
weakened conventional forces, or if that is not feasible due to the condition of the economy, 
increase and re-deploy its nuclear arsenal. All of these possibilities appear to be very real to 
the "Russia first" group and are not considered to be worth risking for the possible security 
gains from NATO expansion. In testimony at a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on 
European Affairs concerning NATO enlargement, Fred Ikle said, 
In the context of U.S. interests in European security and NATO, the 
nuclear question is still the most important one.... And for the nuclear 
question the most important, and in the long run most promising avenue still 
remains for the United States to pursue a cooperative, mutually supportive 
relationship with Russia. As of today, this goal is more important than 
tidying up loose ends in Eastern Europe. I 50 
It is the view ofikle and others that the nuclear threat emanating from Russia is a much 
greater security concern for the United States than a continuation of the status quo in 
Central Europe. The "Russia firsters" would also promote better relations with Moscow to 
get its assistance in responding to international crises and rogue states. 
With the end of the Cold War and the bi-polar world, numerous regional conflicts 
have resurfaced that will undoubtedly require some sort of action by the Western powers. 
The "Russia firsters" believe that good relations with Russia will be needed to properly 
respond to these regional conflicts and restore peace to the states involved. They use the 
Gulf War and the current situation in Bosnia as evidence that Russian diplomatic assistance 
and (in some cases) military support is crucial and necessary if the West desires to achieve a 
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resolution to these crises. It is thought that NATO expansion would jeopardize Russian 
assistance in responding to regional conflicts and end the possibility of achieving any 
meaningful solutions. 
Of even greater importance is the rise of "rogue states" that are working to obtain 
nuclear weapons to enhance their status and regional power. Russian aid may be critical in 
halting their plans to acquire nuclear weapons and in containing their aggressive intentions. 
As Stephen Sestanovich said about the recent Russian reactor sales to Iran, "it will be far 
easier to turn off Moscow's nuclear deliveries to Iran if relations improve. "151 A Russia 
that has good relations with the West would be much more willing to restrict the flow of 
both conventional weapons and nuclear material and technology. These good relations 
would certainly be damaged by any expansion of the Alliance. 
A final area where Russian assistance might be needed is "the looming emergence of 
China as a military and economic colossus." A Russia oriented to the West would be 
needed to build an effective coalition against an aggressive China. In fact, it is possible that 
good relations between Russia and the West could deter China from taking risks that might 
make a coalition necessary. 152 All of these possible scenarios are seen by those who put 
"Russia first" as being much more important than the possible security gained by expanding 
NATO in Central Europe. In the view of these liberal internationalists, the risk oflosing 
Russian assistance and goodwill is not justified by the addition of a few states to a Cold War 
alliance. The views of those who oppose NATO expansion are generally divided between 
those who do not want to see expansion interfere with US-Russian relations and those who 
would quit Europe completely. 
A final element that opposes NATO expansion are the "defense hawks." These 
leaders ''worry that additional states [within NATO] will weaken the alliance's defenses, 
strain the current members' shrinking military resources, and risk leaks of sensitive 
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information. "153 This relatively small group of internationalists fears that an expansion of 
NATO could divert scarce defense dollars from the Pentagon and add new commitments for 
the already underfunded and overextended American military. Senator Sam Nunn, the 
senior Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, captured the spirit of this 
argument, along with the ideas of the liberal internationalists, in the following comment: 
"By forcing the pace ofNATO enlargement at a volatile and unpredictable moment in 
Russia's history, we could place ourselves in the worst of all security environments: rapidly 
declining defense budgets, broader responsibilities, and heightened instability."I54 These 
"defense hawks," though generally supportive ofNATO, feel that NATO expansion could 
create unnecessary and unacceptable demands on the United States armed forces that could 
weaken American and European security in the long-run. 
On the side ofNATO expansion, there are also two main schools of thought, those 
who would emphasize the geopolitical arguments for expansion and those who would 
emphasize the democratization arguments for expansion. Henry Kissinger, a proponent of 
the geopolitical arguments, is afraid that a security vacuum will form between Germany and 
Russia if NATO does not expand to cover that area. This vacuum would surely invite 
Germany and Russia to seek security in the area through national efforts. This would in 
tum lead to a clash of interests that would threaten NATO's cohesion and existence. 
According to Kissinger, "NATO cannot long survive if the borders it protects are not 
threatened while it refuses to protect borders of adjoining countries that do feel threatened." 
He also wrote that Russia should be given a security treaty with NATO, but should not be 
allowed in NATO, as it would change the alliance from one of collective defense to 
collective security and negate its usefulness.155 
153 Jeremy Rosner, ''NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle," Foreign Affairs, 
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The NATO expansionists that believe in geopolitics and the primacy of power 
relations view political upheaval or a war in Central Europe as the greatest threat to the 
Alliance. As Gary Geipel stated, "One is left to wonder what-if not a conflict in Central 
Europe-would constitute an external threat to the current membership of the alliance. "156 A 
security vacuum between Russia and Germany, which has historically existed and precluded 
any lasting peace in the region, would need to be filled by the stability and security of an 
expanded NATO. This would be the only way to "the achievement of a true European 
peace." Geipel also argued that if NATO were to ignore the security vacuum to the east, it 
would "reveal itself to be nothing more than an insurance policy for wealthy Western 
Europe" and would thereby risk losing US support.157 
Another expansionist, William Satire, calling himself a "realistic distruster," also 
fears that a "resurgent Russia will someday again seek to dominate or re-absorb the nations 
of Eastern Europe." His goal would be to expand the alliance quickly, while Russia is in no 
position to interfere: "if we wait until the bear regains both strength and appetite, the most 
wlnerable nations will never be protected--because at that time, faint hearts would see 
expansion as provocative." Unlike some of his contemporaries, Satire believes that the 
Baltic states must be invited to join NATO. IfNATO accepts the "old, imperialist Soviet 
claims" to special consideration in the Baltic states, they will be condemned to the Russian 
sphere of influence, the same mistake that was made at Yalta. 158 The proponents of the 
geopolitical arguments believe that Western security can only be guaranteed if the border of 
NATO is pushed to the east. These ideas emphasize the importance of a security vacuum in 
Central Europe and the threat to Europe that still exists from Russia. 
Strobe Talbott, who has changed from a "Russia first" position, now believes that 
NATO expansion is necessary for a number of reasons. He has an important point 
concerning the geopolitical argument for expansion. NATO is "a collective defensive pact" 
156 Gary Geipel, Foreign Policy, Fall 1995, p. 174. 
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and must prepare for uncertainty in Russia's future, including the possible abandonment of 
democracy and return to threatening patterns of behavior. This action by NATO may make 
Russia feel as though it is "still subject to a thinly disguised policy of containment," but it is 
prudent considering the reality of the situation. 159 Talbott's other reasons for supporting 
expansion are the democratization arguments. Concerning the internal development of the 
new members, Talbott would make "respect for democracy and international norms of 
behavior explicit preconditions for membership, so that enlargement ofNATO would be a 
force for the rule oflaw both within Europe's new democracies and among them. "160 This 
goal, to support the Central European states in their attempt to adopt Western-style 
democracy and a :free-market economy by covering them with the NATO security 
guarantee, is the basis for the democratization arguments for NATO expansion. 
The Central European states do face genuine security threats. The Russians, their 
former overlords, have the potential to once again play a role in their internal politics. 
There is certainly mistrust and fear among the Central European states. Their new 
democratic governments are vulnerable to political upheavals or poor economic progress as 
they gain experience and their citizenry matures. NATO could, in principle, provide the 
security needed by these fledgling democracies, in view of the "second chance" offered by 
the West's victory in the Cold War. The expansion of the alliance to include these states 
would create the stability needed for democracy and capitalism to flourish, thereby ensuring 
that they would remain anchored to the West. "But if the new eastern democracies are not 
soon given a hope of eventual security within a broader NATO, they may come to feel 
rejected, to look elsewhere, or to succumb to internal reactionary forces. Efforts to create 
liberal democracies in the Central and East European area will then diminish, and much of 
the West's investment in the cold war will be squandered,"161 writes Jeffrey Simon. The 
expansion of NATO is perceived to be necessary to defend the gains made by the West in 
159 Strobe Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," The New York Review of Books, I 0 
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the Cold War, these gains being freedom for democracy and a free market economy in 
Central Europe. It would be a terrible tragedy if after the great efforts made during over 
forty years of Cold War, the fruits of victory were allowed to slip out ofNATO's grasp. It 
would be a very expensive mistake, both in "blood and treasure," to allow democracy "to 
fail or be crushed." As Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee wrote, "While there are certainly costs 
and potential risks in expanding NATO, there are also costs and risks in remaining wedded 
to the status quo. "162 In the view of those who support the democratization arguments, the 
political and financial expense of expanding NATO is small compared to the cost of a failure 
of democratic and economic reforms in Central Europe. 
A strong supporter ofNATO expansion, William Odom, believes in the primacy of 
the democratization argument. For him, "a much better argument for NATO's expansion is 
found in its inception: the concern of its proponents with internal political and economic 
affairs in Western Europe." He believes that, in principle, external military security is a 
reason for expansion; however, "that challenge is nonexistent today. "163 Odom's testimony 
before a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs concerning NATO 
enlargement illustrates his point. 
By establishing the Atlantic Alliance and deploying U.S. military 
forces in Europe, we transformed half of Europe from a set of warring 
states, a threat to our interests, into a set of dynamic economic and military 
partners. Our presence allowed age-old enemies to do what they had never 
been able to achieve before: cooperate economically, politically, and 
militarily. The result was spectacular. 
Our interests in Europe today are the same as in the past, only larger. 
The threats to them are remarkably like those in the late 1940s, internal 
instability and mistrust of neighboring states. And like in 1949, NATO is no 
less important as a means for dealing with those threats. To meet its 
challenge today, however, it has to be enlarged .... 164 
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Odom views NATO's primary goal as the spread of democracy, capitalism, and Western 
values throughout Europe and thinks expansion is necessary to accomplish this goal. 
NATO's great success in transforming Western Europe can and must be repeated in Central 
Europe. The geopolitical and democratization arguments for expansion have their merits. 
However, the next question is, who should be allowed in the alliance? 
The question of who would be allowed future membership in the alliance is indeed a 
critical one. Depending on which argument for expansion is used, non-membership would 
entail either de facto relegation to a Russian sphere of influence, no effective support for 
democratic and economic reforms, or, possibly, both. The Baltic States, which fall in the 
eastern part of Central Europe and share a common border with Russia and Belarus, are 
especially sensitive to the issue of who would be able to join NATO. 
Given the two arguments for expansion, it is theoretically feasible that the Baltic 
States could join NATO. Using the geopolitical argument, the Baltic States would qualify 
for membership because they definitely fall into the area of security vacuum between 
Germany and Russia which NATO would want to stabilize. Using the democratization 
argument, the Baltic States would also qualify for membership because they have newly 
democratic governments that are working to install free market economies which NATO 
would want to assist and protect. Despite these theoretical justifications for NATO 
membership, not all expansionists would have the Baltic States in the Alliance. 
The Baltic States' fear of "falling into what President Clinton has called a 'strategic 
limbo' if they are not included in the first or second phase ofNATO expansion"l65 is 
certainly justified because many of those who adamantly support NATO expansion do not 
see any room for the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. William Odom believes that the 
Baltic States cannot be included in the expanded alliance, due to their indefensibility. 
Though they may have good moral arguments for joining, NATO would be "assuming too 
164 William Odom, testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs of the 
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great a reach. "166 Richard Kugler thinks that an equilibrium between Russian and NATO 
influence would be necessary. He would allow the "Visegrad four" states into the Alliance 
and let Russia have influence over the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Between the two blocs would be "a band of neutral but secure countries in East Central 
Europe and the Balkans" that would include the Baltic States. He claims that these states 
would "remain free and outside Russia's orbit," 167 but fails to explain how this would 
happen. Zbigniew Brzezinski would not rule out Baltic inclusion in NATO, but he would 
greatly delay their entry. He feels that they should be viewed "in the wider Scandinavian 
context," and that they currently have a status "similar to that of Finland during the recent 
past: formally neutral but aware of the West's enormous sympathy, to the point that any 
aggression against them would surely precipitate a serious international crisis. "168 
Brzezinski feels this form of protection should be sufficient, unless Russia adopts an overtly 
threatening posture which might justify a quicker inclusion in NATO. The Baltic States 
would theoretically be included in the Alliance no matter which argument for expansion is 
used. There are, however, some realistic arguments against their entrance. 
The idea ofNATO expansion has its supporters and detractors. The supporters 
have two arguments for expansion, geopolitics and democratization, while the detractors 
fall into two groups, those who would build good relations with Russia and those who 
would leave Europe on its own. The opinions of the leaders who make American 
governmental policy are, of course, likely to be more influential than those of commentators 
and analysts, however distinguished. 
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C. THE VIEWS OF AMERICAN LEADERS 
The Bush administration had a "Russia first" mentality in that its primary focus was 
on the traditional superpower relationship. There was no movement to expand NATO as 
Soviet forces left Central Europe, and the United States actually began to reduce its forces 
stationed in Western Europe. The Bush administration worked on issues such as the end of 
the Cold War, arms control (including strategic nuclear weapons, chemical and biological 
weapons, and the CFE Treaty), the unification of Germany, and the GulfWar. The Soviets 
proved to be helpful on many of these issues, and President Bush was "hopeful that such 
cooperation can be expanded. "169 At the same time, Bush's National Security Strategy 
stated that "we will encourage greater European responsibility for Europe's defense. "170 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the concern over strategic nuclear weapons and the 
denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was paramount. The administration's 
"Russia first" agenda, to strengthen the strategic nuclear weapons reduction programs and 
to support the democratization effort and economic reforms in Russia, became the top 
foreign policy priority. 
The Clinton administration seemed to inherit this "Russia first" attitude from the 
Bush administration. After the "genuine entente between Moscow and Washington during 
1990 and 1991 ",Clinton wanted to "tum the relationship into a true 'strategic partnership' 
or quasi-alliance. "171 The deteriorating political scene in Russia, especially after the 
October 1993 battle between Boris Y eltsin and his parliament, and a fear of deeper 
American involvement in Bosnia gave the administration reason to focus its attention on 
Russia and leave Europe to the Europeans. Concern for what Russia's reaction would be 
limited support for NATO enlargement by the administration. 172 According to Paul 
Wolfowitz, the Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy during the Bush administration, 
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Clinton seemed "to be subordinating [his] policy toward other countries in the region to 
concern about how those policies will affect Y eltsin, even where American interests may be 
large and the effect on Y eltsin marginal." The Clinton administration was "unresponsive to 
the security concerns of the East Europeans" and "slipping into a dangerous and misguided 
policy of 'Russia only."'l73 
By the end of 1993, increased calls for action on the NATO expansion issue resulted 
in a change in the Clinton administration's policy. President Clinton became a proponent of 
NATO expansion and claimed to have forsaken the idea of "Russia first." The first solid 
evidence of this policy shift was the US proposal in October 1993 of the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) program. The official announcement of the PfP by NATO, in January 1994, 
was tied to the statement that NATO was open to new members. President Clinton 
emphasized to the Eastern European states that, "while the partnership is not NATO 
membership, neither is it a permanent holding room .... the question is no longer whether 
NATO will take on new members, but when and how."174 One of the purposes of the PiP 
was to prepare prospective members for inclusion in NATO by giving them a chance to 
cooperate with the alliance. By conducting joint exercises, military to military exchanges, 
and political consultation, the PfP would begin the process of cultivating ties with those 
states that desired NATO membership. As Secretary of State Warren Christopher said, PfP 
would "pave the way for NATO's eventual expansion."175 In supporting NATO expansion, 
the administration used both the geopolitical argument and the democratization argument. 
The new National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement claimed that, 
Expanding the Alliance will promote our interests by reducing the 
risk of instability or conflict in Europe's eastern half-the region where two 
world wars and the Cold War began. It will help assure that no part of 
Europe will revert to a zone of great power competition or a sphere of 
influence. It will build confidence, and give new democracies a powerful 
173 Paul Wolfowitz, "Clinton's First Year," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1994, p. 41. 
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incentive to consolidate their reforms. And each potential member will be 
judged according to the strength of its democratic institutions ... 176 
By claiming both arguments for expansion, while trying to avoid giving the geopolitical 
argument an anti-Russian tone, the administration was certain to maximize political support 
for its new policy. In order to make a break with the original "Russia first" policy, the 
administration made public statements that Russia would not influence the process of 
NATO expansion. Referring to Russia, Clinton stated that, "no country outside [the 
alliance] will be allowed to veto expansion. "177 With this shift in policy, Clinton appeared 
to be a strong supporter of NATO expansion. 
Critics of the Clinton administration's policy towards expansion viewed the PfP as a 
way to delay expansion and limit negative Russian reactions. John Borawski suggested 
that, "PfP was deliberately intended to avoid early decisions being taken on NATO 
enlargement. "178 Senator Richard Lugar said that PtP "appears in the first instance to be 
Russian-oriented," and renamed it the "Policy for Postponement. "179 To many people, it 
appeared that the Clinton administration had not actually given up its "Russia first" policy 
but was in fact practicing it while claiming to be pro-expansion. "The Partnership for Peace 
is a sharp rebuff to the Central Europeans' plea for NATO membership," wrote Paul 
Wolfowitz. In his view, the Clinton "administration seems to have simply yielded to 
Russian objections to Central European membership. "18° Clinton's policies after the 
initiation of the PtP may lend some credibility to the critics' assertions. 
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In December 1994, eleven months after the initial declaration that NATO would 
accept new members, the administration asked NATO to begin a study of how enlargement 
should proceed. That study was to take almost a year to prepare and would then be briefed 
to the prospective members. As the Secretary of State described it, "the alliance began a 
steady, deliberate, and transparent process that will lead to NATO expansion. "181 To 
critics of the administration, the study was another way to delay the actual expansion. 
William Odom's view of the situation differed from the Secretary of State's. He said, "we 
have gone into a long phase of study. I think all of us from either the executive or 
legislative branch have a long experience of what studies mean, particularly when you do 
not have a clear sense of what is going to come out of the study. "182 In his view, as with 
many supporters ofNATO expansion, the Clinton administration was using every possible 
method to delay the acceptance of new members while continuing to publicly state that it 
was in favor of expansion. Critics of the Clinton administration stated that the motivation 
for Clinton's supposed pro-expansionist views and his recent call to study NATO expansion 
was the popularity of the Republican Contract with America, which contained a pledge to 
accelerate NATO expansion, and the recent successes of the Republican Party in the 1994 
Congressional elections. They contended that Clinton was attempting to "steal" an issue 
from the Republicans, while he had not really changed his personal beliefs and was still a 
"Russia firster. " 
The pro-expansionist critics of the Clinton administration were given more 
ammunition in December 1995, when NATO declared that 1996 would be used for 
consultations with prospective members over the results of the enlargement study. "This 
process amounts to perhaps the world's most extensive and prolonged series of membership 
interviews. "183 As the Clinton administration views the situation, expansion is on a "steady, 
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---------------------------------------------------, 
deliberate course ... not faster nor slower than we have indicated in the past. "184 Others, 
however, do not see the situation the same way. Many believe that NATO expansion has 
been put on hold for two reasons, the Russian and the American presidential elections. In 
the Russian elections, the "administration does not want to undercut President Boris 
Y eltsin" or "hand Y eltsin's nationalist and Communist opponents a new campaign issue." 
As for the American elections, "the general idea of expanding NATO is-popular in this 
country. But the details of exactly how it will be done could prove considerably more 
troublesome." 185 The Clinton administration appears to many critics to be delayirig 
expansion to aid democratization and economic reform in Russia-- that is, practicing 
"Russia first", while preaching NATO expansion because it is popular. 
One critic, Peter Rodman, believes that President Clinton has not only put off 
admitting new members until after the election, but that he has also traded NATO expansion 
for Russian support in the Bosnia crisis. He claims that Clinton has "given Moscow secret 
assurances that, in return for its cooperation with the United States in Bosnia peacekeeping, 
NATO enlargement will be put 'on the back burner' for the foreseeable future. "186 This deal 
would remain in effect if Clinton were re-elected to a second term, according to Rodman's 
Russian sources. The administration's purported logic for this deal is that Russian support 
in Bosnia would prove that the Russians could be trusted to work within the new 
"European security architecture" and that NATO expansion is unnecessary. 187 Rodman's 
accusation is rather pointed, but there is some evidence that lends credibility to his 
arguments. 
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As the 1996 presidential campaign began to get into full swing, Clinton continued to 
proclaim his support for NATO expansion. The White House press secretary, Mike 
McCurry, defended the pace of the expansion process with statements like, ''NATO is not a 
country club that you go join some afternoon ... " 188, and "this is a process that is going to 
have to be very carefully, deliberately designed, and it's likely to take some time."189 
During a White House visit by Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Clinton stated 
that, "you should make no mistakes about it: NATO will expand."19° Despite this pro-
expansion rhetoric, the Clinton administration expects no concrete action towards admitting 
a new member to occur during 1997. McCurry stated in July 1996, that the December 
1996 NAC meeting will begin "a process of evaluating over the course of the coming year 
how they [NATO] will answer the questions 'who' and 'when.' Its going to take some 
time."I9I 
The three Presidents of the Baltic states met with Clinton in June 1996, but they 
received no firm commitments for their eventual inclusion in the alliance. They said that the 
administration assured them that "the first group of new members permitted to join the 
Western alliance since the end of the Cold war will not be the last."I92 Clinton's comments, 
in keeping with his position of the past two years, seemed to imply that the Baltic states 
may someday be invited to join the alliance, but they were very nebulous and non-
committal. As the Estonian President Lennart Meri stated, in reference to American 
commitments, "suddenly I feel hungry, I want something more substantial to swallow."I93 
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The fears of the Baltic presidents were confirmed in September 1996, when Secretary of 
Defense William Perry announced that the Baltic states were not ready for NATO 
membership. In his statement, Perry declined to indicate which nations were ready for 
NATO membership and emphasized that though the Baltic states were "not yet ready," they 
may still be eligible for future NATO membership.194 
Though the Clinton administration continues to profess its support for the expansion 
of the Atlantic Alliance, it has so far chosen not to show the leadership needed to bring 
about the timely addition of new members. Recent statements seem to be preparing the 
NATO allies, prospective members, and the American people for another year of study and 
deliberation but no real action. The Clinton administration would claim that it supports 
NATO expansion. All the official public documents and statements do back up this claim, 
but there are still doubts in many people's minds. The doubters would say that the 
administration has never lost its "Russia first" focus, and the constant delay regarding actual 
expansion does support this theory. If this is the case, it is very possible that the reason for 
this approach lies in the popularity ofNATO expansion with the American people. "A 
plurality ofthe public (42%) and a strong majority (59%) ofleaders support the expansion 
ofNATO .... "195 The United States Congress, quick to sense the mood of the nation, has 
pressured the administration on the subject ofNATO expansion. Such pressure may have 
given President Clinton motivation to cover his true policy with a more popular rhetoric. 
One reason for the Clinton administration's apparent shift to a pro-expansion policy 
may have been the action taken by the United States Congress. In April1994, House 
Resolution (H.R.) 4210, the NATO Participation Act of 1994, was sponsored by 
Republican Representatives Gilman and Solomon. The original bill "was to authorize the 
President to establish a program to assist the transition to full NATO membership of 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia by January 1999. "196 A version of it 
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was passed by the Senate in July 1994 but was defeated in conference with the House after 
the State Department recommended that it be withdrawn or widened to include Russia. 197 
The bill was finally passed by the House as an amendment to another piece oflegislation, 
H.R. 5246, on the last day of the 103rd Congress and just prior to Congressional elections. 
It was also passed by the Senate during the same session and was signed into law by the 
President in November. This bill, though sponsored by Republicans, was passed by a 
Democrat-controlled Congress and enjoyed wide bipartisan support, reflecting the 
popularity of the issue with the voters. The ~nallaw was not as strong as the original bill 
because the target date of January 1999 was deleted. The law stated that "the President 
may establish a program to assist the transition to full NATO membership," but there was 
no requirement for him to do so. Though the law specifically mentioned the "Visegrad 
four" states, it did have a provision to assist "other Partnership for Peace countries 
emerging from communist domination."198 Using this clause, the Baltic States could 
certainly be designated to receive assistance under the program if the President so desired. 
In the summer of 1994, while the Democrat-controlled Congress debated the NATO 
Participation Act and finally passed a watered-down version, the Republican Party was 
writing its "Contract With America." In the Contract, the Republican Party proposed a 
"National Security Restoration Act" as one of the ten bills that would be introduced in the 
first 100 days. This bill would focus "on adding new members to the alliance," specifically 
the "Visegrad four," but also other European states if they could contribute to the security 
of the alliance. 199 The Republican promise also contained a timetable, with a target date of 
10 January 1999 (the five year anniversary of the PfP) for the first four new members to 
join. The Contract was adamant that new members ofNATO would have to "embrace 
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democracy, enact free market economic reforms, and place their armies under civilian 
control. "200 Thus, the Republicans were using the democratization arguments for 
expansion, though they were probably also thinking of the geopolitical arguments as well. 
Once again the Baltic States were not excluded, but neither were they specifically 
mentioned as good candidates for membership. 
The Republican party took control of both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate in the 1994 elections, setting the stage for the next round ofNATO expansion 
legislation. In accordance with the "Contract With America," HR. 7, the National Security 
Revitalization Act of 1995, was introduced on 4 January 1995. A section of this bill, Title 
VI, called the NATO Expansion Act of 1995, dealt specifically with NATO expansion. 
Provisions of the bill called for the "Visegrad four" states to be "invited to become full 
NATO members not later than" 10 January 1999 and required the President to establish a 
program to assist those four states in the transition to NATO membership.201 Though the 
President was required to assist the four specified states, he also had the option of assisting 
other states. The bill received "almost unanimous opposition from Democrats and loud 
objections from President Clinton's national security team. "202 Secretary of State 
Christopher testified that the United States "must not give up prematurely on the process of 
democratization and reform in Russia," and that "we must be very careful about trying to 
prematurely choose certain countries over others for NATO membership, or to set specific 
timetables. "203 It is reasonable to infer that the Clinton administration did not want this bill 
to interfere with US-Russian relations. The House Democrats tried to amend the bill to 
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give the President discretion on whether to establish the program to aid the Central 
European states in the transition to NATO membership, but this was defeated in a vote that 
split along party lines. 204 The issue ofNATO expansion had gone from a bipartisan effort 
to a Republican issue. 
In an effort to push the bill through the House, a second, less-stringent bill with the 
same name, H.R. 872, was introduced on 9 February 1995. This bill was sponsored by 
Republican Representatives Spence, Gilman, and E. Bryant and "Southern Democrat" 
Representative Hayes and was meant to be something of a compromise. In this bill the 
deadline of 10 January 1999 for NATO membership was dropped, though the President was 
still required to create a program to assist the prospective members. House Minority 
Leader Richard Gephardt claimed that the bill still strained "to reinvent a cold war that no 
longer exists" and politicized NAT0.205 Despite Democratic opposition, the changes found 
in H.R. 872 were adopted into H.R. 7 on 15 February 1995, and H.R. 7, with a few 
amendments, was passed on 16 February 1995 in a vote that split along party lines. The bill 
moved on to the Senate where it was assumed that it would not be acted upon in its current 
form, and it was still targeted by a "faintly veiled veto threat by President Clinton. "206 It 
was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and, as of October 1996, it has 
not yet left the Committee. 
One of the final amendments to the bill is of great interest for the Baltic States. An 
amendment offered by Representatives Durbin and Lipinski, Democrats from Dlinois, added 
language that gave the Baltic States greater prospects than the original bill had intended. 
Whereas before only the "Visegrad four" were mentioned in the "should be invited to 
become a full NATO member" category, the amendment added that "when any other 
European country emerging from communist domination is in a position to further the 
204 Pat Towell, "House Votes to Sharply Rein in U.S. Peacekeeping Expanses," 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 18 February 1995, p. 538. 
205 Richard Gephardt, remarks before the House of Representatives, Congressional 
Record, 16 February 1995, p. H1881. 
206 Ibid., p. 535. 
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principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area, it should be invited to become a full NATO member." The amendment went 
on to state that the United States "should furnish appropriate assistance" to these states.207 
Though the amendment was not so strong as to require any action towards these states, it 
clearly implied that they were not to be shut out of the process entirely. In arguments for 
the amendment, the Baltic States were praised for their progress towards achieving 
Western-style democracy and economic reform and were specifically mentioned as 
"potential allies of the United States. "2°8 The support for the amendment was bipartisan, 
which can be explained by two factors: it was non-binding for the President, and it was 
supported by the Central and Eastern European Coalition, "which consists of those 
prominent organizations that represent Americans of East European lineage. "2°9 In the 
NATO Expansion Act's final form, the President was required to establish a program to 
assist the "Visegrad four" and was allowed, but not required, to designate other Central 
European states for assistance. The states ofEstonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were 
specifically mentioned as being among those states that the President could designate for 
assistance. 210 
While HR. 7languished in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate 
Resolution (S.R.) 602 was intr<?duced by Republican Senators Hank Brown and Lauch 
Faircloth on 23 March 1995. This bill, titled the NATO Participation Act Amendments of 
1995, contained much of the language ofH.R. 7, Title VI, the NATO Expansion Act of 
1995. It would also require the President to create an assistance program for Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia to make the transition to full NATO 
207 Durbin Amendment to H.R. 7, Congressional Record, 16 February 1995, p. H1871. 
208 Richard Durbin, remarks before the House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 
16 February 1995, p. H1872. 
209 Benjamin Gilman, remarks before the House ofRepresentatives, Congressional Record, 
16 February 1995, p. H1872. 
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membership. The President was still given the option of designating "other European 
countries emerging from Communist domination to receive assistance under the program." 
A new aspect of the bill was that it asked the President to press for "observer status in the 
North Atlantic Council" for the prospective NATO member states receiving aid under the 
program. The justification in the bill for NATO enlargement was to "enhance the security 
of the Alliance" and to "create a stable environment needed to successfully complete the 
political and economic transformation envisioned by the Eastern and Central European 
countries." The Republicans were again using both arguments for NATO expansion. 
Concerning the Baltic States, the bill stated that "Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have made 
significant progress in preparing for NATO membership and should be given every 
consideration for inclusion in programs for NATO transition assistance. "211 No other 
states, except the "Visegrad four," were so mentioned by the bill, and one may assume that 
the authors of the bill view the Baltic states as a "second tier," below the "Visegrad four," 
but above the states of Southeastern Europe. This differentiation has had no real effect as 
the bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and, as of October 1996, it has 
not emerged for a Senate vote. 
In an attempt to re-invigorate the debate over NATO expansion in the Congress and 
spur the Clinton administration to action, nearly identical bills were introduced into the 
House and Senate on 4 June 1996. The bills, titled the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act 
of 1996, were announced during an appearance by former Solidarity leader and Polish 
President Lech Walesa before the Congress. The bills, which specifically identified the 
Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion as preparing the Baltic states for the responsibilities of 
NATO membership, called for the United States to actively assist the emerging democracies 
in Central Europe so that they may qualify for NATO membership. The bills designated 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as able to receive part of the 60 million dollars 
appropriated for ''NATO Enlargement Assistance" in FY 97. Other Central European 
211 S.R. 602, NATO Participation Act Amendments of 1995, as introduced in the Senate 
on 23 March 1995. 
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states, including the Baltic states, were also specified as being eligible for designation by the 
President to receive aid.21z 
The House version, H.R. 3564, sponsored by Representative Gilman, who is now 
the Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, contained a section that 
discussed the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union in 1940. This 
section stated that it was the sense of the Congress that the Baltic states have "valid 
historical security concerns that must be taken into account by the US" and that they 
"should not be disadvantaged in seeking to join NATO by virtue of their forcible 
incorporation. "213 It seems that the intent of this section was to reaffirm that the Baltic 
states are a part of Europe and should not be assigned to a Russian sphere of influence, just 
because they were a part of the USSR H.R. 3564, which was passed on 23 July 1996, by a 
vote of353-55, received strong bipartisan support. A reason for this may be the non-
binding nature of the bill and the fact that elections are near, and that many Democratic 
Representatives from the industrial Mid-West and North-East have large segments oftheir 
constituency that are of Central European descent. 
The Senate version of this bill, S. 1830, has not fared as well as the House version 
and has joined S.R. 602 in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The bill was 
sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, just before he resigned to campaign in the 
1996 Presidential election, and eight other senior Republican Senators, such as Jesse Helms, 
Arlen Specter, and Mitch McConnelP14 Despite this strong backing, the bill remains in 
committee with little hope of early floor debate. The only legislation concerning NATO 
enlargement that the Senate has recently passed is an amendment to the FY97 Defense 
Appropriations bill. This amendment, S.A. 4367, which passed by a vote of97-0, requires 
the President to submit a report on NATO enlargement to the Congress. Democratic 
212 HR. 3564, NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, as passed in the House on 23 
July 1996. 
213 Ibid. 
214 S. 1830, NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, as introduced in the Senate on 4 
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Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, the sponsor, has said that the report should discuss how 
NATO would defend the new members and the cost ofexpansion.215 
Forcing the President to act on NATO expansion has certainly become a Republican 
desire. It would appear to be something of a priority in the Republican-controlled House, 
where it was a part of the "Contract With America" and acted on within weeks of the 
opening of the I 04th Congress. The House Republican Policy Committ-ee endorsed an 
immediate expansion ofNATO in May I996, saying delay would "perpetuate a power 
vacuum in the heart of Europe." Their statement said that NATO should "immediately 
expand to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The Baltic Republics and 
other former Warsaw Pact states should be added at the earliest possible time." The 
Committee repeatedly criticized President Clinton for his slow approach to NATO 
expansion and said the result of the current policy would be the spreading of instability 
throughout Central Europe. 216 
Representative Gilman, in a review of US policy toward NATO enlargement before 
the House International Relations Committee, identified the issue of NATO expansion as 
"one of the greatest national security challenges we [the US] face" and stated that the 
Clinton administration had failed to act as authorized by Congress in the NATO 
Participation Act of I994.217 The theme of Gilman's address was that the House 
Republicans would continue to spur Clinton on towards action until such time as new 
members actually join NATO. The Republicans maintained their control of the House in the 
I996 elections and appear to be poised to continue pressing for NATO expansion. 
However, the Republican majority in the House in the I 05th Congress is considerably 
2I5 Susan Cornwell, "US Sees Senate Possibly Hindering NATO Expansion,"Reuters, I4 
July I996. 
2I6 John Diamond, "House Republicans Support Immediate NATO Expansion," 
Associated Press, 2I May I996. 
217 Benjamin Gilman, Statement at a Hearing on the US Policy Toward NATO 
Enlargement before the House International Relations Committee, 20 June I996. 
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smaller than before, and this may force the Republicans to tone down their rhetoric and 
legislation. 
The support in the Senate for a rapid NATO expansion has not been nearly so 
strong. The small Republican majority and the large number of moderate Republican 
Senators made it difficult to force through legislation that would radically change American 
foreign policy. The negative views regarding NATO enlargement of many well-respected 
moderate Senators, from both parties, have helped to slow or stop all of this legislation in 
the Senate. Republican Senator William Cohen of Maine commented in February 1995, 
"Stability is not a concept that is easy to sell. What we need is a thorough public debate, 
but in the United States it hasn't even begun. The answer today would be no. "218 Senator 
Nunn commented in June 1995, "By forcing the pace ofNATO enlargement at a volatile 
and unpredictable moment in Russia's history, we could place ourselves in the worst of all 
security environments .... "219 These types of statements by moderate Senators have 
influenced the NATO expansion debate in the Senate. Many moderate Senators in both 
parties worry about the cost of expanding NATO, especially when the United States is 
attempting to reduce expenditures and balance the budget, and about the added 
commitment for the United States. These Senators have effectively worked to slow all 
NATO expansion legislation in the Senate. Finally, the fear of a Presidential veto, one that 
probably could not be overridden, has not helped the situation. 
While the Republican majority in the House had been pushing the NATO expansion 
legislation, a combination of minority Democrats and Republicans were also introducing 
legislation that could affect NATO expansion. The Shays-Frank Amendment to the defense 
appropriations bill, introduced on 14 June 1995, by Republican Representative Christopher 
Shays and Democratic Representative Barney Frank, was designed to increase European 
burden sharing ofthe non-personnel costs of stationing American troops in Europe. The 
218 William Cohen, cited in Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Securitv 
Alignments, p. 72. 
219 Sam Nunn, Speech to SACLANT conference in Norfolk, VA on 22 June 1995, cited in 
Congressional Record, 30 June 1995, p. S9572. 
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amendment would have the NATO European governments paying 75% of all non-personnel 
costs by 1999. If the European governments did not pay the required costs, the amendment 
would require 1,000 soldiers from the forces deployed to Europe to be :returned to the 
United States per percentage point under the goal. Of the soldiers returning from Europe, 
half would have to leave the service, and half would be permanently reassigned within the 
United States.220 This amendment enjoyed a degree ofbipartisan support and was passed 
by the House. About one half of the House Republicans voted for the amendment while 
almost nine-tenths of the House Democrats voted to support it.221 With these results, it 
would appear that this amendment was partly a Democratic rejection ofNATO expansion 
and partly an opportunity to reduce the defense budget or, at least, an opportunity to go on 
record as supporting more equitable burden-sharing. 
A similar amendment was introduced in the Senate on 4 August 1995. Amendment 
No. 2121, introduced by Democratic Senator Tom Harkin and Republican Senators 
Spencer Abraham and Olympia Snowe, would also increase European burden-sharing of the 
non-personnel costs. The amendments differed in that, according to the Senate version, the 
Europeans would have to pay 75% of the costs by 1997 and that any soldiers leaving 
Europe would be reassigned in the United States.222 The amendment was tabled in the 
Senate by a vote of70 to 26, with only five Republicans voting against the tabling 
motion.223 As in the House, this legislation enjoyed a degree ofbipartisan support, with a 
majority of its backers being Democrats. Taking the voting patterns for H.R. 7 into 
account, it would seem that the Democratic minority generally does not support NATO 
expansion and would favor a reduced American financial and possibly military commitment 
to the Alliance. 
220 Reduction of United States Military Forces in Europe, Amendment to Defense 
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The most recent actions by members of the Democratic minority include a pair of 
bills that would have the Europeans pay for all American non-personnel costs and all the 
costs of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). The first bill, H.R. 2788, introduced by 
Democratic Representative Barney Frank on 15 December 1995, would have the European 
allies pay for all American non-personnel costs by 1997, or all American forces in Europe 
would be returned to the United States by 1999.224 The second bill, HR. 2874, introduced 
by Democratic Representative Joseph Kennedy on 24 January 1996, would have the 
European allies pay for all costs associated with supporting American forces participating in 
the IFOR in Bosnia. However, this bill does not state that there would be any repercussions 
if the NATO allies failed to pay the American costs. 225 Both of these bills have been 
referred to the Committee on International Relations, and they have not yet been debated. 
Within the House of Representatives, the Republican majority wishes to accelerate 
the schedule for NATO expansion, but it has not achieved any success due to inaction by 
the Senate. Within the Senate, moderates from both parties have slowed down the process 
and seem to hold the key to the passage of this legislation. The results of the 1996 
elections, which saw a large number of moderates from both parties, including Sam Nunn, 
retire, gave the Republicans a slightly increased majority in the Senate. This change to the 
Senate's composition may allow for the passage of the NATO expansion bill. The fact that 
the Republican party maintained its control of the House in the recent elections and 
increased its influence in the Senate means that the strongest impediment to the House's 
plan would most likely be the president. 
The debate during the 1996 Presidential election served to focus the positions of the 
leaders of both parties on the subject ofNATO expansion. The issue may have become an 
important element of the campaign for three reasons. First, the Republicans felt that it 
could be used to show foreign policy incompetence within the Clinton administration. 
Second, the issue could be used by the Republicans to highlight the differences between the 
two candidates. Finally, the large number of voters ofEastem European heritage in the key 
224 H.R. 2788, as introduced in the House on 15 December 1995. 
225 HR. 2874, as introduced in the House on 24 January 1996. 
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"industrial mid-west" states, which both parties felt they could win, and their well-organized 
political organizations were concerned with the outcome of the NATO expansion debate. 
The Republican presidential candidate, the former Senate Majority Leader, Robert 
Dole, championed a rapid NATO expansion. Jim Mann writes, "Dole, in his long career in 
the Senate, has established a record of championing an active role for the United States 
overseas. "226 As part of this active role, the Senator would see the United States 
"preserving alliances inherited from the Cold War and leading to create new ones where 
necessary. "227 He has always been in favor of America's continued involvement in Europe 
and even advocated a tough policy in Bosnia as far back as the Bush administration. 228 On 
the topic ofNATO expansion, Dole said in a March 1995 speech at the Nixon Center that 
"Russia continues to threaten prospective NATO members over alliance expansion, thereby 
confirming the need to enlarge NATO sooner rather than later." He went on to say that the 
"Clinton Administration's misguided devotion to a 'Russia first' policy--which has turned 
into a 'Y eltsin first' policy--resulted in the loss of a tremendous opportunity .... "229 
Throughout his time as the Senate Majority Leader, Dole was a supporter of enlarging the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
In June 1996, Dole discussed NATO expansion as a campaign issue against Clinton. 
Saying that Clinton had "deferred and delayed, placing the threats of Russian nationalists 
before the aspirations of democrats" in Central Europe, Dole pledged to "stand firmly with 
the champions of democracy" and to bring the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary into 
NATO by 1998.230 In addition to his recent campaign promise to expand the alliance, Dole 
226 Jim Mann, "Internationalism is Foreign to Most GOP Candidates," Los Angeles Times, 
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initiated a bill in the Senate, shortly before his resignation as a Senator, that would 
accelerate the process ofNATO expansion. Despite his support for speeding up the 
expansion process, Dole would not include the Baltic states in the "fasttrack'' to NATO 
membership. During his June 1996 meeting with the three Baltic Presidents, Dole discussed 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in terms of a "second category" for expansion. As Estonian 
President Meri said, he received a "cautious positive answer" from the candidate, while 
Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis commented that "Dole was the only person who actually 
named names."231 If Dole had been elected as president, he almost certainly would have 
accepted a law pressing for rapid NATO enlargement and might even have initiated such a 
process. 
Pat Buchanan, a political commentator and one ofDole's strongest rivals in the fight 
for the Republican presidential nomination may have had some influence over the NATO 
expansion debate during the election. Buchanan "doesn't believe we need allies. He doesn't 
see much worth defending outside the 12-mile limit,"232 claims a former colleague, Peter 
Rodman. According to Buchanan, "we need a new foreign policy that ends foreign aid, and 
pulls up all the trip wires laid down abroad to involve America's soldiers in wars that are 
none of America's business, and we need to demand that rich allies begin paying the full cost 
of their own defense. "233 Though his views appear to be "isolationist," he claims that he 
believes in "Americanism." As for his position on NATO, Buchanan writes it "is the time 
to tell the Europeans what they should have been told years ago: Defense of their continent 
is now their responsibility. Why must 260 million Americans defend forever 300 million 
Europeans from 160 million Russians mired in poverty and despair? How long must their 
damnable dependency endure?"234 Buchanan would most certainly not support NATO 
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expansion and would in fact "deed NATO over to the Europeans. "235 Concerning the 
Baltic states, he would give Russia guarantees that the United States would not arm 
them. 236 Buchanan's ideas certainly do not conform with recent mainstream Republican 
policies, but his "populist" views have found surprisingly strong support in some segments 
of the party and the American body politic. 
Another individual that influenced the debate during the 1996 election is Republican 
Senator Richard Lugar. He was also a rival of Dole for the Republican presidential 
nomination but left the campaign early. With his strong foreign policy experience, as the 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Lugar is seen as "defending the 
traditional internationalist view of active U.S. engagement with the world. "237 Lugar has 
"accused the President of virtually abdicating American leadership in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization by supporting the group's eventual expansion to include nations in 
Eastern Europe, but never specifYing how the countries would join, or trying to sell the idea 
to the American public. "238 He describes Clinton's Partnership for Peace as containing 
"inherent contradictions. It seeks to accommodate a variety of interests and, in the process, 
satisfies none, least of all American interests. "239 In his view, Clinton "has embraced the 
Russian President too unreservedly. "240 An active participant in the expansion debate, 
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Lugar has developed "Six Commandments" on enlargement. These are: One, show 
leadership. Two, have a clear moral and political vision. Three, start with the strongest 
candidates and keep the door open. Four, know the costs and commitments. Five, have a 
strategy for the second round of entrants. Six, realize the US need for partners beyond 
Europe. 241 Lugar is seen by many to be the foil to Buchanan's isolationism, and he is 
expected to continue to have some influence within the Republican Party. 
The last few weeks of the election saw President Clinton make his first specific 
statements about a timeline for NATO expansion. The president, in a speech in Detroit, 
called for the first group of new members to be admitted to the alliance in 1999. The 
president, as in the past, refused to declare which states he wished to see join the alliance. 
White House officials initially declared that the October speech in Detroit to a crowd of 
"academics, elementary school children and ardent Democrats" was intended to "influence a 
meeting ofNATO foreign ministers in December.''242 However, the speech was delivered 
in a region with a large Eastern European "ethnic vote", as the same officials 
acknowledged, and was more likely aimed at these voters, rather than the NATO foreign 
ministers, one of whom is the Secretary of State, who will be the president's representative 
at the meeting. The president's comments would seem to indicate that he is serious about 
expanding NATO, but the fact that he refuses to indicate which states might be eligible 
continues to create concern, at least in some circles, regarding the will of his administration 
to deal effectively with Russian opposition to NATO expansion. 
The United States is still the leader of the Atlantic Alliance. Though some of the 
great powers, particularly Germany, are gaining greater influence, the primacy of American 
leadership will remain for the foreseeable future. With this in mind, it is logical to think that 
the policy of the American government towards NATO expansion will significantly 
influence the policy ofNATO towards expansion. The current American government is 
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divided on the subject of expansion, with the House pressing for accelerated expansion and 
the Senate and the Clinton administration effectively slowing the process. Considering the 
influence of moderate Senators and President Clinton, with his discreet "Russia first" 
agenda, there is little doubt that any real action towards accepting new members to the 
alliance will be postponed untill999, and perhaps later, despite the fact that the official pro-
expansion rhetoric will continue. Even if the United States took the lead and pressed for 
expansion, there is doubt that the Baltic states would be in a position to gain early 
admission to the alliance. Though there is certainly support for the Baltic states within the 
different elements of the American government, this support would probably not be strong 
enough to successfully press for their early admission into NATO. The Baltic states would 
almost certainly be eligible for any aid that the United States may provide to prospective 
members--probably in the framework of Partnership for Peace--and (at least in some circles) 
they might be seen as a "second tier" for NATO enlargement, ahead of Bulgaria, Rumania, 
and Slovenia, but behind the "Visegrad four." 
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IV. RUSSIA AND NATO EXPANSION 
I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped 
in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is 
Russian national interest. 
Sir Winston Churchill, 1 October 1939 
Russia plays a critical role in the debate over NATO expansion. The Russian 
leadership's strong opposition to the enlargement ofNATO has created indecision within 
the capitals of the United States, Germany, and the other members of the Atlantic alliance. 
The leaders of these states, especially the United States, must balance good relations with 
Russia, and the benefits that are accrued from those relations, against the probable increase 
in European stability and security that Central European membership in NATO would 
create. In the face of stiff, and often times threatening, Russian opposition, those Western 
leaders with a "Russia First" viewpoint are unwilling to jeopardize progress in arms control 
negotiations, combined international crisis response, and democratization in Russia. At the 
same time, pro-expansion leaders see Russia's actions as further justification for the timely 
enlargement of the alliance. Thus, Russian opposition has split the top leadership within the 
alliance and created indecision that has effectively delayed the actual enlargement of the 
alliance. Considering the powerful effect that Russian opposition is having on the issue of 
NATO expansion, it is important to understand the source of this policy of opposition and 
how it may change in the future. 
A. REASONS FOR RUSSIAN OPPOSITION TO NATO EXPANSION 
Opposition to NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe is one of the few 
issues that most elements of the Russian political elite and society in general can agree 
upon. Political factions from the liberal reformers to the ultra-nationalists are all concerned 
about NATO's planned move to the east and are especially worried about the possible 
inclusion of the Baltic states in the alliance. Despite this universal fear ofNATO expansion, 
there are different thoughts on the subject. A number of reasons are given by the various 
political leaders for their anxiety over the growth of the Atlantic alliance. These reasons are 
believed singularly, or in varying combinations, by the different elements of the political 
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leadership and the masses. These reasons for opposition to NATO expansion include 
concerns about the strategic defense of Russia, fear of Russian isolation from Europe, 
concern for the fate of the Baltic Russians, the effect on Russia's great power status, and a 
desire to distract the public from the domestic situation. 
A powerful source of opposition to NATO expansion is Russian anxiety about the 
military defense of Russian territory. Many Western observers have traditionally believed 
that the Russian people live in constant fear of attack by great powers on their borders. 
This belief is supposed to have come from the Mongol invasion and was later reinforced by 
Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Hitler. Regardless of the validity of this belief, some 
elements of Russian society do fear that an expanded NATO would be an aggressive 
military organization perched on Russia's borders. As Pavel Felgengauer, a respected 
though often outspoken analyst, wrote, "most of Russian society views an expansion of the 
NATO military bloc as an infernal threat that condemns it once again to live in constant 
expectation of a 'big war' --a new June 22, 1941. ''243 This viewpoint is rather extreme, but 
it is not uncommon in Russia. 
Many Russians see NATO's modest post-Cold War changes towards a more 
capable military force for "out of area" operations as a direct threat to Russia. The recent 
NATO involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina is considered an example of how NATO will 
involve itself militarily throughout the unstable regions ofEurope, which could include parts 
of the CIS and even Russia. Shortly after NATO's September 1995 multi-day bombing 
campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, Russian President Y eltsin expressed his conviction of 
how an expanded NATO on Russian borders would act. "The political leaders who are 
championing the rapid bloating of NATO should be very careful.... NATO is already 
showing what it is capable of Only of bombing, and then counting the trophies, of how 
many are killed among the civilian population. "244 An aggressive expanded NATO on 
243 Pavel Felgengauer, "Russian General Aren't Interested in NATO Countries' Good 
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Russia's border is considered to be unacceptable to most Russians. This occurrence would 
not only jeopardize the safety of Russia, but it would also invalidate the enormous sacrifices 
made by the Russian people in the Great Patriotic War. 245 Considering the emotions that 
the immense suffering caused by the Second World War still evoke in Russia, this is a 
significant source of Russian opposition. 
More tangible threats that NATO expansion in the Baltic states would create for 
Russian security would be the proximity of NATO forces to the Russian "heartland" and the 
isolation ofKaliningrad. Were the Baltic states to join NATO, Russia's psychological and 
demographic center would be within a short flying distance from NATO bases. The sea 
route to St. Petersburg and access to Europe via the Baltic Sea would be susceptible to 
blockade from naval bases in Estonia. Russian military planners and other leaders see this 
as a completely unacceptable strategic situation and have issued threats of military action to 
stop NATO expansion in the Baltic states. Kaliningrad oblast, with a population of 
900,000 Russians, of whom 300,000 are military, relies on the transit of supplies through 
Lithuania for survival. This situation would, the Russians fear, be untenable if Lithuania 
were to join NATO. Russia is adamant that Kaliningrad, whose ports are the main base for 
the Russian Baltic Fleet, will remain a part of the Russian Federation. A Foreign Ministry 
press release from 1994 stated, "Kaliningrad is, was, and will be part of the Russian 
Federation. Any further encroachments upon Russia's sovereignty will be met by a serious 
rebuff"246 Should Lithuania join NATO, Russian security would be greatly affected by the 
probable isolation ofKaliningrad. 
A second reason for opposition to NATO expansion is the fear that Russia would 
become isolated from Europe. This fear is found in all elements of the Russian political 
elite. The liberals and reformers fear that NATO expansion would create a new partition in 
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Europe. This new "Iron Curtain" would act as a "formidable obstacle to Russia's 
integration in the Western community."247 Isolation from Europe would have dire effects 
on Russia's progress towards democracy and free market reforms. As Anatol Lieven 
wrote, NATO expansion would "deal a blow of historic importance to the whole effort, 
intermittent since the time of Peter [the Great], to reform Russia in a Western direction."248 
Centrist politicians and observers believe that NATO expansion would force Russia out of 
Europe, an action which would be economically and politically dangerous for Russia. The 
previous Russian Defense Minister Grachev, a conservative member of Y eltsin' s 
government, felt that it "would be unfortunate if the former Warsaw Pact states joined 
NATO in the near future, because this step would relegate Russia to a much more isolated 
position.''249 These politicians believe that NATO expansion, along with EU expansion, 
would squeeze Russia out of an expanded and consolidated Euro-Atlantic community.250 
The radical nationalists take this idea of isolation to its extreme and preach about 
NATO's goal of encircling Russia with a hostile alliance system. Pravda reporter Vladimir 
Bolshakov described Russia as "a nut squeezed between pincers," with one of the pincers an 
expanded NATO that would include the formerly "friendly neutral" Finland and the "hostile 
Baltics.''251 In a later article, he proclaimed that NATO expansion was a drive to "surround 
Russia" and compared it to the Nazi military campaigns in Russia. Bolshakov specifically 
stated that the states that now desire to join NATO, and many current NATO members, like 
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France, ~elgium, and Italy, "fought on the Eastern front, and frequently in the SS troops, 
fighting under the same flags that have now become their state banners .... ''252 Though 
these statement may seem rather far-fetched, there is an audience for them in Russia. 
Virtually all segments of society and the elites fear that NATO expansion would isolate 
Russia from Europe and thereby cause a number of crises for the Russian Federation. 
A third reason for opposition to NATO expansion is concern for the fate of the 
ethnic Russians in the Baltic states. The Russian political elite has vocally accepted the 
existence of a special responsibility the Russian government has to protect the rights of 
ethnic Russians in the "near abroad". To ensure that Russia can protect the members of this 
"Russian diaspora," many elements of the Russian political elite believe that Russia must 
have special influence over the governments of the newly independent states. Some would 
even go so far as to demand that Russia have a military presence in all the former Soviet 
republics to enforce its policies. 253 Were the Baltic states to join NATO, the Russians 
would be less able to make demands on behalf of the Baltic Russians. The Russian 
government would find its ability to influence domestic policy within the Baltic states 
greatly diminished, if not completely eradicated. The Russian political elites profess to fear 
NATO expansion because it would put an end to their ability to protect the Baltic Russians. 
A fourth source of opposition to NATO expansion is its perceived effect on Russia's 
status as a great power. The Russians are having a difficult time accepting the loss of 
superpower status that the dissolution of the Soviet Union entailed. Alexander Rutskoy 
described this as follows in 1991: "the Soviet Union was a great power, and its army was a 
mighty force, a factor of peace and stability in the world. But what happened then was a 
veritable disintegration ofthe state and of course disintegration ofthe army.''254 To make 
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matters worse, the simultaneous loss of territories acquired during three hundred years of 
imperial expansion and a virtual economic and military collapse have created doubts about 
Russia's claim to be a great power. To many Russians, the expansion ofNATO would be 
an insult of historical proportions to Russia's status as a great power and the respect that it 
is due. Though most Russian leaders understand that NATO expansion would be a 
legitimate action taken by sovereign states, its effect on Russian pride would still be 
terrible. As Flora Lewis wrote, what is "more important is the misty definition of Russia's 
status, its prestige, its sense of itself as a great nation and a power to be reckoned with. ''255 
The Russians argue that the Western great powers, the United States, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and France, promised Russia, as a fellow great power of Europe, that 
NATO would never expand. They assert that the "Two-plus-Four" agreement on German 
unification entailed an implicit commitment by the West to consider Russia's special military 
and security interests in Central and Eastern Europe. The best example of this line of 
thinking can be found in Yeltsin's September 1993 letter to the leaders ofthe United 
States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France: 
I would also like to draw your attention to the following fact. It is 
the matter of the Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany 
signed in September 1990, and particularly its stipulations banning the 
deployment of foreign troops in the eastern federal lander of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The spirit of these stipulations rules out any 
possibility of a NATO expansion eastwards.256 
The Russians believe that this treaty created a permanent "neutral zone" between NATO 
and Russia and feel cheated by NATO's planned expansion into this region. In reality, the 
treaty only restricted NATO troops from the territory of the former GDR and only while 
Soviet forces remained in that region. 257 Despite this fact, many Russians feel that the 
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West is breaking a promise to Russia, and they are unwilling to accept the expansion of 
NATO. 
A final reason behind the opposition to NATO expansion by the Russian political 
elites is the desire to distract their people from the extremely poor domestic situation with 
exaggerated threats from the outside world. Analyst Alex Pravda wrote, "Whether and 
how strongly [the political elites] voice their objections depends more on considerations of 
how the NATO question can serve their own domestic purposes than on substantive 
concerns. ''258 The nationalist and communist political factions have used the opportunity 
that NATO expansion creates to attack the current government and its reformist policies. 
They have continued to declare that Y eltsin and his administration are weakening Russia, 
both economically and militarily, and allowing the West to absorb the states of the Warsaw 
Pact and even former Soviet republics. Vyacheslav Nikonov, Chairman of the Duma's 
Subcommittee on International Security and Arms Control, wrote that "the main force 
within Russia that is using anti-NATO sentiment to further its own interests is the 
opposition. It maintains that all Russia's troubles stem from rapprochement with the West, 
whose strike force is NAT0.''259 The factions in the center and on the right will continue 
to use the issue ofNATO expansion to further their own political causes. They will 
continue to blame the current problems within Russia on the West and focus their attention 
on the most visible element ofWestern power, NATO. These actions will only strengthen 
the opposition to the expansion of the alliance within society and the political elites. 
Virtually all Russians are united in their opposition to NATO expansion. Though 
the various elements of society and factions of the political elites are motivated by different 
reasons or combinations of reasons for opposition, they are still against the growth of the 
Atlantic Alliance. To understand how these motivations and beliefs are translated into 
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governmental policies and actions, it is necessary to understand the formal foreign policy 
decision-making structure and how domestic politics affects actual decision-making. 
B. FORMAL STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION..;MAKJNG 
The Russian Federation's foreign policy appears to be ambiguous and unstable, with 
often times contradictory statements issued by different elements of the government in 
Moscow. This situation stands in contrast to the USSR's relatively consistent and stable 
foreign policy, which was acted upon in a disciplined manner by all segments of 
government. With the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia entered a period of internal 
political disorder that has affected all elements of policy, including foreign policy. Russia's 
chaotic internal political situation has made it impossible for a consistent foreign policy to 
be agreed upon and implemented. Instead, different elements of the government have 
attempted to fashion and re-fashion the state's foreign policy to conform to their own 
political views. In many cases, foreign policy has fallen victim to domestic political in-
fighting. Nowhere is this more evident than in the policy towards NATO expansion. This 
issue has been repeatedly used as a weapon by different political factions fighting for power 
in the government. The result is a confused policy that defies precise definition. To 
understand the Russian policy towards NATO expansion, it is necessary to understand both 
the formal structure of Russian foreign policy decision-making and the internal political 
dynamics that allow and motivate political factions to use and misuse that formal structure. 
This section will explore the evolution of the formal foreign policy decision-making 
structure from the end of the Soviet Union to the present Russian system. 
The Soviet Union and its legacy had a great effect on the current structure of 
foreign policy decision-making in the Russian Federation. During the Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev eras, the locus of power was in the CPSU, and more precisely the Political 
Bureau, or Politburo, and not in the government ministries. The Politburo, which was led 
by the General Secretary and consisted of fifteen to twenty of the most senior members of 
the CPSU, generally made foreign policy decisions by using a rule of internal consensus. 
These decisions were automatically approved by the Central Committee at bi-annual 
meetings. 26° Control of the government ministries was maintained through the Central 
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Committee's International Department, Party membership of the government bureaucrats, 
and later, the inclusion of the most important Ministers (Foreign Affairs, Defense, and 
Chairman of KGB) in the Politburo. Through this system foreign policy decision-making 
was "highly centralized, controlled, and coordinated by the CPSU Politburo."261 Despite 
this rigid centralization, there was a certain element of bureaucratic politics, with constantly 
shifting levels of influence, amongst the different ministries and institutiens represented 
within the Politburo. On occasion, the General Secretary, "who did not have the advantage 
of endorsement by popular vote and who was no longer able to use terror against his 
rivals," was even forced to build and align coalitions of powerful elements within the 
apparatus or defer to the leaders of the security forces. 262 The centralization of this Soviet 
system began to break down as a result of Gorbachev' s reforms in the late 1980's. 
During the fi!st phases of these reforms, Gorbachev increased the limited forum for 
the discussion of foreign policy issues and reduced the level of specialization of the key 
foreign policy "institutions." This resulted in a weakening of the CPSU International 
Department's hold on implementing policy, the end of the security services' monopoly on 
defense-related policy, and a steady shift of influence to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs. 
These actions were taken in part to skirt resistance within the CPSU and the military to 
Gorbachev' s new policies of reduced tensions with the West and serious arms control 
negotiations. The creation of an executive presidency, with Gorbachev as the President, 
and the reduced power of the CPSU, specifically the Politburo and International 
Department, further decentralized control of foreign policy. By 1991, strict central control 
had been lost and, as there was no underlying national consensus on foreign policy goals, 
rogue elements of the government, specifically the security services, began to apply their 
own ideas to foreign policy implementation. These ideas were at odds with the new 
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political thinking ofGorbachev and the Ministry ofForeign Affairs.263 With the dissolution 
of the CPSU after the August 1991 coup attempt, all means of controlling the various 
elements of the government with foreign policy interests were eliminated, reducing foreign 
policy decision-making to a situation of institutional anarchy. 
The dis-establishment of the Soviet Union left the Russian Federation with a legacy 
of chaotic internal politics. This was certainly the case with regards to foreign policy 
decision-making. The old Soviet constitution, which remained in effect until late 1993, 
gave the Supreme Soviet, "the supreme organ of state power," the authority to create the 
state's general foreign policy while it required the president and government to implement 
that policy.264 Unfortunately, this had never actually occurred, and no element of the 
government was willing to submit to the will of the Supreme Soviet, creating a situation in 
which the "established" hierarchy was neither accepted nor obeyed. The virtually overnight 
loss of the International Department and other elements of the CPSU that coordinated and 
guided all aspects of foreign policy created a massive overload on the capacities of the 
president and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This gave other elements of government the 
opportunity to act in the foreign policy field with little or no real political control.265 The 
intense specialization and limited debate during the Soviet period left Russia with few 
leaders who were able to deal with foreign policy objectively. Bureaucratic perspectives 
dominated Russian leaders' foreign policy beliefs and goals, making it difficult to build a 
consensus within the government. Often times, these different beliefs were extremely 
polarized, as was the government and society in general, and foreign policy issues, such as 
NATO expansion, quickly became political weapons for the opposition parties.266 
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Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and into 
1992, the Russian president was effectively in control of establishing foreign policy. 
Despite its constitutional authority, the Supreme Soviet openly deferred to the executive 
branch. Ruslan Khasbulatov, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, stated, "the foreign 
policy of the country is determined primarily by the president. We support the foreign 
policy of our president. ''267 Within the executive branch, the primary n~sponsibility for 
coordinating foreign policy fell to the Foreign Ministry, though Yeltsin maintained the final 
authority to make major decisions. During this period the security services were politically 
weakened and physically split apart, while a Russian Defense Ministry did not even exist. 
These circumstances allowed the Foreign Ministry, under Kozyrev, to have complete 
control over foreign policy decision-making for the first half of 1992. 
This situation began to deteriorate for the Foreign Ministry with the creation of the 
Defense Ministry in March 1992 and the appointment of the first Defense Minister, General 
Pavel Grachev, in May 1992. From the moment Grachev took office, the Defense Ministry 
started a campaign for influence over foreign policy decision-making. This organization 
was determined to achieve the important status its Soviet predecessor had held in the 
decision-making structure. 268 At the same time, the Supreme Soviet was starting to make 
its presence felt in the foreign policy arena. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Supreme Soviet, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, used his position as "a bully 
pulpit to attack the Foreign Ministry" in an attempt to alter the current foreign policy and 
increase his own influence.269 Throughout 1992 and into 1993, the parliament continued to 
attack Yeltsin and the Foreign Ministry over foreign policy issues as the polarization of the 
executive and legislative branches of government increased. The parliament went so far as 
to pass laws and resolutions that were in direct conflict with the president's announced 
foreign policies. 
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By the end of 1992, the Defense Ministry, the security services, and the Supreme 
Soviet had created enough doubt in the ability ofKozyrev and the Foreign Ministry, that 
Yeltsin had to act. His first action was to issue a decree in November 1992 that, in 
Kozyrev's words, made the Foreign Ministry the "horizontal coordinator" of foreign policy 
for the president. Through this law, the Foreign Ministry acquired the responsibility to 
coordinate all actions of the ministries, the military, and other elements of the executive 
branch concerning foreign policy. 270 Within a month in December 1992, Y eltsin acted 
again, this time creating an Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission under the 
Security Council. This commission was tasked to "coordinate the drafting of foreign policy 
decisions,''271 a function that had just been assigned to the Foreign Ministry. This was a 
reaction to Kozyrev' s lack of internal political authority, which made it impossible for the 
Foreign Ministry to effectively coordinate foreign policy actions in all the discordant 
elements of government. This commission soon proved to be a failure, spending most of its 
time engaged in "turf wars" and internal security matters, and it now plays a minor role in 
the formulation offoreign policy.272 
The October 1993 conflict between the Supreme Soviet and the President, and the 
new Constitution that was adopted in December 1993 as a result, altered the balance of 
power in foreign policy decision-making between the legislative and executive branches. 
The new Constitution stated that the President "exercises leadership in Russian Federation 
foreign policy" and has the authority to conduct negotiations and sign international 
treaties. 273 More importantly, the President has the authority to appoint any government 
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official, except the Prime Minister, who must have the consent of the Duma, and dismiss 
any official, including the Prime Minister. 274 This ability to hire and fire at will creates a 
situation where all government officials, including those elements involved in foreign policy 
decision-making, are directly accountable to the President. The Duma's only real influence 
over foreign policy resides in its authority to ratify international treaties. 275 Y eltsin further 
increased his hold on foreign policy decision-making with a January 1994 decree that re-
organized the chain of command for some key ministries. This decree stated that the 
Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS), and the 
Federal Border Service (FBS) would be subordinated directly to the president as opposed 
to the prime minister, as they had been previously.276 With these changes, Yeltsin was 
theoretically in firm control of the entire foreign policy decision-making structure. 
In reality, Yeltsin was unable to exercise anything close to firm control during 1994 
and early 1995. His Foreign Minister did not have the political clout to effectively impose 
order on the foreign policy decision-making process. The Defense Minister routinely 
attempted to pursue an independent foreign policy while his ministry was locked in a 
struggle for influence with the Foreign Ministry. Even the interdepartmental commission 
that was created under the Security Council failed to coordinate, or even become involved 
with, the government's foreign policy actions. In an attempt to rectify this situation, Yeltsin 
resorted to his earlier ineffective methods of"creating order". 
A new decree was issued by the president in March 1995 to consolidate power in 
the Foreign Ministry. The Statute on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
promulgated "to ensure the conduct of a uniform Russian policy line. ''277 In this decree, the 
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president confirmed that the "Foreign Ministry remains the chief coordinator of the 
country's foreign policy and that all other departments are required to clear any steps they 
take in the international arena with the ministry."278 This decree was virtually identical to 
the 1992 decree. Like the first decree, this decree failed to solve the problem of a politically 
weak Foreign Minister who was unable to rein in the other elements of the government. 
Yeltsin's reaction to the failure of this new decree to solve the problem was, as in 
1992, to create a new organization to coordinate foreign policy. In December 1995, the 
president issued a decree to form the Council on Foreign Policy. This group was to be 
headed by the president. It was to produce recommendations that would then be given to 
the president for approval. This council, which was staffed by members of the relevant 
ministries and the security services, was planned to coordinate the efforts of the principal 
departments that worked in the foreign policy arena. 279 Shortly after this council was 
created, Yeltsin again took action to improve the coordination of foreign policy. 
In January 1996, Yevgenii Primakov replaced Kozyrev as Foreign Minister. 
Primakov, who had been the director of the FIS, was more acceptable to the opposition 
parties and was much more politically powerful than Kozyrev. Y eltsin expected that 
Primakov would be able to have greater success at reining in the rogue elements of 
government, and to an extent this was correct. Despite Primikov' s successes at actually 
coordinating the Russian foreign policy, Y eltsin felt that it was necessary to reiterate that 
the Foreign Ministry was in charge of foreign policy.280 In March 1996, Yeltsin issued his 
third decree stipulating that the Foreign Ministry was tasked to coordinate the activities of 
all elements of the executive branch as regards foreign policy. The new law stated that the 
Foreign Ministry "shall be the principal agency in the field of relations with foreign states 
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and international organizations and shall exercise overall supervision .... "281 Considering the 
increased political power of the new Foreign Minister, it is very possible that the Foreign 
Ministry will finally be able to effectively coordinate the activities of the diverse elements of 
the executive branch as they pertain to foreign policy. 
C. INTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND NATO EXPANSION 
The constantly changing political situation within Russia has made it difficult to find 
a consistent official policy on relations with the West and NATO expansion. The demise of 
the Soviet Union left a nation bereft of sound political institutions or even a unifYing 
political ideology. As Martin Malia wrote, "communism left in its wake, as a poisoned 
legacy to the democratic August Revolution, nothing but rubble. "282 From under this 
rubble a system has appeared that is full of institutional emptiness and multiple centers of 
power, in which the Constitution is neither accepted as legitimate by the people, nor 
followed by the President. There are few full-fledged political parties, though more than 
fifty groups are officially registered as such. Instead, "the political configuration in 
parliament can best be understood in terms of factions" and "frequently shifting, amorphous 
political blocs. ''283 Within this system, the diverse factions maneuver for power and 
attempt to sway the voters with emotional rhetoric. There is no stable governmental 
coalition or unified opposition. Instead, the leading personalities of these factions operate 
in an environment where established institutions and official power structures play a 
secondary role, and as a result "political positions are easily and speedily changed. "284 One 
of the most sensitive areas is foreign policy, especially relations with the West. 
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The foreign policy legacy of the Soviet Union included the "new political thinking" 
initiated by Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, in the mid to late 
1980's. This policy entailed cooperation with the West in arms control and a general 
reduction in the confrontational nature ofEast-West relations, while maintaining the distinct 
political and economic differences that separated Western Europe from the "Soviet 
Empire". Immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union, an official pro-Western or 
Atlanticist foreign policy was established by the pro-democracy and reformist factions that 
held power. These factions can be seen as the heirs of the zapadniki, or "Westemisers," 
who since the nineteenth century have "defined themselves in terms of Western values''285 
and have aspired to bring Russia into the family ofWestern states. "Thezapadniki 
anticipated that the concept of the West, defined in terms of the sanctity of law, political 
methods of conflict resolution and collective security, could be extended eastwards to 
embrace the entire Eurasian continent. "286 The reformist and pro-democracy factions 
hoped that ties to the West would anchor their reform movement and help to marshal the 
resources needed to overcome the resistance of Russian society to political and economic 
reforms. 
The leading figures behind this new Atlanticist foreign policy were President Boris 
Yeltsin, State Secretary Gennady Burbulis, and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. Other 
leading reformers, such as acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar, leader of the Democratic 
Choice "party", and First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais, were proponents of this 
new policy but were not involved in its development or implementation. Y eltsin was clearly 
the most important figure behind the Atlanticist foreign policy, which (though Yeltsin would 
be loath to acknowledge the fact) had its roots in Gorbachev's foreign policy. Some have 
called Y eltsin' s ideas "new political thinking plus" as they go much further than did 
Gorbachev's policies and approach the ideas of the zapadniki. Analyst JeffCheckel has 
contrasted the two policies as follows: "whereas the Gorbachev leadership sought 
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accommodation with the West, Yeltsin wants something more: entry into the 'civilized' 
(that is, Western) world; 'integration' with its primary institutions; and 'partnership' with 
the United States."287 Despite Yeltsin's dominant position in foreign policy decision-
making, Kozyrev was the main spokesman for this Atlanticist foreign policy. He 
articulated a new ideology that would guide Russia's relations with the West in a number of 
articles in both the Russian and Western press. In an Izvestia article, written just days after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kozyrev wrote that Russia was "counting on a 
dependable partnership with foreign states to help us solve many of our problems" and that 
it must "bring to a logical conclusion the not always consistent steps toward rapprochement 
that began with perestroika." He went on to say that the "the developed countries of the 
West are Russia's natural allies."288 Writing to a Western audience in the journal Foreign 
Affairs, Kozyrev declared that Russia will remain a great, though "normal", power that 
defends its national interests through "interaction with partners, not through 
confrontation. ''289 
The pro-Western foreign policy based relations with the West on international 
institutions that would serve in a collective security role. For Kozyrev, this approach was 
not surprising, considering that he served in the Directorate oflnternational Organizations 
of the Soviet Ministry ofForeign Affairs from 1974 to 1990.290 The most important 
institutions for the application of his policy were to be the CSCE and the UN. Russia and 
the rest of the CIS joined the CSCE in January 1992, and Kozyrev hoped that the 
experiences of this organization would lead to the "civilized development of the 
Commonwealth [of Independent States]." The Foreign Minister also believed that "the 
United Nations has a special role to play. Russia intends to promote in every possible way 
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the strengthening of the United Nations as an instrument to harmonize national, regional 
and global interests.''291 Kozyrev thought that the end of the Cold War and the changes 
taking place in Central Europe and Russia would lead to radical changes in the mission and 
structure ofNATO. He saw the formation of the NACC as the first step towards NATO's 
development into a more pan-European collective security organization instead of a 
defensive alliance. 292 
The pro-Western foreign policy, as described by Kozyrev's statements, reflected a 
general consensus of the reformist political factions that dominated the government in early 
1992, but these priorities "were not fully shared" by all elements of the political elite or 
society.293 The Foreign Minister understood this fact, writing in January 1992 that his 
policy "is the firm position of those who make up the government of Russia today, but not 
yet the mentality of the entire society, particularly in its managerial apparatus and in the 
corridors of the military-industrial complex. ''294 He hoped that economic prosperity 
resulting from the various reforms would solidity support for the pro-Western foreign 
policy. 
The Atlanticist foreign policy soon came under fire from more centrist and 
nationalist factions and was used by these groups, for internal political reasons, to discredit 
those in power. Leszek Buszynski accurately describes the situation as follows: 
For domestic audiences, the pro-Western policy was fundamentally 
flawed. Resorting to broad visions of shared democratic values and 
collective security was irrelevant to those whose concerns related to specific 
security and political issues in the 'near abroad' or former Soviet Union. The 
pro-Western policy was criticized by a wide spectrum of opinion groups -
moderate and hard-line nationalists, communists, 'neo- Bolsheviks' and so-
called Eurasianists- for failing to reflect Russia's real interests.295 
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Kozyrev, the most vocal proponent of the Atlanticist foreign policy, quickly became a 
lightning rod for the fury of these more conservative factions. By mid-1992, the policy was 
starting to be criticized by various opposition groups for allegedly failing to safeguard 
Russia's vital national interests and as being humiliating to the greatness of the Russian 
people. This criticism coincided with the attempts by the newly formed Defense Ministry 
and the Supreme Soviet to increase their influence over foreign policy decision-making. 
In May 1992, at a conference on military doctrine, Colonel-General Igor Rodionov, 
then Chief of the General Staff Academy, listed a number of goals that he believed should 
be Russia's national interests. The goals included "maintaining the CIS states under 
Russia's exclusive influence," the "neutrality of East European countries or their friendly 
relations with Russia," "free Russian access to seaports in the Baltics," and "the exclusion 
of 'third country' military forces from the Baltics and non-membership of the Baltic states in 
military blocs directed at Russia. ''296 These goals were generally adopted by the centrist 
factions and groups that criticized Yeltsin's government and its foreign policy. One of the 
more prominent groups, the Civic Union, created in the summer of 1992, was formed by a 
number of influential factions that inhabited the center of the Russian political spectrum. 
This group, which advocated the defense of Russians in the near-abroad, as well as 
Rodionov' s goals, "gave form to a so-called centrist opposition. ''297 Another centrist 
group, the Foreign and Defense Policy Council, which formed in early 1993, claimed that 
Russia must maintain a pragmatic engagement with the far -abroad and ensure that the 
nations of Central Europe did not join any security systems in which Russia was not also a 
member. 298 These ideas found increasing support in the Defense Ministry and with the 
military. The Russian vote in the UN Security Council to apply sanctions against Serbia, a 
295 Buszynski, "Russia and the West: Towards Renewed Geopolitical Rivalry?" p. 105-6. 
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suspicion that the Yeltsin government intended to return the disputed Northern Territories 
to Japan, and, most critically, the Foreign Ministry's dispute with the Supreme Soviet over 
the protection of Russians living in the "near abroad" continued to reduce support for the 
government's pro-Western foreign policy. 
By mid-1993, three major schools of thought on foreign policy had emerged. The 
first school consisted of the Atlanticists, who still controlled the government and the 
"official" foreign policy, though they were in serious competition with the Supreme Soviet 
and the security services. The second school was composed of statists or derzhavniki. 
These centrists were "advocates of a strong and powerful state which can maintain order, a 
rather traditional Russian view of the state's role."299 Richard Kugler, an analyst with the 
RAND National Defense Research Institute, described the statist foreign policy as one that 
"seeks a secure environment that will allow the state to live safely and prosper. 
Accordingly, it often aspires to dominate the areas near its borders and to exert influence 
farther out."300 The third and final school consisted of the "Neo-Imperialists." These 
extreme nationalists called for the "reabsorption of the CIS and a rearmed Russian empire 
that would act as a global power, in opposition to the West, ifnecessary."301 
Until as late as 1993, the supporters of the Atlanticist foreign policy still felt that the 
CSCE would become the main European security institution and that NATO would be 
radically altered or even go the way of the Warsaw Pact. As the idea ofNATO expansion 
was discussed in the West and became a more realistic option, the key foreign policy 
makers began to doubt their basic strategy of relations with the West. For a short period of 
time in the summer of 1993, no consistent policy towards NATO expansion was held by the 
Russian government. In August 1993, Y eltsin, with Polish President Lech W alesa, issued a 
declaration concerning Poland's intention to join NATO, stating that "In the long term, such 
a decision taken by a sovereign Poland in the interest of overall European integration does 
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not go against the interests of other states, including the interests of Russia. "302 Y eltsin also 
"stated publicly that Russia 'has no right' to hinder the Czech Republic's joining of any 
organization. "303 These improvisational comments were characteristic of Y eltsin' s "off-the-
cuff remarks" made during other foreign visits. 304 The statements were soon 
"reinterpreted" and, a month later, Yeltsin sent a letter to the leaders of the United States, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and France in which "he warns against expanding NATO by 
admitting former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. "305 In his letter, Yeltsin explained 
that his earlier statements were merely an "opportunity to confirm the sovereign right of 
each state to choose its own method for guaranteeing its security," and expressed alarm 
over the discussion of NATO expansion. He wrote that "not only the opposition, but also 
moderate circles will--undoubtedly--view this [NATO expansion] as a new kind of isolation 
for our country, something that diametrically contradicts our logical involvement in the 
Euro-Atlantic region. ''306 
The conflict between the President and the Supreme Soviet on October 1993 
radically altered the power structure that ruled Russia. After the fighting ended, Y eltsin 
found himself much more dependent on the military and the centrist political factions. The 
newly empowered Russian security agencies began forming a united policy against NATO 
expansion. In November 1993, the chief of the FIS, Yevgeny Primakov, with the 
concurrence of the Defense Ministry and General Staff, issued a report implying that the 
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defense establishment opposed NATO expansion because it would create a siege mentality 
in Russia.3°7 The report stated that NATO's move to the east would affect Russia's 
security interests and create a barrier between Russia and the rest of the continent. 
Specifically, the report said that Baltic membership in NATO would be a "challenge to 
Russia, whose geopolitical interests are at variance with the military presence of third states 
in the Baltic region. "308 While announcing the issuance of this report, Primakov 
emphasized to reporters that "our renewed Russia has a right to count on having its opinion 
taken into consideration. "309 The security services, with their new position of influence, 
and specifically Primakov, continued to extol the statist view of safeguarding Russia's 
national interests regardless of how it affects relations with the West. 
The rise of imperial revisionism was reinforced by the success of the communist 
and nationalist factions, especially Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party, in the 
December 1993 parliamentary elections. Zhirinovsky, a rabid nationalist and neo-
imperialist, had promised to restore the greatness of the Russian empire, even including the 
return of Alaska to Russian control. The Duma elections saw the reformist and liberal 
factions lose seats while the centrist and far-right factions gained significantly. This victory, 
combined with NATO's January 1994 decision to remain open for expansion and the 
increased importance of the Russian security services, sealed the fate of the government's 
Atlanticist foreign policy. 
A new statist policy, one of opposition to NATO expansion and support for 
Russians abroad, was soon expounded by Kozyrev and supported by Yeltsin. In a January 
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1994 speech, Kozyrev "signaled his acceptance of the prevailing trend," and declared that 
the main issue for Russian diplomacy was to secure the rights of the Russian minorities in 
the near-abroad, including support for a military presence in that area. 310 Y eltsin, in his 
February 1994 "State of the Federation" address, reiterated that the "consistent promotion 
of Russia's national interests is the main task of our [Russian] foreign policy," and that "if 
required to protect the state's legitimate interests, Russia has a right to act firmly and 
tough .... " He further expressed his opposition to NATO expansion, calling it "a path 
toward new threats to Europe and the world."311 This new statist foreign policy was 
primarily aimed at halting NATO expansion, which the centrists saw as the greatest threat 
to Russian security interests. 
The Russians had a special concern about the Baltic states being included in NATO. 
"The admission of the East European countries to NATO would inevitably cause tension .... 
Not to mention the pernicious consequences that the Baltic countries' participation in this 
alliance could have. "312 These comments written by Doctor of History Boris Pokland in a 
Pravda editorial shortly after the parliamentary elections were representative of the opinions 
of many leaders, from the moderate liberals to the nationalists. The Baltic states were 
considered to be in a different category from the rest of Eastern Europe. It was claimed 
that this was due to the large number of ethnic-Russians in the region, especially in Estonia 
and Latvia, where they made up about a third of the population and questions about their 
civil rights and eligibility for citizenship existed. The Russian military was also concerned 
about the use of strategic bases, such as the Hen House ballistic missile early warning radar 
site at Skrunda, Latvia, a secure transit route to Kaliningrad, and the proximity of the 
Baltics to critical military facilities around St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad and in the Russian 
"heartland." The Russian troop withdrawals from Estonia and Latvia were slowed down 
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and tied to the satisfactory conclusion of agreements on these issues. This action was, of 
course, denounced by Western leaders and gave the Baltic states a greater desire to join 
NATO. 
After the December 1993 parliamentary elections and throughout 1994, the Russian 
government's position towards NATO hardened as mainstream Russian politics shifted 
towards the center and the right.. The worsening of the economic situation did nothing to 
help pro-Western attitudes, and the nostalgia for Soviet greatness continued to grow. "If 
there is a foreign policy issue on which there is national consensus in Russia, it is the issue 
ofNATO expansion," stated Vyacheslav Nikonov.313 In an attempt to take the offensive 
against expansion, Kozyrev outlined a plan that would separate the NACC from NATO and 
link it to the CSCE.314 Writing in the journal Foreign Affairs in May 1994, Kozyrev 
asserted that, 
The creation of a unified, non-bloc Europe can best be pursued by 
upgrading the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe into 
broader and more universal organization. After all, it was the democratic 
principles of the 56-member CSCE that won the Cold War--not the NATO 
military machine. The CSCE should have the central role in transforming the 
post-confrontational system ofEuro-Atlantic cooperation into a truly stable, 
democratic regime.315 
Kozyrev's ideas were in line with Yeltsin's earlier proposal to make the CSCE essentially an 
umbrella organization supported by equally important NATO and CIS pillars.316 By the 
summer of 1995, Kozyrev had abandoned the idea of using the CSCE as an alternative to 
NATO and promoted the idea of turning NATO into a CSCE, but without the Central 
Asian or Trans-Caucasian states. Referring to NATO's policy towards expansion as a 
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continuation of"a policy aimed at containment of Russia," he wrote that Russia would only 
accept the "gradual entry" of the Central European states into NATO after Russia's entry 
into the alliance and the "transformation ofNATO into a pan-European security 
organization and a joint instrument for the efficient response to the new common 
challenges."317 These alternatives to NATO expansion were an attempt to ensure that the 
Eastern European states would remain in a collective security system with no ability to 
provide protection against coercion by a great power, such as Russia, and one in which the 
Russians would be able to maintain a degree of influence. 
After the war in Chechnya commenced, the Russian government began to make 
threats to forestall any expansion ofNATO into Eastern Europe. The CFE Treaty soon 
became a target for nationalists in and out of government. Objections were raised that the 
treaty had been signed before the demise of the Warsaw Pact and was now unfair towards 
Russia, especially on the issue of forces in the northern and southern flank regions. In April 
1995, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev bluntly told Secretary of Defense William Perry that 
"ifNATO's zone of responsibility is extended eastward, Russia will take 'appropriate 
measures' and will be forced to reconsider its obligation under the CFE Treaty. "318 
Meanwhile, Yeltsin, in a news conference in September 1995, again called for NATO to be 
transformed from a military organization to a political one and commented that expansion 
"will mean a conflagration of war throughout Europe."319 
The threats of action have been even more severe against the Baltic states and their 
possible admission into the alliance. Pavel F elgengauer wrote that "while Polish 
membership in NATO would pose a dangerous military threat, the integration of the Baltics 
into NATO is utterly unacceptable in any form. Moscow will never allow Poland, and 
especially the Baltics, to become a potential military toehold for exerting pressure on 
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Russia."320 A similar idea was stated by Grachev at a press conference in September 1995: 
"we continue to take a negative view of the entry of East European countries into NATO, 
and we remain opponents of NATO's expansion .... But if the Baltic countries become 
members of NATO, Russia will no longer be able to make compromises. "321 The Russian 
government, the military, and most of the opposition parties see the Baltic states as an area 
of great concern and would feel exceptionally threatened if they were to join NATO. 
As a result of the war in Chechnya, the military lost confidence in Russia's 
democrats and reformers. Russian society has also become increasingly divided between 
those who support the use of the armed forces and those who do not, with the former 
gaining the upper hand. 322 This willingness to use force does not bode well for the future 
and lends credibility to September 1995 reports of a draft version of a new Russian defense 
doctrine. This doctrine dictates the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad 
and Belarus in response to an expansion ofNATO. More ominously, if the Baltic states 
were to join NATO, the doctrine would call for the occupation of the Baltic states by 
Russian troops, and any NATO response would be considered cause for a nuclear war. 
According to "a high-ranking General Staff officer," the plan was "cautiously approved" by 
Grachev, and it was created by the military in "response to the absence of any consistent 
policy line," or more likely, an acceptable foreign policy line, from the Foreign Ministry or 
the President's office on military security. Of special concern is the fact that this policy 
would not lack supporters "in the Duma and inside the Kremlin. "323 Kozyrev quickly 
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denied that this doctrine existed but went on to say that "opinions calling for the taking of 
counter-measures are being expressed. This could create quite a stir in the Baltics. "324 A 
few days later, another "high-ranking" officer stated that the General Staff was studying 
proposals that would be submitted to the President. These proposals would call for 
targeting Poland and the Czech Republic with nuclear weapons if they joined NATO and 
the creation of new armor and infantry divisions to be stationed in Belarus and Russia for 
use in the Baltic states. 325 On a related note, in January 1996 the President ofBelarus, 
Alexander Lukashenko, a political ally of the anti-Western hard-line factions, warned that 
he would ask Russia to redeploy nuclear weapons in Belarus if NATO extended 
membership to the Central European states. 326 All of these implicit threats seem to fit a 
pattern of gradual increases to what the Russians claim their response will be to NATO 
expansion. The Russians appear to be taking special precautions to ensure that the Baltic 
states do not join the alliance. 
This point is taken to the extreme by the ultra-nationalist and neo-imperialist 
factions. An example of their thinking is the October 1995 report issued by the Defense 
Research Institute in Moscow. This private group, which may have some ties to the 
Defense Ministry and the military, stated that NATO expansion is a Western attempt to 
isolate Russia and drive it out of Europe. The authors claimed that it is a "resumption of 
German expansion to the east and southeast, which was twice interrupted in this century'' 
and is being accomplished "under the American 'nuclear umbrella'. ''327 Concerning the 
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Baltic states, the report suggested that a "neutral status," like that of"Finland during the 
Cold War," would be acceptable and that a Russian invasion would be necessary if they 
joined NATO. The authors believed that Russia would have "every legal and moral reason" 
for these actions.328 They compared Estonia and Latvia to the former states of the South 
African Republic and Southern Rhodesia, proclaiming that the Baltic Russians have a right 
to form "parallel governmental and power-wielding structures" and a right to tum to Russia 
for military assistance if threatened by the Baltic governments. 329 These radical statements 
may not be generally accepted by the majority of Russian leaders, but there is a substantial 
and growing minority that believes and promotes these views. 
Despite all the nationalist rhetoric, there are still a few Russian leaders who do not 
see a threat from the expansion ofNATO and still support an Atlanticist foreign policy. 
Yegor Gaydar, leader of the Russia's Choice faction, while visiting Estonia in July 1995, 
stated that he did not think the Baltic states joining NATO would be a threat to Russia. 
"We think that the expansion ofNATO is not a threat to Russia's interests. NATO is an 
organization incapable of aggressive actions because of its decision making mechanism. It 
takes a sick imagination to conceive of the Danish, Norwegian, and Luxembourg 
government[ s] agreeing to attack Russia. "330 In a later interview in Bonn, he said that his 
party never opposed NATO expansion and did not think that NATO posed a military threat 
to Russia.331 Unfortunately, those of this view are part of a small minority in Russia, and it 
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is more likely that Russian foreign policy will continue moving towards the right and will 
involve greater opposition to NATO expansion. 
Russia's statist foreign policy was cemented into position by the results of the 
December 1995 parliamentary elections. The Communist party, the only "viable national 
party,''332 and allied factions, such as the Agrarian party, were victorious. This victory 
ensured that the Duma, dominated by the Communists and nationalists, would continue to 
demand a statist foreign policy that focused on securing Russia's national interests, 
especially opposing NATO expansion. The Communists, led by Gennady Zyuganov, have 
renounced a foreign policy based on ideology and support a pragmatic approach to 
international relations that promotes Russia's vital national interests.333 They have also 
threatened to break the START II and CFE Treaties ifNATO expands into Central Europe. 
The statist foreign policy was further solidified in early 1996 by Yeltsin's removal of his 
remaining reformers in government, First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais, Chief of 
Staff Sergei Filatov, and most importantly, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, ensuring that the 
previously Atlanticist ideals of Russian foreign policy would have no supporters in the 
Y eltsin administration. 334 
Kozyrev's replacement by Yevgenii Primakov, the head of the FIS, in January 1996, 
was seen as "a symbol of the foreign-policy shift away from the heady idealism of the early 
1990s toward a stance rooted in the Russian great-power tradition.''335 This "sign of the 
new Russian foreign policy consensus" was seen in the comments that greeted Yeltsin's 
decision to make Primakov the Foreign Minister. Yeltsin's supporters and opponents alike 
commended Primakov's abilities and his political beliefs, while Zyuganov "described 
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Primakov as 'an experienced and skilled statesman,' and Zhirinovsky called his appointment 
'the best option possible'. ''336 By making Primakov the Foreign Minister, Yeltsin made it 
possible for the Foreign Ministry to finally take control of coordinating foreign policy for 
the government. Primakov' s political clout within the security services was expected to 
give him advantages when dealing with the Defense Ministry and the military. He should 
also be less of a target for the Duma's rage. As one Russian reporter wrote, "he will not 
draw an allergic reaction from the Communist majority in the Duma, and the Deputies may 
leave the foreign-policy department in peace, at least at first. "337 
Despite expectations that Primakov would have a greater hold on Russian foreign 
policy, he did not appear to have control over all elements of the government by February 
1996. In that month, the Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov, a member of 
the Security Council, claimed that he would take extreme actions if new states joined 
NATO and accepted nuclear weapons on their soil. In what was probably a threat 
motivated by an excessive indulgence in alcohol, he said, " .. .I am responsible for Russia's 
nuclear security, I have to take adequate measures. Very simple measures to make it so 
these sites don't exist. They will simply be destroyed.''338 Mikhailov's threats were quickly 
"reinterpreted" by his administration to mean Russia would merely "be compelled to take 
appropriate measures. This does not mean that we would strike NATO military bases in 
those countries in order to destroy nuclear weapons. ''339 This incident, while it does not 
prove that Russian foreign policy is still disseminated from multiple sources, does show the 
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cavalier attitude that some senior Russian leaders have towards accepted international 
norms of behavior and internal protocol within the Y eltsin administration. 
The presidential election held in June 1996 stirred up the Y eltsin government and 
forced some changes, but generally failed to alter the new foreign policy consensus under 
Primakov's Foreign Ministry. In the first election, no candidate received over half the vote, 
as was required to win. Yeltsin gained 35% of the vote, with Zyuganov- trailing at 32%, 
and Aleksandr Lebed at 14%.340 Y eltsin soon convinced Lebed, a retired Lieutenant-
General, to join his campaign, which resulted in Yeltsin's victory in the July 1996 run-off 
election. Lebed's price for support was his appointment as the head of the Security Council 
and the dismissal ofLebed's rival, Defense Minister Grachev.341 Lebed, a nationalist who 
first gained fame by supporting ethnic Russians in the breakaway Transdnister region as the 
commander of the Russian 14th Army in Moldova, has long supported a statist foreign 
policy. The political faction he is associated with, the Congress of Russian Communities, is 
one of the most outspoken supporters of protecting the ethnic Russians in the near-abroad, 
claiming that Russia should take "appropriate counter-measures" if ethnic Russians living 
outside Russia are mistreated, including the use of military force. 342 In his autobiography, 
Lebed wrote that "we [Russia] should create a successor to czarist Russia as it existed in 
February 1917.''343 All the information about Lebed's past, from his time in Afghanistan 
and Moldova, to his campaign rhetoric, suggests that he is sincerely concerned about 
safeguarding his nation. As a derzhavnik and a proponent of the current statist foreign 
policy, he is unlikely to alter the current policy towards NATO enlargement. 
340 Scott Parrish, "Russia: What Lebed's Policies Could Mean For the Outside World," 
OMRI Analytical Brief, Vol. 1, No. 176, 17 June 1996, p. 2. 
341 Laura Belin, "Yeltsin Picks Lebed's Choice to Lead Defense Ministry," OMRI 
Analytical Brief, Vol. 1, No. 231, 18 July 1996, p. 1. 
342 Parrish, "Russia: What Lebed's Policies Could Mean For the Outside World," p. 2. 
343 Alexander Lebed, in his auto-biography I Grieve For My Country, published in October 
1995, cited in Alan Koman, "Prince of Darkness" Armed Forces Journal International, 
January 1996, p. 11. 
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Lebed's influence in the Yeltsin government was highlighted by the selection of 
Lebed's choice to fill the vacant Defense Ministry post. Colonel General Igor Rodionov, 
called the "Butcher of Tbilisi" by some for his involvement in the death of some 20 
demonstrators in Georgia in 1989, was selected to be the new Defense Minister in July 
1996. Rodionov backed Lebed's political faction, the Congress of Russian Communities, 
and took part in the founding of the Honor and Motherland movement, which organized 
Lebed's presidential campaign. Rodionov's selection as the Defense Minister is "expected 
to strengthen ... Lebed's influence over military policy."344 Rodionov, a confirmed supporter 
of statist foreign policy since the end of the Soviet Union, will probably act to support 
Primakov and reduce the rivalry between their two ministries. 
Recently, in a possible attempt to prepare for an expected NATO expansion, Lebed 
told reporter Chrystia Freeland of the Financial Times that he saw no threat in NATO 
expansion. Lebed said that "he had no objections to NATO's planned eastward expansion." 
He added that "NATO enlargement would be expensive and unnecessary but that it did not 
pose a security threat to Russia."345 His comments may be a sign that the Kremlin's 
hostility towards NATO enlargement may be easing. In the interview, Lebed said nothing 
about which countries he might be willing to see in NATO, discussing the whole issue in a 
very general sense. It would be difficult to imagine Lebed or other Russian leaders 
accepting NATO membership for the Baltic states, though they might be willing to see the 
"Visegrad Four" join with relatively little reaction, except for rhetorical opposition. 
The recent power struggles within the Y eltsin government, which culminated in the 
ouster ofLebed as the leader of the Security Council, have seen Lebed's influence on 
foreign policy wane, but not completely disappear. He is still the most popular politician in 
Russia and will be able to continue to pressure the government in many ways. These 
changes within the government have had no effect on the statist foreign policy that has been 
3 44 Belin, "Y eltsin Picks Lebed' s Choice to Lead Defense Ministry," p. 1. 
345 Alexander Lebed, cited in Chrystia Freeland, "NATO Growth No Threat," Financial 
Times, 25 July 1996, p. 1. 
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followed by the Y eltsin government or on the universally accepted policy of opposition to 
NATO expansion. 
The Y eltsin government, despite its strong flirtation with an Atlanticist foreign 
policy during its first two years, is solidly supportive of a statist foreign policy. The 
appointment ofPrimakov as Foreign Minister, both as a sign of political consensus and as a 
powerful political player, has finally made it possible for the President, through the Foreign 
Ministry, to control foreign policy decision-making. The statist foreign policy is by its 
nature against the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance, which it considers intrinsically hostile 
towards Russia. Despite this fact, it is very possible that the Y eltsin government, now that 
it has recently been elected for another four years, would be willing to accept the accession 
of a limited number of states to NATO membership. Just as the Soviet Union finally 
accepted the inclusion of the former GDR into NATO, Russia may find itself unable and 
unwilling to stop the Czech Republic or Poland from joining. This should not be taken as a 
sign that Russia would be unwilling to act to stop any state from joining NATO. Russia 
would almost certainly not be willing to accept Baltic membership. To allow this would be 
political suicide for the Y eltsin government, and it would probably destroy the already 
fragile unity of the government. It is possible that Russia might attempt to use force to stop 
the Baltic states from joining the Atlantic Alliance and, at the very least, Russia might 
attempt to foment civil unrest in these states. As a result of the Russian consensus on a 
statist foreign policy, NATO expansion that came too close to Russia could eventually 
cause a conflict between Russia and the West. 
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V. FUTURE OF NATO EXPANSION 
As soon as questions of will or decision or reason or choice of 
action arise, human science is at a loss. 
Professor Noam Chomsky, 30 March 1978346 
A. ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL FACTORS CONCERNING NATO EXPANSION 
In the debate over NATO expansion since the end of the Cold War, many different 
ideas, opinions, and policies have been forwarded by the individuals, organizations, and 
states involved. Of the hundreds of factors that affect NATO expansion, only a few stand 
out as decisive for the future Euro-Atlantic security structure. These factors primarily 
involve only two states, the United States of America and the Russian Federation. These 
states, both existing on the periphery of Europe and having developed under circumstances 
distinctly different from those of the states of Europe, have strong European cultural, 
economic, and political ties, but could be legitimately classified as non-European. The 
governments of these two states, through their actions and policies, will be the decisive 
actors that influence the future European security architecture. The Russian policy of 
opposition to NATO expansion has created doubts among the leadership ofNATO and has 
reduced actual expansion efforts to rhetoric and dialogue, except for the more practical 
activities under the aegis of Partnership for Peace. This Russian policy of opposition will 
continue in the foreseeable future. The only way that NATO can overcome its internal 
dissension and doubt is through strong and resolute American leadership. The return of this 
leadership, intermittent at best since the unification of Germany, will depend on the actions 
of the president and the consent of the "notoriously independent Senate."347 Even with a 
return of vibrant American leadership, there would still be the question, what should NATO 
do about the Baltic states? 
346 Noam Chomsky, comment during a television interview, 30 March 1978, cited in 
Oxford Dictionazy ofOuotations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 148. 
347 Jeremy Rosner, ''NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle," Foreign Affairs, 
July/August 1996, p. 9. 
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1. The Effects of Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion 
The primary factor concerning the Russian Federation is the official policy of 
opposition to NATO expansion and its effects on the West. The Russians understand that 
their forceful opposition, replete with veiled threats of a renewed East-West confrontation 
and military responses, has effectively delayed any serious decisions about inviting new 
members to join the alliance. As Anatol Lieven wrote, "Russian observers are also fairly 
optimistic that divisions within NATO itself will stop NATO expansion."348 The Russian 
government is attempting to exploit those divisions by emphasizing the negative effects that 
NATO expansion will have on relations with Russia. This policy is directed towards the 
"Russia First" elements in Western leadership circles that fear the onset of a Cold Peace 
with Russia. These "Russia Firsters" continue to believe, as analyst James Brusstar argued: 
... that the West should not only refrain from immediately granting 
NATO membership to Central Europe, but should place its highest priority 
on security cooperation with Russia. 
Moreover, incorporation ofthe countries of Central Europe into the 
Western defense alliances would not significantly enhance Western security. 
In fact, an attempt to incorporate them into the West would decrease 
Western security because Russia would then adopt a much more 
confrontational stance. 349 
The Western leaders that support these ideas understand that Russia probably would not 
attempt to stop NATO expansion by the use of military force, partly due to the current 
inability of its armed forces to project much conventional power beyond Russia's borders, 
but they fear that Russia would act to damage other strategic Western interests. The 
following comprehensive list of important Western interests that could be imperiled by the 
Russian reaction to NATO expansion was compiled by senior analysts at RAND: 
... accelerating the reintegration of the CIS and turning it into a 
counter-bloc to NATO; increasing pressure on Ukraine and the Baltic states; 
building up Russia's military presence in forward areas (Belarus, 
Kaliningrad, or Moldova); abrogating arms-control agreements, such as the 
348 Anatol Lieven, "Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion," World Today, October 
1995, p. 199. 
349 James Brusstar, "Russian Vital Interests and Western Security," Orbis, Fall1994, p. 
617. 
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CFE Treaty or START II Treaty; opting out of the PFP; curtailing bilateral 
defence cooperation with Western countries; and reducing cooperation in the 
UN on an array of issues, ranging from Iraq to Bosnia. 350 
The fear of a Cold Peace that would wreck the recent advances made in East-West relations 
exists within elements ofNATO's leadership, including the United States. The Russians, 
through their policy of forceful opposition, have played on this fear and have successfully 
created serious doubts within the leadership of the Atlantic Alliance and delayed its actual 
expansion. 
The current Russian statist foreign policy, which evolved from the Atlanticist foreign 
policy in effect immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is supported by a 
consensus among the majority of political factions in Russia, and it will in all probability 
continue for the foreseeable future. This statist foreign policy, of which opposition to 
NATO expansion is an integral part, supports the protection of a certain definition of 
Russian national interests, even at the expense of worsening relations with the West. "In 
the view of the Russian establishment, NATO expansion is directed against Russia, and 
Russia's permanent national interests dictate opposition to this process.''351 Opposition to 
NATO expansion has become much more than a policy issue for high-level decision-makers. 
The internal political dynamics of the Russian state have placed the issue in the arena of 
domestic politics. In the past few years, the centrist and far-right factions have used the 
issue to discredit the Y eltsin administration and to gain influence over the government. As 
a result, this emotional issue has been in the public eye and cannot be overlooked by the 
constantly maneuvering political factions. Journalist Anatol Lieven, describing the Russian 
domestic political scene in late 1995, explained that, 
... in opposing this [NATO] expansion, Russian politicians can only 
gain domestic support. All significant Russian political parties and blocs are 
now opposed to expansion, including the only remaining powerful liberal 
grouping, Grigory Yavlinsky's 'Yabloko' bloc. The handful of radical 
350 Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee, ''NATO Expansion: The Next 
Steps," Survival, Spring 1995, p. 21. 
351 Lieven, "Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion," p. 196. 
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'Atlanticists' who view NATO expansion neutrally or favourably are by now 
politically insignificant. ... 352 
This situation was solidified by the results of the December 1995 parliamentary elections 
and the June/July 1996 Presidential election. NATO expansion will remain a highly 
sensitive issue in Russian domestic politics, necessitating a policy of forceful opposition by 
any political faction that hopes to maintain the support of the voters and ensure itself a role 
in government. 
President Yeltsin, the most powerful political leader in Russia, has whole-heartedly 
accepted the statist foreign policy and its opposition to NATO expansion. It is almost 
certain that his successor, after his death or retirement or the next presidential election, 
would share in his support for this policy. All three of the men that today appear the most 
likely to succeed Yeltsin oppose NATO expansion and support the statist foreign policy. 
The three men, Lebed, the recently fired head of the Security Council, Chernomyrdin, the 
Russian Prime Minister, and Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party, have all publicly 
stated their opposition to NATO expansion and would be unable to alter this policy without 
incurring serious political damage. The liberal leaders that support a return to an Atlanticist 
foreign policy have been almost totally discredited by the mainstream political factions. The 
only dissenting factions with any real support are the extreme nationalists that promote a 
neo-imperial foreign policy, which not only violently opposes NATO expansion, but would 
intrigue to place Central Europe back under Russian domination. As a result, it is doubtful 
that the current statist foreign policy will be altered in the foreseeable future. Even if it 
should be changed, it would probably be replaced by a foreign policy that continues to 
oppose NATO expansion. 
It would appear that the Russian government does not maintain a monolithic 
opposition to NATO expansion. Official and private statements have led many Western 
analysts to believe that Russia would not be willing to take extreme actions to prevent the 
states of Central Europe from attaining membership in the alliance. Lieven contends that, 
"if NATO expansion explicitly stops with Visegrad, then it is probable that Moscow will 
352 Ibid., p. 197. 
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eventually accept this, albeit resentfully."353 Though the Russians may accept the 
admission of the states of Central Europe to NATO membership with no more than heated 
rhetoric, it is probable that they would be unwilling to allow the same for the Baltic states 
without some sort of active response. The weakness of the Russian economy and armed 
forces may preclude action in Central Europe, but Russia would be able to make trouble on 
its borders, particularly in the Baltic states and Ukraine. Some segments of the Russian 
political elite would probably support a Russian invasion of the Baltic states or Ukraine, if 
they were accepted for NATO membership. Others, however, might well be deterred by the 
prospects of war with NATO if Russia attacked states identified be NATO as probable new 
members. Even if this extreme measure was not carried out, it would certainly be possible 
for the Russians to foment civil unrest in Estonia and Latvia, and to a lesser extent 
Lithuania, through the use of the Russian minorities in these states. Such actions could be 
combined with stringent economic sanctions in an attempt to destabilize these states. 
Despite the Baltic states' earnest attempts to restructure their trade towards the West, all 
three states rely on Russian raw materials and energy, as do Ukraine and many Western 
states. Economic "warfare", conducted in conjunction with Russian-sponsored civil unrest, 
might prove to be a useful strategy to force the Baltic states to adopt a policy of"friendly 
neutrality" towards the Russian Federation. Through its forceful opposition, Russia has 
been able to decisively influence thinking in NATO countries about the risks involved in 
expansion. In the absence of strong political will within NATO, the Russians may be able 
to continue delaying expansion far into the future. 
2. The Role of American Leadership within NATO 
The primary factor concerning the United States is the role of American leadership 
within the Atlantic alliance. Strong American leadership will be needed ifNATO leaders 
are to overcome doubts caused by Russian opposition and actually add new members to the 
alliance. In the past, leadership provided by the United States, and specifically the 
American President, was required to convince the allies to make difficult decisions in the 
face of opposition or divergent national interests. American leadership is even more critical 
353 Ibid. 
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in the post-Cold War era, because the threat to the security ofWestem Europe is much 
more vague and poorly understood. Analysts Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Stephen 
Larrabee wrote the following about the future of NATO expansion: 
US leadership will be critical, especially after the debacle in Bosnia. 
The US President must be directly and forcefully engaged to forge the 
necessary consensus, both among the Allies and in Congress, for expansion. 
Europe will follow and Russia will acquiesce only if the United States 
provides the requisite leadership and vision to expand the Atlantic and 
European communities .... 354 
As oflate, there has been no strong American leadership within the alliance to resolutely 
guide the expansion process towards the admission of new members. 
During the period from late 1993 to late 1996, the Clinton administration maintained 
a "Russia First" mentality that precluded taking resolute action towards expansion, despite 
rhetoric asserting American support for NATO expansion. The administration appeared to 
fear that a rapid or robust expansion of the alliance might damage Russian-American 
relations and create a Cold Peace. Such an outcome would have invalidated the American 
foreign policy of the last four years and would have conveyed the impression that the 
Clinton administration was burdened with foreign policy naivete. The administration's past 
pronouncements that Russia was a friendly and democratic country within the family of 
Western nations might then have been ciassified as "wishful thinking" and might have 
proved to be a grave political liability. The perception that a young and inexperienced 
president, focused on domestic issues, had squandered the gains of the Cold War decades 
might have caused irreparable political damage to both the Clinton administration and the 
Democratic Party. As a result, even with Clinton's election to a second term, it is possible 
that the critical lack of American leadership within the alliance will continue and that NATO 
expansion will continue to be hesitant and slow, or will even remain "on hold" indefinitely, 
in deference to Russian sensitivities. 
3. A Final Obstacle: The United States Senate 
354 Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," p. 32. 
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Even with strong American leadership within the alliance, NATO expansion would 
have to face one final obstacle in the United States, ratification by the Senate. It might 
prove to be a difficult task to muster the sixty-seven votes needed to clear this hurdle. A 
modem version of the unexpected political grouping that opposed ratification of the North 
Atlantic Treaty may reform. In 1949, "the Truman administration faced opposition from 
three elements: isolationists, defense hawks, and liberal intemationalists.-"355 During the 
Cold War, these elements did not significantly oppose the expansion ofNATO to include 
Greece, Turkey, West Germany, and Spain. However, now that the looming Soviet menace 
is gone, elements of these three diverse factions are once again questioning the need to 
expand NATO into Central Europe. This modem political triangle encompasses 
.. .isolationists opposed to further security commitments, 
internationalists who see enlargement as antagonistic to Russia and 
unnecessary for the region's political and economic development and 
security, and hawks who worry that the additional states will weaken the 
alliance's defenses, strain the current members' shrinking military resources, 
and risk leaks of sensitive information. 356 
This odd combination of factions crosses party lines and tends to include the 
moderate Senators of both parties_ Thus it is possible that a combination of liberal and 
moderate Democrats, and moderate Republican defense hawks or isolationists could muster 
the thirty-four votes needed to stop NATO expansion. The viability of this political triangle 
rests on the character of the Senate that resulted from the 1996 elections. An unusually 
large number of moderate senators from both parties retired and a radicalization of the 
Senate may therefore occur. The question remains as to whether the Republicans, who 
marginally strengthened their control of the Senate, will maintain the generally moderate 
tone of the Senate or join their fellow party members in the House and press for a more 
rapid enlargement. Either way, the Republican victory probably strengthened the chances 
for ratification ofNATO expansion_ Ratification could also have a much greater chance of 
success if the vote was seen within the Senate not as "a limited policy decision but as a 
355 Rosner, ''NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle," p. 15. 
356 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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broader referendum on whether the United States should continue to lead NATO or even 
remain a member. "'357 
4. The Enduring Baltic Security Question 
Even after a return of American leadership to the process of expanding the alliance 
and the expectation of a successful ratification by the Senate, the question of the security of 
the Baltic states would remain. These three states have justifiable moral- reasons for seeking 
admission into NATO. Their history of Russian and Soviet domination and exploitation 
makes them wary of future Russian intentions, while at the same time they are quickly 
evolving into Western-style democracies with free market economies. The cultural and 
historical ties of these states to Europe make them natural supporters of Western ideals and 
values. Their internal situation has been described as follows: 
... while acknowledging the importance of regional cooperation and 
of maintaining friendly relations with Russia, the Baltic states have 
unambiguously stated that their goal is to become full members of the 
European Union and NATO--the two organizations they believe can anchor 
them to the West and provide real security--as soon as possible. 
Neutrality or non-alignment as a foreign-policy option is widely and 
firmly rejected. 358 
Despite their desire to join NATO and their moral justifications for doing so, these 
states may not be considered by the alliance for membership. They do not yet meet all the 
requirements specified in the Study on NATO Enlargement. At the same time, the study 
does state that there is "no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new members to join the 
Alliance."359 Many critics ofBaltic membership refer to their poor defensibility and the 
possibility of a strategic over -stretch by the alliance. But this argument loses some of its 
validity when the poor state of the Russian military and the changing nature of war are 
taken into account. In the end, Russian opposition will play the critical role_ The final 
357 Ibid., p. 15. 
358 Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," 
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359 Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO Press Service, Brussels, September 1995, para. 
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decision on admission for the Baltic states into NATO will probably rest on the perceived 
effect it would have on Russia and what actions the Russians might take to prevent it from 
happening. 
B. POSSffiLE OUTCOMES AND CONSEQUENCES OF NATO EXPANSION 
Distinct approaches to NATO expansion would obviously have different 
consequences for European security. In the face of continued Russian opposition, NATO 
will have to decide how it will expand, or if it will fulfill its "pledge" to remain open for new 
memberships at all. Three different outcomes appear plausible. First, no expansion will 
take place. Second, the addition of new members will be carried out in an unmotivated 
fashion by a leaderless alliance, resulting in a slow, weak, and, most likely, ineffective 
expansion. Finally, new members will be promptly invited to join a well-led and energetic 
alliance, resulting in a strong and resolute expansion. The consequences are not necessarily 
specific to any one outcome, nor is there any guarantee that an outcome will produce a 
certain consequence. However, there is some probability that specific consequences will be 
caused by certain outcomes. 
If the Atlantic Alliance, without strong American leadership and split by doubts 
created by forceful Russian opposition, were to make the unlikely, but not impossible, 
decision not to take on new members, Central Europe would be left in a "no man's land" 
between NATO and Russia. A probable consequence of this inaction would be chronic 
instability in the region. Though it is possible that Central Europe, if left as a neutral zone, 
could independently develop into a community of prosperous and democratic states, it is 
highly unlikely. The region, rife with ethnic fault-lines and opportunities for irredentism, 
has only just begun to recover economically and still has a weak tradition of democracy. 
Without inclusion in an overarching Western security structure, Central Europe might 
quickly fall into the trap of the "inter-war years." Insecurity, competing territorial claims, 
and local arms races would undoubtedly slow or reverse economic reforms and gradually 
replace the fledgling democracies with authoritarian states. In this state of security anarchy, 
the creation of effective alliances or a regional security bloc would be difficult and mutual 
animosity would probably pervade the unstable region. 
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This scenario ignores an improbable, but nonetheless possible, assertive Russian 
reaction. This reaction could take the form of renewed nee-imperialism in Central Europe, 
or more likely, the creation of multiple constantly shifting security blocs aligned with or 
against Russia. No matter which specific consequence occurred, the result would be 
insecurity on NATO's, and Germany's, eastern border. Though Germany is firmly 
integrated with the West, long-term insecurity to its east, especially if coupled with 
expanded Russian influence in Central Europe, could in the long term cause it to choose a 
path different from that of the rest of Western Europe. This distinct path could lead to a 
German-led security bloc in Central Europe or a renewed confrontation between Germany 
and Russia. Though it might be possible for Central Europe to develop independently, 
chronic instability and turmoil in Central Europe would, in all probability, be the result of 
NATO choosing not to expand. All of the probable consequences of a failure to accept new 
members on NATO's part would have very negative effects on European security. 
If the Atlantic Alliance, still without strong American leadership, but believing that it 
must expand or lose all credibility and risk internal disintegration, were to accept only a few 
new members in a slow and overly cautious manner, the consequences might be similar to 
the regional instability created by not expanding at all. It is possible that a hesitant and 
ineffective expansion would fail to provide the necessary security structure and guarantees 
that might be needed by the insecure Central European states to ensure the growth of 
democracy and economic prosperity. A corollary to this scenario might be intermittent 
American leadership that alternately pressed for an active NATO expansion and retreated 
into a preoccupation with domestic issues, virtually ignoring its European security 
commitments. The unpredictable nature of this seemingly random "leadership" could fail to 
create enduring confidence within the Central European states and result in a situation 
closely resembling a total lack of American leadership. Thus, despite NATO's claim that it 
had fulfilled its pledge, most of Central and Eastern Europe would still be doomed to exist 
in a state of security uncertainty and instability. This situation would again create insecurity 
on NATO's eastern border and fail to safeguard democracy and economic reforms in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
130 
Another possible negative consequence of this action would be the Russian reaction. 
Any type of expansion, whether slow and ineffective or strong and resolute, runs the risk of 
souring East-West relations. The result could be a Cold Peace, or even a return to Cold 
War, between NATO and a strengthened Russian-dominated CIS. A Cold Peace would be 
characterized by hostile political relations with only some limited cooperation in economic 
areas. Both sides would need to maintain higher levels of defense spending to ensure their 
security across a sharply defined inter-European dividing line or new "Iron Curtain". A 
Cold War, which would be unlikely considering the state of the Russian economy, would 
involve a renewed offensive Russian military threat to Western Europe and a return to the 
policy of containment for NATO. The worst possible consequence that an ineffective 
NATO expansion could produce, short of an armed conflict between NATO and Russia, 
would be a combination of instability in Central Europe and a Cold Peace or Cold War. 
The likelihood of this combination may not be high, but there is a strong possibility that an 
ineffective NATO expansion would have one or more negative consequences for European 
security. 
If the Atlantic Alliance, with confident American leadership, added new members in 
a rapid and resolute manner, the chances for chronic instability in Central Europe would be 
very small. However, this type of expansion would be far more likely to provoke the 
Russian reaction of a Cold Peace or a renewed Cold War. 
A resolute NATO expansion could legitimately take two forms, and each could 
greatly affect the Russian reaction. The first form, which would probably incite the 
strongest reaction, would entail expansion with an "open door" policy. The second form, 
which would attempt to take Russian national interests into account, would be an advertised 
"limited expansion." 
An "open door expansion" would involve the rapid admission of the Visegrad Four 
states, followed by the gradual entry of other Central and Eastern European states, with the 
possible inclusion of Russia in the distant future. If successful, this expansion would 
stabilize democracy and free market reforms across Eurasia and greatly enhance European 
security. This type of expansion would depend on (a) Russian acceptance of the Baltic 
states and Ukraine as NATO members, (b) Russian acknowledgment that an expanded 
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NATO would not threaten Moscow's political and security interests, or (c) NATO's ability 
to discourage Russian dominance of the CIS, to ensure that Russia would not become 
strong enough to effectively oppose NATO expansion on Russia's borders. None of these 
three requirements would be easy to fulfill. Russia would probably attempt to ensure that 
the Baltic states, and especially Ukraine, did not join NATO. The West's ability to 
influence the non-Russian members of the CIS is limited and would probably not be strong 
enough to prevent Russian domination of the region. This type of expansion would also 
assume that Ukraine, and later Russia, would seek admission into NATO, which might in 
fact not take place. In the end, the "open door" form of expansion would be very risky and 
would probably result in a new dividing line across Europe. Russia would be motivated to 
increase its hold over the other CIS countries and to terminate some arms control 
agreements with the West, such as the CFE and START Treaties. A Cold Peace or Cold 
War would probably replace the current, relatively cooperative, state of East-West 
relations. In this case, the security of certain Central European states would be enhanced by 
their admission into NATO, while European security in general would be degraded by the 
confrontation between NATO and the Russian-dominated CIS. 
An advertised "limited expansion" would involve the rapid admission of the 
Visegrad Four states, followed by the gradual entry of the other Central European states, 
including Austria, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. As expansion started, in deference to 
Russian security concerns, Russia would be given guarantees that NATO would not admit 
any of the former Soviet republics. At the same time, the Baltic states would be given 
promises that they would still be eligible for EU membership. The leaders of the European 
Union nations would then have to press for a rapid admission of the Baltic states into the 
EU to reassure them that they remain in the family ofWestern nations. Admittance to the 
EU would give the Baltic states some implied security guarantees, but ones that would be 
much more palatable to Russia than NATO membership would be. The expanded NATO 
would also create strong ties with Ukraine to ensure that economic reforms and 
democratization in that state would continue. This type of expansion, which would create 
stability in Central Europe while taking Russian national interests into account, would also 
reduce the possibility of an extreme Russian reaction. While a Cold Peace or, though not 
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very likely, a Cold War could result, the Russian reaction would probably consist of heated 
comments and a strengthening of the Russian-dominated CIS, while East-West relations 
would cool but remain sufficiently satisfactory. Thus, European security would be 
enhanced by the admission of the nations of Central Europe into NATO and continued 
constructive relations with Russia. The critical point would be to ensure that the Baltic 
states and Ukraine could retain their independence and continue to act as a bridge between 
East and West. 360 
NATO expansion is not the only important issue that will affect the stability and 
security of Europe. Many of the vital arguments in the debate over NATO expansion could 
easily become of secondary concern if there were to be a major crisis involving the leading 
states of Europe. A critical event, such as a violent succession struggle in Russia, ethnic 
conflict in Central Europe, or a Russian-Ukrainian conflict, could rapidly overshadow the 
issue ofNATO expansion as a primary determinant of European security and stability. 
While NATO expansion is only one of the many factors that will have an effect on the 
future ofEurope, it may be one of the most influential factors in the near future. 
The best possible outcome for European security would be a strong and robust 
NATO expansion, regardless of continued Russian opposition. This expansion would have 
stated geographic limits so as to minimize the risks of the Russians taking rash actions that 
could negatively affect European security. Despite these limits, NATO would not abandon 
the in~endent and democratic Baltic states or Ukraine to a Russian sphere of influence. 
The Baltic states would be offered EU membership while Ukraine would be linked with the 
West through other institutions and programs of cooperation. All of this would require 
resolute American leadership within the Atlantic Alliance and United States Senate 
ratification of specific NATO enlargement agreements. 
360 Some of the basic ideas stated in this section can be found in Richard Kugler, Enlarging 
NATO: The Russia Factor (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), Chapters 6-7. Though the 
author's specific ideas differ in many important ways from those in Enlarging NATO, some 
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